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The Quest for World Order



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The Quest for World Order

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

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CONFERENCE ON CONDITIONS OF WORLD ORDER—JUNE 12–19, 1965, VILLA SERBELLONI, BELLAGIO, ITALY

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Preface to the Issue "The Quest for World Order"

THREE TIMES IN THIS CHAOTIC CENTURY, presidents of the United States have assumed responsibility for directing others to what they assumed would be the establishment of a new world order. The efforts of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt were serious, though flawed; that of George Bush, essentially trivial, is no longer even spoken about. The two terrible wars of this century substantially increased the power and reputation of the American presidency, making it possible for a latecomer to those conflicts to take the lead in defining what the postwar world should be. This has not happened since the end of the Cold War. The United States, like much of the rest of the world, is at sea today, having neither a compass nor a chart to guide its foreign policy efforts.

Because almost no one, as late as 1988, predicted the early demise of the Soviet Union's far-flung empire, the most outlandish theories circulated about what the results of that unexpected "victory" would be. It was not only in the pages of *Dædalus* that authors familiar with the Soviet Union argued against an excessive "triumphalism," knowing its dangers. In late 1995, more than six years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of communist

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regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there is no agreement about what principles exist to guide those who bear some responsibility for restoring national and international confidences.

This has been the theme of several recent issues of *Dædalus*, most particularly, the Spring 1995 issue, "What Future for the State?" and now, "The Quest for World Order." Each, in its own way, continues a dialogue opened in the summer of 1993 with an issue entitled "Reconstructing Nations and States," intended to be something more than a study of "the creation of new states, emerging from the ruins of a Soviet domination now largely extinct." The demise of the Soviet Union, having "generated new reflection on all manner of subjects relating to empire, multinational states, international organization, and capitalism itself," could not fail to be accounted one of the capital events of the century, in many ways as significant as the two world wars. The "Cold War" preoccupations were clearly passing, and the time had come to consider what the political, economic, and social consequences of the new conditions would be.

"What Future for the State?" sought to answer questions about how the major technological changes of recent years have affected states' sovereignty, whether there has been a loss of authority to other entities, whether international trade and finance are creating new kinds of competitions, where "industrial policy and trade policy are becoming more important than defense and foreign policy." If this is happening, then the older preoccupations of historians and political scientists with war and peace, with all those issues that seemed so formidably difficult in the years of American-Soviet nuclear rivalry, recede in importance, replaced by a new agenda that makes questions of economic growth and social well-being all-important. In this very new international setting, domestic politics are necessarily affected, with the globalizing tendencies making new kinds of international cooperation imperative.

Precisely thirty years ago, in Bellagio, the late Raymond Aron led a seminar titled "Conditions of World Order." The report of that conference, prepared by Stanley Hoffmann and published in *Dædalus* in the spring of 1966, and reprinted in this volume, has as much relevance today as it did then. These discussions, so

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redolent of their time, when "planning" was thought to be the panacea that would obliterate social differences and create unprecedented levels of productivity, have their late twentieth-century analog in the new beliefs in what "markets" will do, how much the prosperity and peace of the universe depend on productivity and trade. Indeed, both have become the new "godheads" of late twentieth-century social science, in some quarters at least. As Hoffmann made abundantly clear in his comments, he was not at all certain of "the extent to which the new forms of interdependence would create not only the 'minimum conditions of coexistence,' but also a genuine community of values and of power—one world in the sense of philosophical agreement on 'the good life' and political harmony."

The conference, in Hoffmann's view, demonstrated "the truth of Marx's proposition—that mankind raises only those problems it can solve." Very large issues, including those that related to migrations, communications, access to information and to scarce resources hardly figured. Indeed, even matters as central as the population explosion were largely absent from the discussions. As Hoffmann wrote, "We used the word democracy rather than the word freedom, and we all politely mentioned Hitler whenever we wanted to blast villainy or to blame irrationality. In a world in which the regime of Spain could prevent a Spanish professor from coming to our meeting, our wisdom may have been cowardice." Still, this did not prevent him from seeing that Kant's essay on universal history may indeed be the prophetic one, with nations uniting "as a result of the negative process of increasingly costly wars and the positive process of increasing material interdependence."

The Bellagio conference of 1965 owed an enormous amount to the chairmanship of Raymond Aron. In the essay, "The Anarchical Order of Power," which originally appeared in the Spring 1966 issue and is reprinted here, Aron argued that the existence of legally sovereign states made for rivalry, and that competitiveness could not be "corrected by the growth of commercial transactions between countries." The universal diffusion of advanced technology did not invalidate traditional diplomacy. The recourse to violence, within states and between states, was a constant hazard and could not be eliminated, which did not mean that some sort of

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order could not be created out of the anarchy common to all international systems. In Aron's view, there had been a blurring of the distinction between war and peace; what he described as the "bellicose peace" involved "the permanent mobilization of the nuclear apparatus, the limited use of military force here and there throughout the world, the qualitative race for armaments, with each of the major powers devoting billions and billions of dollars to the development of bombs, missiles, planes, and more highly perfected conventional weapons." All this made "total war less probable—that monstrous and absurd war in which thermonuclear powers heap upon one another, as in an orgy of destruction, all the means of destruction at their disposal."

Aron believed that the principal cause of this limitation of violence in the contemporary world was "psychological," which was not the same thing as believing that wars began in the minds of men. Rather, "the very limitless nature" of atomic armament created the "atomic taboo." Aron predicted the rise of China, the dissolution of the Soviet camp, and what he called the "'nationalization' of the Marxist-Leninist religions." More than that, he wrote, "The superpowers will have to resign themselves to giving up their presence in the four corners of the globe."

When one considers that Aron wrote all this when the United States was heavily engaged in Vietnam, when many Americans believed that this was the significant watershed in post-1945 world history, one is better able to appreciate his prescience. While Americans had eyes only for the conflict in Southeast Asia, a more dispassionate analysis of the conditions that obtained at the time, that took into account a longer historic record, emerged with a substantially different story. So, today, when there is so much concern with what a successful market economy will do to revive democracy even in those parts of the world where it is fragile, or with what must be done to resolve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the temptation to see foreign policy as a set of discrete problems, each waiting for resolution, is almost overwhelming. Yet, it is precisely this kind of problem-solving habit that needs to be questioned. To put the matter bluntly, the collapse of the Soviet Union has made the West almost feckless in its enthusiasm for its capitalist system, no longer called that, and in its expectation that

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foreign policy may now take a "holiday," that the West's problems are largely internal.

These are very serious errors. The great challenge of the moment is the same one as preoccupied those who met in Bellagio three decades ago, which is not to say that the problems are the same. They have to do with creating the institutions and devising the principles of international competition that will create a greater stability. Specifically, what is one to say about NATO? Is the time for "alliances" past or is there as great a need for them today as when the Soviet Union existed? If so, what purposes are alliances to serve? Where are the hazards in today's world? Do they exist in "rogue elephants" capable of disrupting the world's supply of vital resources, harboring weapons able to create havoc? And if there is no longer any ideological system like communism capable of creating fear in many quarters, what are the "revolutionary movements" of our time that warrant watching? Can whole continents be written off as too poor, too disordered, or is this a form of wishful thinking, comparable to what certain societies imagine they can do in restricting immigration, in keeping unwanted elements out? Has the faith in science and technology become substantially more nuanced, or are we still witnessing an almost uncritical belief in what each can bring to a world increasingly distracted by the novel inventions of our day? Even more fundamentally, have we taken in the full significance of the events of this chaotic century?

"The Quest for World Order" continues a discussion that has been proceeding in the pages of *Dædalus* for several decades. It is a comment on our age that in the absence of an obvious foe—an acknowledged enemy—there has been a fragmenting of opinion, a growth of inattention to what are in fact the continuing issues of our time, scarcely made obsolescent by the end of communist rule in Europe. To understand the fin de siècle in all its complexity requires an understanding of the whole century, and not only in Europe or the United States. It is appropriate, therefore, that the novelty of our time be seen as something other than what it appeared to be at the moment of mass euphoria, characteristic of 1989. The essay "What is Security?," by Emma Rothschild, seeks to explain how the concept of "common security" or "human security," sometimes spoken of as "extended security," goes sub-

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stantially beyond anything common during the Cold War years, though the roots of today's preoccupations are to be found even then. While many who wrote in 1989 imagined they were witnessing a revival of the pre-1914 world—as it had existed in Europe, where frontiers were breached without passports and trade flowed freely, creating the illusion of commerce guaranteeing peace, as Norman Angell perceived it—in Rothschild's view, we are returning not to a world of Kaisers and Kings, but to one where the philosophers of the eighteenth century speak to us with authority on international affairs. In our present concern with security, defined not as the security of nations but of individuals and groups, we are moving from a preoccupation with military matters to one where political, economic, and social issues figure much more prominently.

The new rhetoric of human security, as it is currently evolving, is in many respects like the old eighteenth-century rhetoric on natural and international rights. It evokes recollections of Kant and Condorcet, but also of Montesquieu and Adam Smith. This, again, is an idea rarely suggested by those whose attention is limited to the purported revolution created by universal markets. Rothschild, believing that "the long militarization of continental (or intercontinental) political confrontation has come to an at least temporary end," recognizes that "the insistence on human rights, and the preoccupation with the 'internalization' of politics—were also the preoccupations of Enlightenment liberalism." For her, those philosophies live today as they have not for much of this century.

If, as Rothschild believes, the "new policies of individual and international security are likely to be a continuing feature of politics in the post-Cold War period, there will have to be new reflection on the principles of international justice." "Deterrence," but of "a new, enlightened, and internationalist complexion," will need to be thought of, and this will not be an easy task. If the "old liberal projects" of the eighteenth century are indeed revived, they will depend on new actors—nongovernmental organizations and nongovernmental individuals. To recognize how the "new international politics of civil society, like the politics of individual security, is founded on old and important political ideas," is more than a plea to recall what men as different as Alexis de Tocqueville and

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Leonard Woolf argued for, emphasizing the idea of "multiple, minimal identities," guaranteeing the kind of liberty Judith Shklar saw as the quintessential expression of liberalism: "to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom."

Is all this prophecy of a "new world order"? Not at all. Rothschild, recognizing that there is a "crisis of liberal internationalism," knows that there is another crisis, less universally acknowledged, but even more serious. She speaks of the "crisis of conservatism," which "revered nothing in the state, excepting only its military power." The disorderly world of the present, which seems to threaten only liberal beliefs, may in fact constitute an even greater danger for Cold War conservatism. Democracy, by definition, is dominated by "interests and passions," by fantasies and disorder, but it is the sole guarantor of the free and equal discussion that John Stuart Mill prized. Such discussion, between individuals, groups, and whole societies, is a present prospect; it justifies the belief that the world has indeed turned a corner, away from conditions that have existed for all of this century and much of the last.

Emma Rothschild's essay, and not only because of its references to Castlereagh and Talleyrand, the subject of Henry Kissinger's first published book, is an admirable introduction to a speech, substantially revised, that Kissinger delivered in London in March 1995, at a conference in celebration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Kissinger's interest is to revive and restore a European-American relationship, to insist on the role that Britain needs to play to achieve that end. The "special relation"—the creation of World War II—waits to be converted into a broader association, and cannot be based simply on occasional consultation or extensive commercial dealings. Nor, for that matter, can it be based on nostalgic reminiscences of battles jointly fought and victories jointly won. Kissinger, speaking from his American experience, recounts what has changed in the United States, making the old Northeastern "establishment" a thing of the past. Recalling the trauma of Vietnam, and what it did to mark a generation, the one that holds power in Washington today, Kissinger knows that this is not the group that crafted the victory over Nazi Germany or

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established the institutions to thwart Stalin's ambitions. Today, he detects the "beginning of a national debate" that will require the United States to devise and "conduct a global foreign policy without an overwhelming ideological enemy, without a clear-cut strategic plan, and in a world that it can neither dominate nor withdraw from." What does this imply? That the country will again need to define its national interest in a way that recognizes two principles: first, that it is against America's interest to see any region of the world, whether in Europe or Asia, dominated by a single country or group of countries able to pursue policies hostile to the interests of the United States; second, that Americans accept to "participate in a world community where global concerns, whether in respect to economies, communications, or technology are acknowledged." Kissinger knows that "provincialism," despite the rhetoric of certain European politicians, is not an American monopoly. He knows also that economic policy can never be the whole of foreign policy.

Recognizing that Europe and the United States confront common problems, and that these can be best met by adopting "parallel approaches," Kissinger argues for a revival of the American alliance with Europe, in a form suited to the needs of a world no longer dominated by fear of the Soviet Union. In realizing this, the United Kingdom has an important role to play. The old "special relation" is no longer enough; Kissinger does not delude himself, as others do, that it can be replaced by one with Germany. There are six or seven major global players in the world, and it is simplistic to believe that the United States, because of its military strength, is in a position to resolve international crises.

Kissinger, with exceptional candor, writes, "We can talk—as we do periodically—about a Pacific Community, but anybody studying the relations of Japan, China, Korea, the Asian part of Russia, and even India must acknowledge that, at this stage, their relations are more like those that existed between nineteenth-century European states than between twentieth-century European states. And, if we move to the area to the south of Europe, the growth of fundamentalism there poses not just an indirect but an explicit challenge to world order of a kind that does not exist in the heart of Europe. By linking religion and politics in a missionary concept that purports to be the only valid answer to contemporary politi-

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cal, social, and economic issues, in certain respects an explicit reaction to the material philosophies that have been dominant in the West, it challenges Western values across the board."

The opinion beginning to emerge in the United States has to be engaged in a dialogue with the new European opinion. Security issues, in Kissinger's view, can no longer figure as the principal components of a European-American alliance: "What is really needed today is for both the United States and the European Union, together with those democratic states who are not EU members to fashion together a global policy, geared not to enemies—the security danger linked to potential threats—but to global opportunities." Kissinger speaks with the freedom that a former Secretary of State enjoys, going substantially beyond what politicians, responding to daily crises, are permitted to speak about.

If the world today is largely preoccupied with events in the Balkans, the explosive situation in Bosnia, it has eyes also—though they are frequently averted for political reasons—on conditions that obtain in the Muslim world, in North Africa but also in the Middle East. Gilles Kepel, writing about the Islamist political movements in Egypt and Algeria, of great concern to France, which ought to be more preoccupying for both Europe and the United States, explains how these movements originated, how they differ, keeping in mind that their common purpose is to create an "Islamic state," faithful to the sacred texts of Islam. Though there are substantial differences in how each perceives that objective, both take for granted that the existing Egyptian and Algerian states need to be fundamentally changed.

The violence that erupted in Egypt in the summer of 1993, with attempts on the lives of the Prime Minister, but also the Ministers of Interior and Information, was a revolutionary challenge. The Egyptian government responded by cracking down on the militants, breaking its "gentleman's agreement with the conservative Islamist movement," and favoring more secularist groups. Official propaganda represented the terrorists as the "bedouin Islam" of the Saudis, "strangers to the traditions of Egypt." On the surface, the policy appears to have succeeded, but Kepel knows that the game is not over. The militants, seeking support from the more miserable elements in Cairo, a city where "the infrastructures of the lower-class districts are crumbling," believe that by providing

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health, education, and transport to these vast, impoverished populations, they will win their favor.

In Algeria, the situation is different. There, the principal re-Islamization movement is of more recent origin, founded shortly after the popular uprising that led to the state created by the National Liberation Front (FLN) to collapse. As Kepel makes clear, "in record time, the Islamist party succeeded in exercising undisputed leadership, acquiring control of the social fabric, dominating the political scene," and doing this by winning the majority of the mosques and its leaders to their cause. By June 1990, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) controlled a large majority of the town halls, and scored an even more important victory in the first round of the legislative elections held in December 1991. Those results, annulled by the military in January 1992, created anger and fury, and not only among the original militants, leading to an agitation that is still not spent. The FIS represents itself today as the incarnation of what the original Algerian revolution was intended to accomplish, that the FLN in the end betrayed. The state is said to be in the hands of an oligarchy, a caste of powerful rich men unconcerned with the underprivileged or the new elites trained in the mass educational institutions set up after Independence. The young graduates, having never received the posts they imagined would come to them, argue for "social justice according to the Koran," a phrase that is wonderfully ambiguous. Their purpose is not to do away with the state, but to "Islamize" it, to make it truly Algerian. While the army remains in control, it has not been able to reassert its authority over all regions of the country. Within the FIS, there is disagreement about what policies are most likely to achieve the "Islamization" thought to be the country's salvation. The urban middle class remains disaffected, and there is no certainty that state power will quickly be reestablished, in either a Western or an Islamic form.

If Kissinger is correct that this linking of religion and politics "challenged Western values across the board," a very different kind of challenge is posed by the poverty and disorder characteristic of much of sub-Saharan Africa, a region wracked by what Jennifer Widner sees as a Hobbesian war of all against all, with no Leviathans in sight. In her view, a state like Zaire may be properly defined as a "failed state," with comparable conditions existing in

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Chad, Sierra Leone, and Equatorial Guinea, though not in Botswana. Through planning and mobilization, Botswana was able to feed its hungry in a drought that was substantially more severe than the one that killed many hundreds of thousands in the Sudan and elsewhere in Africa.

Similar competencies exist in other African states. Widner writes of the superb judiciary in Zambia, of the excellent public works record of Côte d'Ivoire, of civil servants able to carry out the tasks assigned to them in many African states, being unafraid to take responsibility for their actions. Because GDP growth is not by itself a conclusive index of institutional performance, Widner considers what individual citizens receive for the money that states expend. Strong states have generally invested heavily in education and health, the "luxuries of the urban elite," and those states able to maintain expenditures at relatively high levels have often succeeded in keeping children in primary schools.

In some parts of Africa, however, the problem is not one of "ineffective government but the collapse of political order," as in Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, and the Sudan. Chad, Burundi, eastern Zaire, Togo, and the Congo are in scarcely better condition. These states failed when violence could no longer be controlled. Governmental capacity needs to be built up in these states, much as it has in other parts of the world, and African pressure groups have begun to work for new institutional arrangements. Knowing that there are limits to what these groups can accomplish, Widner refuses to guess whether "the champions of greater government effectiveness and fairness will succeed in redesigning states in Africa." The problems Africa faces are in many ways greater than those confronted by early modern Europe or Asia. In Widner's words, Africa remains "a difficult setting for state-formation." Creating order, curbing violence, and controlling the flow of arms are complex matters, not susceptible to easy solution. Also, heavy dependence on foreign aid itself inhibits stabilization. Still, as political liberalization occurs and new multiparty systems develop, Widner expects that there will be greater decentralization, changing the condition of many states.

While Widner's concern is with black Africa generally, David Apter considers a single state, Uganda. Understanding why monographic studies of individual African states are necessary, why it is

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hazardous, as Widner also emphasizes, to speak of whole continents, Apter's concern is to describe how Uganda, seeking to remedy the consequences of "many years of social disruption, dislocation, political instability, and violence," is striving to accomplish that purpose. Believing that Uganda, together with Ghana, is today the African country "with the best prospects for a return to democracy," Apter explains the consultative process that is taking place in the country as it seeks to frame a new constitution for itself. If the issues are superficially redolent of what happened before Independence in 1961, the differences are striking. Apter, contrasting what he terms the "consultative democracy" of today with the "tutelary democracy" of the last period of British rule, understands how much the years of violence have created conditions that make today's problems essentially different from those that existed in 1961. The free press is gone; so, also, is the good university, and the efficient civil service and political administration that linked the central government with provincial and local bodies.

The restoration of anything approaching "normalcy" is not likely to be easy. Reviewing the extraordinary range of problems that have plagued Museveni's government in the last nine years, to eliminate personal armies, control inflation, restore the confidence of foreigners in the government, and bring back the Asians exiled by Idi Amin calls for extraordinary skill. For Museveni's "consultative democracy model" to work, it is essential that the civil service be strengthened, that local government be reconstructed. Both have been formidable tasks. Still, the President, according to Apter, has "learned on the job," and is moving away from "a once-fashionable 'Dar-es-Salam leftism' to a more pragmatic and market oriented perspective." If poverty is more widespread today than in the colonial period, it is only one of many serious social conditions that cry out for remedy. In Apter's view, redefining the political sphere to help form a genuinely national and civil society is the most critical problem. Achieving that objective, he says, is going to require a respect for pluralism and an acceptance of compromise.

Apter, recognizing that these problems are not unique to Uganda, and are indeed not particular to Africa, sees them as comparable in many ways to what Europeans are debating in their discussions

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of subsidiarity. How, in short, can major problems of social and economic life be regulated by the lowest jurisdictions rather than the highest? Emphasizing the importance of a senior administrative service, professionality, and subsidiarity, Apter argues for the need "to bring people more directly into economic, social, and political activities" so that they can "simultaneously pursue their own as well as more collective interests." Localism, in his view, though obviously carrying its own hazards, has clear advantages, and needs to be supported in ways never previously thought of.

Because Africa is so frequently treated as a continent apart, it is refreshing to have Bogumil Jewsiewicki and V. Y. Mudimbe compare the post-Independence black African states with the post-Soviet European states. In their view, the experiences of both suggest how difficult it is to accept Max Weber's view of the state having a legitimate claim to the unrestricted use of violence. For them, as for so many others, there can be no justification for such a claim, carrying as it does the implication that state authority, even when it is autocratic, ought not to be resisted. In colonial Africa, as in Central and Eastern Europe, the intelligentsia played a role that merits critical examination. The relation between state and nation, ethnicity and language is not a simple one. The assumption that the nation creates the state goes counter to all factual evidence; the state "invents" the nation for its own purposes and then socializes the citizenry, creating the illusion of continuity. There is no "crisis of the state," but only a "proliferation of statism" and what Jewsiewicki and Mudimbe term a "statification" of identities and cultures.

Why is all this important? Because today, when globalization is becoming increasingly popular as a slogan, the twentieth-century state offers itself as "the unique political subject, the savior of the nation, legitimizing itself through the rationalization of the past, as produced by an invented historical discourse." The recent restructuring of states, the authors argue, has been caused principally by "crises of social and ideological structures" that individual states have not known how to respond to. The "subnational identities" that exploded after 1989 need to be seen as linked to the collapse of an earlier state legitimacy. This is as true in black Africa as in ex-communist Europe. In both places, the state is seen as the agent of history, correcting a past that is now thought to be

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abnormal. The best way to change the present, it is imagined, is to "correct the past." In this effort, myths are constructed, memories are erased, and the great accomplishment is to pretend that a real continuity exists. Implicit in this essay is a very simple truth: the agent of continuity is the state, not the nation.

To move from a consideration of those fragile states to one that is thought to be stable may seem incongruous. Yet, the problems of Sweden may be as paradigmatic of contemporary life as those that exist in Africa or Eastern Europe. Göran Rosenberg, in considering why Sweden, which saw itself as a forward-looking society, abandoned its liberal policies in respect to the admission of non-Swedes, refugees, the only immigrants still allowed to enter the country, tells a story that is too little known. After 1964, when the number of immigrants to Sweden grew rapidly, arriving primarily from Southern Europe rather than from the Nordic countries, discussion of the social and economic problems created by such immigration led to new regulation; the first restrictions on immigration were introduced in 1966. Labor immigration became virtually extinct, but a new kind of immigration was permitted—asylum. As Rosenberg makes clear, this was no longer a matter of immigrants helping Sweden economically, but of Sweden assuming a moral burden to help those seeking refuge. The decisions, made by a ruling political elite, with little regard for what Swedish public opinion favored, provoked many reactions in a "country where having an accent still remains a stigma," where certain communities were burdened with immigrant populations of substantial size.

Refugee reception became a matter of state responsibility, with substantial sums of public money expended to facilitate integration. Because there was so little public discussion of the whole issue, those who opposed it spoke of a "conspiracy" perpetrated by politicians to conceal the "true and hidden costs of immigration." The press did little to silence such speculation; indeed, its own stories only increased public doubts about the wisdom of the government's policies. The fact that all this happened in Sweden, a country known to be tolerant, suggests why the issue of immigration is so contentious, and why it is not only parties of the far Right who seek to exploit the issue. While many imagine that restrictions on the free movement of goods constitutes a major

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problem for the industrial democracies, free movement of populations is a far more incendiary matter.

If the resources of the world are unevenly divided, this is particularly true of human resources. John de la Mothe and Paul Dufour, knowing that the Group of Seven (G7) nations now employ more than three million professionally trained scientists and engineers, that there has been comparable though not equal expansion in less-developed countries, seek to consider what this portends. As the costs of doing scientific and technological research grow, governments are forced to reorganize their efforts. The ending of the Cold War has inevitably affected what governments are prepared to support. While countries like the United States, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom until recently spent a considerable part of their R&D budgets on military, space, and energy missions, countries like Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands were more concerned with technology diffusion and knowledge transfer. If science and technology expenditures are used as an index to describe technological advance, there are six leaders: the United States, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and Israel, with Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, and Canada falling into a category just below them. Such calculations, however, the authors explain, "can be misleading when questions of efficiency and quality arise." With the end of a bipolar world, the relative decline of American hegemony, and the rapid rise in the number of nation-states, other kinds of calculations are coming to the fore. De la Mothe and Dufour suggest that nations are increasingly being divided "between those that are 'catching up,' and those that are gradually being excluded."

There are more than one hundred states in the "excluded group," mostly in Africa and South America. Though more than 30 percent of the world's population lives in these states, together they account for less than 1 percent of the world's scientific publications, R&D expenditures, and patents. Because their contributions to the creation of scientific and technological knowledge are so very low, the authors argue, their prospects for economic growth are slim. It is difficult to imagine a twenty-first century world in which economic disparity is not very substantial.

If wealth-creation has become a preoccupation of all, this has not meant that an earlier government largesse in regard to science

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and technology is today undiminished. The recent world economic recession has had very large consequences for the support of science and technology, with new attention given to the utility of scientific research, to potential industrial applications. Such considerations, inevitably, have influenced the way in which science and technology policy is made and perceived: "Decision-making processes have become focused on short term, 'value for money' concerns. Some governments have reduced science and technology expenditures across the board so that the onus is now on science-based departments, national laboratories, and universities to 'do more with less.' Still other debates are concerned with whether the social sciences should be funded with public moneys or whether technology foresight and technology assessment capabilities are worthwhile activities." The authors, while acknowledging that the present parsimony may hurt the performance of the research system, take heart from the fact that "broad consensus is emerging across governments on the importance of science and technology. . . ." In their view, the research enterprise is too valuable to be scanted, and technical globalism will only increase the demand for international collaboration and cooperation. What all this will mean for the poorer countries of the world, it is difficult to know.

To be concerned with the "quest for world order" in the last decade of the twentieth century is to be preoccupied with a range of questions that are as much intellectual as political, that transcend the normal boundaries of what passes for economic or social wisdom. The world is certainly more fluid today than it was when Raymond Aron chaired the 1965 *Dædalus* conference at Bellagio. The difficulties, however, are no less acute, and the anxieties, though of a different sort, need to be acknowledged. There is in this issue of *Dædalus* a whole range of recommendations for "what is to be done," but all of them require a kind of transnational dialogue that is uncommon in our time. It is precisely to stimulate such discussion that The Pew Charitable Trusts provided the foundation support that initiated the study that has proved so important to us in recent years. A very great debt is owed that foundation. It is to be hoped that others will now contribute to this continuing dialogue, that it will be international and intergenerational. The second may be as important as the first.

S.R.G.

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Stanley Hoffmann

Report of the Conference on Conditions of World Order—June 12–19, 1965, Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy

I. A WORKING DEFINITION OF WORLD ORDER

UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP AND GUIDANCE of Raymond Aron, the twenty-one men who met at Bellagio from June 12 to June 19 in order to define conditions of World Order participated in a double experiment. One was intellectual—the attempt to discuss both the chances for and the obstacles to world order as they appear in 1965. It is this aspect of the seminar that will be covered primarily in this report. The other experiment was really an enterprise in collective psychology—a psychodrama of sorts. How would men coming from different countries, from different cultural and ideological backgrounds, from different professions and disciplines interpret the subject, lock horns, join issues, and reach conclusions? Would the meeting be a succession of monologues or a successful seminar? I will make some remarks about this aspect at the end.

Inevitably, the first session was devoted to a succession of monologues: each member was asked to state how he saw the problem of world order, the chairman hoping that the main themes would arise from those statements. Not only did the main themes arise, but what happened was like the beginning of a symphony in which all the themes of the piece are introduced, so that the rest of the symphony merely adds developments and variations, but no fresh theme. The metaphor breaks down in one respect only: those

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developments and variations were added not simply because of the skills of the various members of the group—composers capable of refining their themes, if not of inventing new ones—but because of the conductor's subtle and energetic interventions. Aron's leadership prodded the seminar into giving depth and complexity to ideas all of which had appeared by the end of the first session.

Indeed, his first intervention provided the composers with a key for their symphony. They had not all used the term "world order" in the same way. Aron distinguished five possible meanings and suggested that the seminar concern itself with one of those. Two of the meanings were purely descriptive: order as any arrangement of reality, order as the relations between the parts. Two were analytical—partly descriptive, partly normative: order as the minimum conditions for existence, order as the minimum conditions for *co*existence. The fifth conception was purely normative: order as the conditions for the good life. Aron proposed that the conference forget about the last—for it could lead the members only to platitudes or to an acrimonious reproduction of the conflicts of values that exist in the world—and examine the fourth. "Conditions of world order" would thus mean: under what conditions would men (divided in so many ways) be able not merely to avoid destruction, but to live together relatively well in one planet.

If "order" was thus defined, "world" remained a bit fuzzy. Obviously the consequences for the meeting were less disastrous than if "order" had been kept in confusion: after all, there are limits to the planet, and everybody agreed that for the first time the planet was living a single history. But some ambiguity subsisted on two points. One, what are the factors and events that affect that single history? Does the new unity of the planet, does "le monde fini" serve as an echo chamber for *all* that happens within its component parts, or for some aspects or forces only? We all agreed that "world order" means more than interstate relations: world order is affected by domestic structures and transnational phenomena; but we never rigorously defined which domestic and transnational circumstances have an impact on world order and which do not. Secondly, Mr. Conrad H. Waddington remarked that there was not so much *a* world order, as *a set* of world ordering systems—different kinds of relations between groupings of varying natures (nations, industrial organizations, races,

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religions, and so forth). The point, a sound one, was not pursued much further. This is much to be regretted, for the conference rather single-mindedly concentrated on whatever was assumed by some to work for peace, harmony, and unity—with the dissenters trying to show why the millennium would not come—instead of looking at the ways in which ineradicable diversity could be made constructive, and inevitable conflicts manageable. It might have been better, although far more difficult, to discuss the chances of multiple improvements, instead of alternatively throwing up and shooting down grand solutions or wild hopes.

As for "conditions," there remained throughout the conference some ambiguity here also. Perhaps because of the meaning of order proposed by Aron, the seminar concerned itself more with analyzing and assessing the conditions already making for world order than with defining conditions that would assure such order in the future—perhaps also because, as we shall see, many participants thought that the present conditions were both necessary and to a large extent sufficient. In any event, the minority who thought that this was not the case was not homogenous: some were concerned with finding ways of going beyond what existed now or what might come out of a mere continuation of present trends, while others were more interested in showing critically why those trends were far from reassuring.

The order of the sessions that followed the first was anything but rigid and linear. The themes announced in the symphony's prelude were not developed one by one. If anything, the composition was cyclical. This report will not, however, try to follow the order of the meeting. It will deal with the three main themes that emerged; two concerned the conditions of order discerned by all the participants, and which can, with some flippancy, be called peace and prosperity; the third theme—rather unexpected, given the subject-matter of the conference, but not at all surprising given the professional composition of the seminar—dealt with the relations between thought and action, a problem that was in part epistemological and methodological, in part a turn toward the fifth definition of order.

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II. ORDER IN INTERSTATE RELATIONS

The basic problem, here, can be defined as follows: is the nation-state a form of social organization that is likely to persist? Is it an obstacle to world order? If so, how can it be overcome?

It became obvious from the start that description and prescription are hard to separate: our values shape our knowledge. A man convinced that the nation-state is the greatest threat to peace and must be superseded will find ways of showing that in the present world the nation-state is already on the way out. And yet, for clarity's sake, I will try to keep the three questions more separate than they were in the discussions.

Fate of the nation-state. Perhaps because of the scrambling of analysis and judgment, the issue of the nation-state's fate and solidity was not fully discussed, even though (to a student of international relations, at least) it may not be indifferent for world order to know whether the present mushrooming of nation-states represents a last orgiastic gasp before death and transfiguration, or means that any kind of world order will have to be based on a type of unit whose flaws have not exactly gone unnoticed. Evaluation and prescription somehow overshadowed straightforward diagnosis. Stanley Hoffmann suggested that the nuclear stalemate in particular, the increase in the costs of the use of force in general, had given a new lease on life to nation-states, even to those that may appear artificial or unviable; indeed, material as well as nuclear interdependence, while removing the states' incentives to madness, also remove their incentives to suicide. The only conceivable mutation of world politics is a "mutation at the brink," should a local holocaust convince the surviving powers that the uncertainties of a radically new system of relations are less frightening than the perpetuation of traditional interstate politics. Aron agreed that the future of world politics would in all likelihood consist of a "muddling through" of states, for he saw no sign of a mutation in world affairs. The reason that the issue was not directly discussed further may have been that few participants believed either that the nation-state would disappear (Lord Gladwyn, the chief prosecutor of the nation-state, still envisages for 1985 a world in which four of the five expected "poles" would be nation-states: the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, and India) or that the nation-state would remain

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unaffected by trends and institutions that have already changed the substance if not the form of sovereignty.

Defense and indictment of the nation-state. That the nation-state may nevertheless be a threat to world order was denied by nobody. Indeed, the charges against it were formidable and varied. First, there was Lord Gladwyn's often repeated blanket critique of the nation-state as a factor of anarchy whose tendency toward unlimited sovereignty had to be curbed in the interest of survival. Secondly, there were a number of detailed references to the dangers created by contemporary nation-states. One was the analysis of the limits of the nuclear stalemate. Although the restraints imposed on the states by the peril of annihilation were recognized by all the participants, some tried to show that these restraints remain fragile and that the stalemate, a necessary precondition of order in the nuclear age, was however not a sufficient guarantee. Aron reminded his listeners that if total war was no longer "the continuation of politics by other means," the *threat* of war and certain *kinds* of war were another matter altogether. Hoffmann insisted on the persistence of various social functions of war even in the nuclear age, on the prospects of dangerous crises among the major nuclear powers (due in particular to the role of third parties and to revolutionary wars), on the perils of nuclear proliferation. He and Mr. Jean Fourastié showed that the very restrictions on the use of force tend to perpetuate unsolved problems and acute tensions in various parts of the world. Aron and Henry A. Kissinger thought that proliferation might lead to local wars, not to a major nuclear war: global world order would be preserved at the cost of a fragmentation of the international system. Yet Aron himself recognized that there was more magic than necessity in one crucial restraint observed until now by the nuclear powers—their abstention from any aggressive use of nuclear weapons—and Kissinger confessed that the experience of a local nuclear war among small powers without cataclysmic effects could erode the restraint, based on horror, that has marked great power behavior until now.

Kissinger himself introduced another line of attack against the contemporary nation-state. In a systematic analysis of the impact of domestic structures on foreign policy, he showed the absence of any common legitimacy today, due to the heterogeneity of the leaders who have to coexist for the first time in a single interna-

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tional system, and whose range extends all the way from America's bureaucratic leadership to the rulers of the new countries for whom "the future is more real than the present." He spoke of the contrast and clash of the political and of the prophetic style of leadership, of the tensions created by some nations' desire for absolute security, of the rigidities introduced by the heavy bureaucracy of the larger states. He denounced the perils for peace that stem from the insecurity of most leaders, in search of immediate successes; he discussed the dangers resulting either from the excessive sense of identity of some states, engaged in an overbearing manipulation of others, or from the insufficient sense of identity of other states which compensate for its absence by engaging in external adventures. Hoffmann remarked that the picture was perhaps too somber, since those conflicting visions and policies have to interact in an international system that leaves its members with little more freedom than prisoners in a chain gang, that tends to thwart prophets and to tame ambitions; but nobody denied that even the decline of force and the deterrence of ideological expansion would still not mean the reconciliation of ideologies or the harmony of interests. As Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer observed, the way in which the mass media help leaders manufacture the general will and the game of mirrors between leaders and masses do not contribute to peace.

Still another line of criticism of the contemporary nation-state dealt with the heterogeneity of nation-states in the present world. Professor D. P. O'Connell emphasized the differences between the new African states and the model nation-state of the West. This heterogeneity explains in part the present incoherence of international law, whose concepts have been both suddenly extended to and challenged by new states eager to borrow Western notions of the sovereign state but not Western rules for restricting the state.

Against those charges, there were some attempts at defending not so much the nation-state as nationalism, or rather at suggesting distinctions among nationalisms. Mr. Pitambar Pant and Mr. Helio Jaguaribe—an Indian and a Brazilian—revived Mazzini's celebration of liberal nationalism, a necessary spring of action and a force for self-respect and dignity. They contrasted it either with the evil nationalism that entails an assertion of superiority or with the lack of national feeling in countries run by oligarchies and

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dominated by foreign imperialism. Mr. Ivan Málek asserted that cooperation among East European states, despite the difficulties created by their very different levels of development, shows that nationalism can be curbed without abolishing the nation-states. But Kissinger and Aron reminded the group that no clear line separates once and for all good and bad nationalisms. Moreover, nationalism is not the only possible poison carried by the nation-state: ideological claims pushed by it can make conflicts even more intense, and, as Kissinger remarked, states, whether national or not, necessarily breed conflicts due to the fragmentation of power and to the competition of interests in the world.

"*Comment s'en débarrasser*" *(or, shall we overcome?).* When it came to proposals for going from the present danger to future stability, unanimity collapsed. There was disagreement about methods, about specific suggestions, and about their prospects.

On methods, whereas many members, and Lord Gladwyn in particular, expressed an interest in institutional solutions, others pressed for different directions. Professor Waddington, intrigued by the nuclear stalemate (and praised by Aron as the first natural scientist willing to celebrate its virtues), was interested in seeing whether one could set up more automatic feedback systems like it, in which each part would depend for its very existence on its relations with the other parts. Mr. Málek denied the possibility of an institutional solution at this stage of history, but pressed for a functional approach—not in the sense of functional agencies but in the sense of an analysis of the functions that could already be carried out cooperatively at the world level; the promotion of world order implies the promotion of those functions.

On the whole, however, the discussion took place along familiar institutional lines. Very little—surprisingly—was said about the U.N.; Hoffmann's skepticism about a U.N. police force was not really challenged. Nor was his critique of disarmament, which he deemed hopeless because it goes against "the operation of uncertainty in the international state of nature"—that is, nations prefer familiar uncertainties to thoroughly unfamiliar leaps in the dark. As for international law, despite some nuances in the interpretation of the causes, scope, and originality of its present disarray, O'Connell, Aron, and Hoffmann tacitly recognized that it could itself progress only if world order progresses, rather than contrib-

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ute directly to world order in the crucial areas of war and peace. Consequently, two kinds of schemes received more attention. On the one hand, Professor Robert S. Morison paid a glowing tribute to the functional agencies of the U.N., and suggested that they be made more independent of politics, that is, both of the states and of the U.N., a suggestion whose practical chances and likely effects were assessed skeptically by others. On the other hand, the seminar engaged in more than one great debate about the virtues and prospects of regionalism, championed by Lord Gladwyn with the undiscouraged enthusiasm worthy of a true believer.

Lord Gladwyn's case was a two-stage construction. The first stage was an analysis of, and praise for, the movement of European integration. He saw in the supranational method an admirable invention for superseding the nation-state, and in European integration (once Britain is included) a way of removing one of the main sources of tension in the world, by allowing for the disengagement of both superpowers from Europe and for the reunification of Western and Eastern Europe (without Russia). A number of objections were presented (and left Lord Gladwyn unperturbed). Ambassador Pietro Quaroni and Hoffmann stressed the limits and difficulties not yet overcome by the "Monnet method," especially in the areas of foreign policy and strategy. Others showed the discrepancies between the various advantages different advocates of European integration have claimed for their cause: was the purpose of the movement to put an end to wars among Europeans? Was it to ease tensions between the non-European superpowers? Or the end of power politics among European nations? Or, on the contrary, the acquisition of more power for Europe through a fusion of nations separately too weak? Not only are those arguments quite different, but each one is debatable—and was debated, especially by Kissinger, Quaroni, and Aron. Whereas Lord Gladwyn presented European integration as a sure blessing, Hoffmann and Kissinger remarked that an institutional structure cannot be judged *in abstracto*: a collectively impotent United States of Europe, or else a federated Europe that would define its identity only in sharp opposition to the U.S., might be a curse.

The second stage of Lord Gladwyn's analysis was a plea for extending to other parts of the world the benefits of regionalism, borrowing from the European example. He was aware of the

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difficulties, particularly in Africa (where nationalism is still the only alternative to tribalism). But he was confident both about the feasibility of such schemes and about the unlikelihood of regional groupings becoming and behaving merely like enlarged nation-states. In order to assure harmony among the four large poles mentioned before, Europe as the fifth pole, and the other regions of the world, he suggested the creation of a World Council of limited membership. Professor Jan Tinbergen supported Lord Gladwyn by referring to the economic advantages of regionalism and to the impact of European economic integration on other areas which begin to imitate Europe. Aron also gave a *préjugé favorable* to the concept, while suggesting a further study of the effects of regional groupings on nonmembers and on big-power conflicts. However, once again, objections multiplied. Hoffmann and Pant challenged the significance of regional contiguity in a world in which many problems can be tackled only on an international basis. Kissinger, Málek, Jaguaribe, and Hoffmann showed that the transplantation of the European experience outside Europe runs into considerable difficulties, such as the heterogeneity of élites and states in most regions or the divisive role played by the superpowers which try to preserve their domination of or their influence in an area.

In the final analysis, the discussion of the so-called remedies, or solutions, remained inconclusive. Hoffmann presented the picture of a world relying on the fragile hope of self-restraint by the nations; they would remain the basic units, despite a growing and tightening net of functional and regional agencies that would tend to untie the Gordian knot which presently ties so many different functions around the nation-state. Since he himself expressed reservations about the effectiveness of those agencies, and doubts about the permanent triumph of self-restraint in a world of revolutions, unsolved tensions, and nuclear spread, his picture was, as Aron put it, "rather depressing"—like an abdication before reality. But when it came to defining what ought to be done in order to improve reality, the seminar was not able to go beyond Lord Gladwyn's controversial plan and Jaguaribe's praise of certain schemes for the gradual reduction of tension among the superpowers. It is interesting, and perhaps a bit disturbing, that the problem of the relations among those powers, implicitly or explicitly recog-

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nized as decisive for international order by most participants, was not discussed frontally. And so, the sum total of the variations and developments of the first theme amount to: "The nuclear stalemate plus. . . ."

III. DEVELOPMENT AND RATIONALITY

If the first theme led only to a somewhat tentative conclusion, due to the small number among the participants of what Aron called "active optimists" about world politics, active optimism asserted itself much more with respect to the second theme: the contribution to world order of the efforts made, by scientists and economists particularly, in order to overcome poverty and disease and to promote development. Here again, it is possible to divide the discussions into three subjects: a description of the ways and means of such progress, an assessment of their over-all achievements, a prescription for their triumph.

The ways and means of material progress. The seminar included a significant number of men associated with or in charge of economic planning in their respective countries. It was not surprising to hear planning celebrated as a method capable of eliminating poverty, of projecting material progress into the future, and of laying the foundations for international (not merely national) order. Messrs. Pitambar Pant, John W. Dyckman, Jean Fourastié, and Jan Tinbergen, in various ways, stressed that we now had enough knowledge of the regularities of the material world, of the trends and rules of large-scale behavior, of the desirable rates of growth for various categories of nations, in order both to set goals acceptable by most groups in a population and to solve the technical problems of various sectors (health, population). International organizations help to make different plans compatible and to coordinate efforts on a world or regional basis. Those assertions, presented most lyrically by Mr. Pant, were not left unchallenged. Aron pointed out that not all the results attributed to planning were caused by it, and reminded the group of a French economist's unflattering reference to Chantecler in connection with the French plan; Jaguaribe and Hoffmann remarked that planning, a possible condition of world order, was itself possible only when certain essential political and social requirements existed already

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in a country—a basic consensus on goals, a minimum of compatibility between masses and élites, a modicum of efficiency. Kissinger doubted that planning could be useful when the objectives themselves are in question, or provides criteria for their selection. Even the planners did not all deny the blemishes: Dyckman wondered whether planners had succeeded in creating a sense of purpose, and he noticed that our understanding of social systems was far from sufficient; Fourastié observed that the causes of economic progress remain often misunderstood in the new countries, where people tend to cling to a magic conception of economic power, seen as a kind of stock that belongs to the wealthy nations who got it through some unfair mystery, and from whom it should be taken away. In other words, as Aron put it, planning entails not merely the application of techniques, but a change of civilization; economic progress is not a gift but a painful process.

And yet, those reservations did not seem to disturb most of the participants. The achievement of planning, in which scientific knowledge gets applied to the production of goods, was seen as only one example of the increasing practical importance of science in improving living conditions. Morison and Málek celebrated the rise of a community of scientists—capable of solving problems "according to their own criteria," said the former, and numerous enough, by comparison with past communities of scientists, to effect a real qualitative change for mankind, said the latter. Such men are all linked by the responsibilities they have not only toward science but toward society. Thus we came to the notion of the progress of "operational rationality" in the modern world.

History and "operational rationality." The injection into history of scientific rationality—experimental, questioning, anti-authoritarian, as Pant put it—the prevalence of a "rational model" based on faith in progress, formed the core of Professor Jaguaribe's argument, which would have warmed the hearts of the Enlightenment *Philosophes* as well as of Auguste Comte. According to Jaguaribe, the antinomies that have blocked world order were, first, the clash between the requirements of rationality and those of power politics or of the power motivations of politicians and, secondly, the contrast between men's rationality in the area of means and the nonrational character of the selection of ends. Those antinomies could now be overcome at last: our achieve-

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ments in the realm of operational rationality have effected a decisive change in the process of appropriation of wealth, influence, and power. Appropriation through spoliation has ceased to pay (an idea expressed by Aron some years ago); history stops therefore being a zero-sum game. It becomes a game over nature—for organization, not over man—for domination. Rationality is cumulative: the higher the level of the rationality of means, the more the selection of ends itself will tend to become rational.

This seductive presentation and prognosis ran into some objections. Aron, Gadamer, and Hoffmann questioned the assumption of a necessary "spillover" of rationality from the realm of means to the realm of ends. They pointed out that the process of appropriation was far from smooth and could still imply revolutions and expropriations. Hoffmann said that the final use of supposedly rational means still depended on the ends selected by the men in power—that the translation of rationally discovered "truths" into political and social forms could still lead to conflicting polities; or, as Aron put it, where the application of scientific reason brings no demonstrably certain results, relativism persists. Davidson Nicol observed that the scientists still get their funds from national sources. Kissinger remarked that the key issue of today was not appropriation but administration: the progress of bureaucracy leads to the alienation of the masses. Thus, while nobody challenged the notion of a rising level of rationality of means, which contributes to world order as defined by Aron for the seminar, there was no general acceptance of Jaguaribe's philosophy of history.

Material advancement as common goal. Jaguaribe had presented material advancement as the driving force of modern history. Professor Waddington proposed to reach much the same result—a world united by material progress—in a different way: by suggesting it not as a historically determined end, but as a deliberately chosen goal. All other "world-ordering systems," based on spiritual elements (ideology, culture, religion), had been divisive and failed to provide for the kind of order he was looking for, and which he calls "homeorhesis": an order which is not static, which does not prevent disturbances but allows for the return to stability after disturbances (a dynamic notion taken from biology but obviously essential to a social scientist). Therefore, what the world

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needs is an ordering system based on a sufficiently inclusive value, which can only be material development; since disparities in wealth are the ultimate cause of disorder (if not the immediate cause), the adoption of such a value would take the heat out of other sources of disturbances. Once again, as Aron pointed out, the recognition of the new mutual advantage in common development was being used as a thread and a springboard: the experience of dialogue between East and West over rates of growth had indeed led to "mutual instruction," in Aron's words, if perhaps not quite to the convergence discerned by Tinbergen.

Two lines of argument arose out of Waddington's reflections. One, developed in particular by Kissinger, challenged the assumption that most tensions are ultimately due to disparities in wealth and the assumption that material advancement would thus reduce tension: many conflicts arise because leaders have goals that have nothing to do with development, and development may well lead to instability domestically and internationally (one nation's progress being interpreted by another as a threat). Fourastié produced a similar argument; he quoted Ben Bella's statement about "Algerians willing to eat grass," listed the many drives that move men, besides the drive for material progress, and stressed the importance of random phenomena in history. The other line of argument focused on the ambiguity of the "single value" prescribed by Waddington, and therefore on its unifying force. Mankind, said Hoffmann, had never been able to settle for a single goal: the notion of material advancement was either insufficient to create a strong enough bond, or too full of potential conflicts if it includes (as Waddington had hinted) a reference to the "good life"; moreover, (supposing a single goal could prevail) the enforcement of material development would still be quite susceptible of leading to fragmentation, given the diversity of techniques and institutions that would promote this goal. Two kinds of replies were presented to this objection. One was made by Waddington and Dyckman: world order assuredly requires many bonds, not only material advancement; but the latter goal would be a powerful link, and an agreement on means among systems disagreeing on ends could be most useful. In other words, as Aron put it, even if ends keep diverging, material advancement could now become accepted by all as the necessary means. The other reply went further: it pre-

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sented material progress not just as a common set of means, or as one end among others, but as an end that inevitably drags other common ends along with it. Pant mentioned the case of the Indian economy: the solution of material problems cannot be separated from that of problems like corruption, education, peace. Tinbergen spoke of the "ethics of planning." Waddington himself stated his belief that material advancement, taken as a serious value, implies a concern for human dignity. The discussion that followed, about the relation between human dignity and material advancement, established both that there was, at present, a link in the mind of many and that the link was anything but clear (nations, as Aron and others pointed out, have often preferred independence to immediate material progress). To Mr. Adul Wichiencharoen's rather sharp questioning of the meaning of human dignity, Aron replied that it could be defined only negatively—it is the rejection of certain, no longer tolerable, relations among men. But the variability of the notion shows that, as the chairman put it, man is "a dissatisfied being whose dissatisfactions are necessary for history to go on."

As one can see, the discussion failed to produce the kind of "community" that Waddington had hoped to collect around his central value. But if there was dissent about the degree of world order which this value could create, there was none about the positive contribution material advancement as a common goal had already made and could make. Moreover, the discussion on material advancement and the dispute on the scope of its contribution to world unity served as the passageway to the seminar's examination of the relevance of values to world order, and to the assessment of the ways in which different sorts of intellectuals can promote world order.

IV. THOUGHT AND ACTION

The "third theme" of the seminar is more a third dimension than a unified theme. Its coherence comes from what Aron, in *Paix et Guerre,* has called praxiology—the questioning of the original hypotheses and the discussion of one's ability to overcome the basic antinomies of the subject-matter. One could have had a debate on the values required for world order without a debate on

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the contributions of social or natural scientists in particular and intellectuals in general—and vice versa. And yet, the two discussions were very closely linked.

Values and world order. Aron, as we have seen, had warned that any attempt at defining world order as "the good life" would lead to platitudes or to recriminations. However, the problems of whether a world order was possible without a common system of values and whether such a system was possible in the near future never ceased coming up, in the interstices and at the outcome of debates on other subjects.

The assertion of the need for a common system of values was made most strongly by Professor O'Connell. For him, the incoherence of the modern world, the intransigence of the sovereign states, the collapse of international law (deprived of its normative elements by political scientists and fragmented by constitutional lawyers) proceed from the decline of the rational "metaphysic of human order" that had existed in the Middle Ages, and survived until recently. It was obvious from his remarks (and he made it quite explicit in the course of the discussion) that he did not think science could provide a substitute: the scientific method of hypothesis and verification aims at *knowing* the behavior of *things*. What he was concerned with was the *control* of *human* behavior by a "regime of oughtness": what world order requires (as Professor Gadamer confirmed, with a reference to the Greek *dikaion* that served as the basis of Roman Law) is a set of moral norms, not merely a net of empirical norms.

O'Connell's approach was diametrically opposed to that of some other members of the seminar, who both believed in a return to (or progress toward) the unity of values and thought that science was providing those values. Waddington introduced the concept of "arising ends," purposes that come out of the nature of a system. Morison was more explicit, and claimed a great deal: for him, science is capable of defining and solving problems of general importance, possesses techniques for producing agreement, and plays an ethical role, for instance by suggesting (thus, often, helping us rule out) the likely results of certain courses of action (such as nuclear war). Restraints on states could therefore be expected not from the obsolete precepts of natural law, but from the order of nature. Indeed, science has progressed only through and since

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the demise of the old metaphysic. Both Morison and Jaguaribe celebrated the advent of a new humanism, shaped by the universal progress of science or, as Jaguaribe put it—again in Comtian terms—by the passage from a world based on the notion of salvation to a world based on the idea of culture, from the transcendence of God to the transcendence of man.

The optimistic drive of "scientisme" did not conquer all the other participants (not to mention O'Connell). It was not only that, as Kissinger implied, there was a metaphysic hidden behind that drive. It was also because the contribution of the scientific method to the unification of values was not above debate. First, as Aron indefatigably observed, no clear system of ethics can be derived from nature: universal progress is a purpose given by man, not by nature; in other words, the so-called arising ends are a matter of human choice, not of scientific dictation; they do not guarantee our future; or, as Kissinger put it, we can do (technically) whatever we want, but do not always know what we want. Secondly, cultural systems, and in particular religions, have shown great resilience and, far from being "folkloric residues," continue to influence behavior. It was Professor Paul Mus's role in the seminar to trace the complex, continuing impact of Buddhism on the modes of thought and action of Asian states and to remind his listeners of the divergent conceptions of world order represented by different Asian religions. Between China's brand of universalism, which led to a relatively centralized empire, and India's universal order, which covered South-East Asia with self-centered kingdoms, on the one hand, and the respective behavior of China and India today, on the other, the lines of continuity could be seen, barely hidden behind Professor Mus's allusive erudition, and put into strong light by Mr. Adul.

The rejection of the scientific (or scientistic) pretense of a gradual unification of values through science would have led to the relativism lamented by Professor O'Connell, if everybody had agreed that there can be no world order without a harmony of values. This was, however, not the position taken by Aron. For him, the cultural and religious diversity of the world is the inevitable corollary of the fact that mankind lives in the first truly global international system. Moreover, the old metaphysical conception of a true, rational order that preexists man and history and which men-

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in-history ought to approximate and reproduce is dead: today, reason is indeed defined by science and has, therefore, a very different meaning from the one it had in the old conception. Nevertheless, the demise of the traditional sense of order and the heterogeneity of the single system do not condemn the world to disorder, or man to hopeless relativism: it is possible to find a minimum of order common to diverse social systems because of the beginning of certain universal trends—for instance, the diversity of economic systems leaves room for comparisons and conclusions reached as a result of the notion of a generalized economy. Thus the admittedly precarious shoots of a new world order are growing neither out of a metaphysic nor out of scientific requirements alone, but out of a historical experience which suggests lines of evolution. Indeed, our present notion of order is evolutionary: we no longer believe in a fixed order, but view order as creation, the product of man in history. The old conception was adequate for stagnant societies. Our societies are changing and acutely aware of change, and they breed the notion of an order to be achieved. The diversity of conceptions, that is, of value preferences, concerning the ultimate directions and purposes accounts for the fragility of our order; the existence of common directions accounts for its possibility. As Mr. Stephen R. Graubard put it, we ask today not whether what we do and think coincides with what was laid down in the past, but what will be the consequences of our thoughts and acts.

It would have been interesting to pursue those lines of analysis and, following Aron's lead, to investigate the nature and origins of the universal trends he discerned. Some are undoubtedly due to the rise of "operational rationality," to the "necessary means": material advancement, as well as to the nuclear situation; for instance, the trends which the proliferating new international law of world technology exemplifies are due not to common "arising purposes," but to the rising needs of reciprocity and predictability in an ever more interdependent world. But the discussion did not go any further.

Sciences, social sciences, and action. It went quite far, however, on another subject: the contribution the various disciplines can make to the promotion of world order. Those who saw such an order arising out of "operational rationality" were particularly

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anxious—sometimes almost like crusaders—to introduce more of it into the world, and in a more systematic and foresighted fashion; a generalization of planning, so to speak, was their wish and their request. On the other side were those who had some doubts both about the extent to which the rising rationality of means suffices to assure world order and about man's capacity to control and plan his future.

The outlines of the argument appeared, of course, in the first session. Waddington had suggested that world order ought to be like the order of a body or that of a population, not that of a crystal; the order of a population is based on differences among parts, it includes just a few relations among individual elements, and it allows for chance processes. Hoffmann and Aron pointed out, first, that this gives one no idea of what the substance of the order would be—precisely the bone of contention with regard to world order—and, second, that world order has to take into account not mere differences but conflicts. The reciprocal relations of the parts of a body, said Aron, rule out something that is perfectly conceivable in world order, that is, the extermination of one part of the system by another. This early discussion about the notion of order suggested already the subsequent main lines of opposition about the chances and types of scientific control.

On one side were the natural scientists and most of the economists. Proud of the degree to which they have been able to control their subject-matter (in the sense both of accumulating knowledge and of applying it to the solution of problems), they kept summoning the other social scientists who were not economists to reach the same state of development and in particular to engage in what came to be called "political planning." Mr. Fourastié was the most constant advocate of projections of a "future without war," capable of polarizing minds in the same way that Mr. Monnet has captured the Frenchmen's imaginations by projecting an economic future of progress for postwar France. To be sure, he recognized that political planning would have to be more "ideal"(or, as Mr. Gadamer put it, more abstract) than economic planning. But he thought that the confrontation of various representations of the future and the deliberate choice of some possibilities would be useful, if only a greater number of intellectuals and civil servants devoted themselves to long-range thinking and if techniques such

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as simulation were applied. Already, planning for large-scale enterprises (which requires the consideration of their relations with other such enterprises and with the state) approximates political planning. Fourastié was supported by Tinbergen, who regretted that political scientists should go on thinking about shorter intervals of time than economists, and by Pant, who gave constitution-making as an example of domestic political planning and asked for international political planning against war and poverty.

The political scientists, on the other side, picked up the challenge by trying to show why the notion of political planning was unsatisfactory, especially in world affairs. Hoffmann and Kissinger stressed that planning is hardly possible when the ends are in doubt or in contest, when intentions regularly fail to lead to expected results, when gaming techniques only confirm the hypotheses or implicit theories that originally inspired the players. The element of uncertainty, said Kissinger, is far greater in the political than in the economic realm: in foreign policy, judgments depend on assessments that cannot be proven at the time when the judgments must be made, and the scope of decision is greatest when certainty is smallest. A truly effective constitution, said Hoffmann, presupposes a modicum of consensus and is capable of transforming political forces; but this is not always the case domestically, and it is even less so in the world, where consensus is sharply limited and where the Charters of world agencies must take the existence of nation-states as a rather fixed necessity. Aron developed almost a general theory of the differences between economic and political planning. The latter is hampered by our limited knowledge of the rules and trends of the political system: economic planning is based on the notion of growth, but the concept of political development is purely metaphorical since we do not know the direction of political systems and must realize that there are different possible directions. Political planning is hampered by the impossibility of quantifying the values implied in a political system. It is hampered, finally, by the conflictual nature of political systems: planning politics would mean planning the loss of power of some groups to the benefit of others and would thus reduce or eliminate the neutrality of the planners. All these obstacles explain why the political scientists' "time horizon" is

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lower than the economists': deprived of the assumption of growth, the former cannot fail to have a much shorter "optimal distance."

This discussion on various kinds of planning reflected a disagreement about the general possibilities and advantages of scientific control. Natural scientists and economists were looking forward to a planned and controlled future, in which the methods of their disciplines would have been adopted universally. The objecting political scientists tried to show, on the one hand, that the problems involved in manipulating reality were completely different in the world of science (and economics, where planners work toward goals set or accepted by the men in power) and in the world of politics (where control and planning would require both the manipulation of the leaders and the knowledge by the leaders of the laws of successful manipulation of social reality): we do not know enough to control much, and we are not in a position to control what we know. They also stressed, on the other hand, that manipulation in social affairs can lead to repulsive results (such as brainwashing); moreover, such results have been achieved also when science itself was manipulated by leaders with evil purposes. The social scientist thus has excellent reasons for modesty. But this does not mean that he is a pure analyst or critic without practical influence. Social science may not be directly operational, in the sense of controlling events, but it is indirectly operational, as Aron and Fourastié asserted, by influencing minds (cf. the importance of contemporary strategic doctrine); as Fourastié put it, given the historical efficiency of arbitrary wills undetermined by reality, it is of crucial importance to affect those wills. It was again Aron who presented a typology of the ways in which ideas can influence action: either through knowledge—here social and political science are far behind economics and the natural sciences—or through the creation of conceptual frameworks that affect our way of acting—here political science holds its own—or through representations of the future—in which social science (rarely value-free even in its first two modes of influence) combines with ideological, cultural, or religious values.

The role of the intellectuals. Aron's last category suggested that the creation of utopias—the representations of an ideal future—remains the function of intellectuals, even if they have only limited means of guaranteeing their utopias' advent. Inevitably, a seminar

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engaged in a quest for order and composed of intellectuals was going to raise the question of their role in the establishment of order.

The most ambitious statement was made by Jaguaribe. It is to intellectuals that he entrusted the sacred task of promoting the triumph of operational rationality and of the "humanistic *paideia*" which inspires science and which science demonstrates. The word sacred is put here without irony, for Jaguaribe described intellectuals as a new priesthood, whose faith is in the achievement of rational knowledge by objective methods, and whose action would indeed lead to a rising rationality of ends since they are by essence the critics of Caesar and the censors of power. Morison approved and reasserted the need for the intellectuals to be as independent from the world of power as the priests had been in the sixth and seventh centuries; he stated that the world of thought could thereby hope to set some limits on the world of power. Whereas Comte, who carried the idea of the new priesthood to its logical consequences, had wanted the intellectuals to have a set of dogmas, Jaguaribe and Morison rebelled against any dogmatism for their technical humanism, except the dogmatism of scientific method and of the search for truth.

The seminar did not receive the notion of the new priesthood too well. Kissinger pointed out that, in any priesthood, the requirements of insight fight against those of organization, and that inspiration is always thwarted by its institutionalization. As Waddington put it more brutally, a priesthood would consecrate the mediocrities and penalize the creators. Even apart from that somewhat artificial notion, there were serious objections to the Jaguaribe-Morison view of the role of the intellectual. First, many participants challenged the idea, implicit in this view, of a kind of natural unity of the servants and practitioners of scientific rationality. As Aron reminded his listeners, intellectuals in the past have often been the carriers of discord, and in the long run conscience is the dissatisfied part of mankind. The present emergence of a community of scientists is not an innovation; it is merely a return to a past tradition which the cold war had interrupted. Hoffmann said that the nationalization of the intellectuals by the states was as possible as the internationalization of the world by the intellectuals; the fierce debates among atomic scientists were a

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chilly denial of Jaguaribe's optimism. Professor Masao Maruyama quoted Pasteur: science has no boundary, but scientists do: they are rarely capable of transcending the reality in which they live; they are often committed or bound to the value system of their society. Second, even if the intellectuals showed more solidarity than they have exhibited so far, their capacity to tame the world of power was assessed with skepticism by many of the conferees. Aron remembered how often intellectuals had been the justifiers of power. Kissinger listed the permanent contradictions between policy-making and intellectual performance—the intellectual asks about the truth of a proposition, works at the pace of the mind, tends to criticize the attainable because it is not the ideal, while the policy-maker is concerned with the consequences of action, has problems thrust on him, and must approach them by stages. Today's wave of Caesarism-cum-technocracy reduces the capacity of any group to operate as an effective conscience. Aron pointed out that the community of scientists can perfectly well coexist with violent conflicts in the world.

Thus the hopes of some that the concept of the good life could emerge from science, be propagated by the intellectuals, and become operational because of science's control of reality were far from shared by all the participants.

V. THOUGHTS ON THOUGHTS ON WORLD ORDER

It is now time for me to do to the seminar what the seminar ultimately did to world order—question the basic postulates and pass some kind of judgment.

Any exercise like this conference is necessarily unfinished. One goes into it not knowing what will come out of it, and one leaves it with a set of general impressions and of reactions to individual statements or performances, not with a clear-cut sense of accomplishment. However, two general remarks should be made.

The first one may appear somewhat discouraging. The conference revealed a double kind of fragmentation that contrasted rather sardonically with its theme—how to coexist in one world. The most frequently noticed was the fragmentation of knowledge. As this report has tried to show, the gaps between disciplines were revealed rather starkly, not only by analyses that threw light on

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the differences between their methods and their effects, but also by the difficulty for the specialists of one discipline to enter into the universe of discourse of another. As Graubard put it, the world trend may be toward a decline of parochialism, but the professional parochialisms are intense indeed. The only mind that seemed able to transcend them all, to understand both the essence and the limits of each, and to see how they can be concerted was that of the Chairman, whose prolonged exercise in creative catalysis was indispensable to the success of a meeting which would, without him, have sagged into the proverbial soufflé that fails to rise. He managed to reduce the damage to a shaky start and a saggy close, but everything in between was so to speak carried and lifted by his brilliant, yet diplomatic, definitions, interpretations, and *relances*.

Another kind of split was equally evident, if less discussed: the split between what might be called the builders and the critics, between minds primarily devoted to the creation of a system or the advocacy of a method or the proselytizing of an idea, and minds primarily concerned with the analysis of reality, with the dissection (or vivisection) of systems, utopias, and theories. The battle lines here did not separate disciplines so much as personalities. True, the natural scientists were all, or so it seemed, on the "constructive" side, and so were most of the economists—but not all, and not unqualifiedly. The political scientists were mostly on the other side, but again with a significant exception (Jaguaribe). It should be added that this kind of division has nothing to do with the division between optimists and pessimists, on which the conferees tended at times to hypnotize themselves. A critical mind is not necessarily a pessimist—if he is a good analytical intellectual he will rather be neither a permanent optimist nor a permanent pessimist—whereas a "constructor" may well be deeply pessimistic about what would happen if his theory or utopia were not realized (cf. Lord Gladwyn).

The second remark has to do with the balance of achievements and failures of the meeting. We agreed on the importance of the nuclear stalemate and on the continuing dynamics of development as the bases of world order. We disagreed about the degree to which international relations would be transformed by those forces, as well as on the extent to which the new forms of interdependence would create not only the "minimum conditions of co-

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existence" but also a genuine community of values and of power—one world in the sense of philosophical agreement on "the good life" and political harmony. This, in my eyes, suggests that the conference reflected quite well the present state of affairs in the world despite occasional flings into utopianism. It suggests that the seminar demonstrated, on its own scale, the truth of Marx's proposition—that mankind raises only those problems it can solve. For what was omitted entirely, or barely mentioned, or left undeveloped was precisely those issues that nobody knows how to tackle yet. We do not know yet how the development and the power rise of Red China will affect the relations between the superpowers and the future of the nuclear stalemate. We do not know yet, for the single international system in which we live is still too recent, what kinds of domestic problems and upheavals will have a direct impact on world order: hence our neglect of an impressive list of issues raised at the last session by Dyckman, such as migrations, communications, access to information and to scarce resources, what Graubard called the problems of mass (including those of the city). We do not know how to control the population explosion, which remained as absent from our discussions as Red China. Finally, despite the hopes and prophecies described before, we do not really agree on philosophical and political values; therefore, the conference, moved by the same desire for survival and development as the world at large, carefully avoided exposing the ideological differences that remain, and refrained from defining the "good life" in a single world. We used the word democracy rather than the word freedom, and we all politely mentioned Hitler whenever we wanted to blast villainy or to blame irrationality. In a world in which the regime of Spain could still prevent a Spanish professor from coming to our meeting, our wisdom may have been cowardice. But whether our *pudeur* was tantamount to abdication is not so certain: for one could argue that the very possibility of discussing world order meaningfully, that is, without platitudes even while leaving out ideological antagonisms, is in itself evidence of a "demise of the ideological age." To hear a Czech Marxist speak for a "functional analysis of the state and of world order" came as a welcome surprise, and could have been used as partial evidence by those who saw in nuclear and material solidarity resilient and dynamic forces toward order. Whether the

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failure to discuss the "good life" should be applauded also is far less sure, but it too reflected deep (though disturbing) trends in the world. For if scientists believe that the world of nature and technology sets its own "arising ends," it may well be because the truly normative functions of man suffer an eclipse—as a result of the collapse of old metaphysics or because of a lazy or tired resignation to the kind of life that the necessities of modern economics and techniques, the methods of science, and the delicate dictates of nuclear survival seem to shape—so that the quality of life is more determined than planned, more foisted upon man than willed by him, perhaps even without distinction of culture, religion, or ideology. Thus, it is difficult to forecast moral unification around a new humanism not only when philosophical and political splits persist, but also when one feels impotent to impose one's vision or one's dreams on a world whose necessities are felt too compelling, or when one feels complacently confident that those necessities bring with them the best of all possible worlds. The seminar's avoidance of the somewhat overwhelming subject of education in a "monde fini," despite Málek's and Gadamer's references to its importance, is both understandable and symbolic.

I have mentioned Marx's dictum. I must also mention Kant's prophecy. His tantalizing essay on universal history had predicted that the world of nations would unite as a result of the negative process of increasingly costly wars and the positive process of increasing material interdependence. The Seminar showed that Kant's account remains the most likely theory of world order. The increasing disutility of war and the rising tide of development are both the products of science. The former, which takes the strategic form of mutual deterrence, that is, a system of mutual denials and frustrations, merely prevents disasters; the latter exploits the possibilities thus created, in order to bring to mankind the satisfactions which science and its applications provide. Whether the continuing divisions of mankind, in the form of rival nation-states as well as of domestic powderkegs, will ultimately destroy the negative process (without which the positive one could not function), as only a few of us seemed to dread; whether these divisions will, even without destroying our fragile peace, delay, dilute, or distort the positive process of development, as some of us continued to fear; whether on the contrary both processes would interact

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so as to overcome the divisions of mankind and replace its present forms of organization with more "rational" ones, as many of us hoped, was obviously not something which the Seminar could decide. Kant's philosophy of order—like the philosophy that underlies, despite their denials, the projections and certainties of our "*scientistes*"—presented as necessary something which is only possible. We did not agree that it was indeed necessary. But we agreed that the possibility appeared likelier than ever and that, if a "homeorhetic" world order emerges, it will be along those lines. It would have been premature and presumptuous to say more: as the one professional philosopher among us—Gadamer—remarked, we should not require of the future so much more (or better) than we have received in the past. Or should we?

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Raymond Aron

The Anarchical Order of Power

MEN CONTINUE TO BELONG TO political units pretending to independence. Hence, there is no "planetary society" or "human society" comparable to Pueblo or French society, or to the society of the United States or the Soviet Union.

The examples just given intentionally illustrate the diversity of the "political units" or "societies" of which the state claims to be the sovereign expression. A historian of the school of Spengler or Toynbee would contrast "national societies," naïvely proud of their originality, with the "intelligible field" that makes up a whole "civilization," such as ancient civilization or Western Christian civilization.* An ethnologist would reply that the truly intelligible field lies below and not above politically organized society. A state such as the Soviet Union encompasses many ethnic groups or cultural communities whose past, customs, and even creeds remain different in many respects.

We shall, nonetheless, take the multiplicity of legally sovereign states (according to the Charter of the United Nations) as the characteristic trait of the "asocial society" or the "anarchical order" of mankind. The former expression goes back to Kant; the latter borrows the notion of anarchy from the banal critique of the system of rival sovereignties. Both seek to emphasize the *essential imperfection* of "human society," to assume the existence of a "society" of all mankind in the sense that the city-states and empires of the ancient world and the nation-states of Europe constituted one.

*Toynbee prefers to use the term society in designating these "intelligible fields."

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This essential imperfection is not corrected by the growth of commercial transactions between countries and continents. It is in vain that telecommunication satellites transmit words and images instantaneously; it is in vain that scholars and intellectuals meet at conventions. However useful relations transcending national borders among private individuals may be—whether in the domain of sports, science, tourism, religion, or business—and whatever influence these individual relations may exert over a long term on the "reserved domain" of relations between states, international relations still remain today what they have been throughout history: they have not entirely left the state of the law of the jungle. A sovereign collectivity is one which makes its own laws and whose leaders acknowledge obedience to no one else in certain matters—those affecting so-called vital interests, which in certain circumstances involve the choice between war and peace. The state is not solely, but it is at the very least and in any case, that agency which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence. Now this monopoly must be effective and not merely legal. What army would be capable of fulfilling for the whole of mankind the function entrusted to the police force in nation-states? All civilizations (or societies, in Toynbee's use of the word) have known a violent history whose mainspring has been the relations between states. Modern civilization, while planetary in its technico-economic dynamism, has not eliminated or even morally modified interstate relations, which, despite our individual condemnations of their cruelty and our desire to shake off their yoke, continue mercilessly in their unreasonable rationality to forge our common destiny.

"Asocial society," "anarchical order," "unreasonable rationality"—these apparently contradictory expressions are not dictated by a taste for paradox or literary affectation. The society of sovereign states is in essence asocial, since it does not outlaw the recourse to force among the "collective persons" that are its members. Order, if there be one, in this society of states is anarchical in that it rejects the authority of law, of morality, or of collective force. In an anarchical society, why would any individual entrust to someone other than himself the concern for his security? On the other hand, when one thermonuclear bomb alone has more power of destruction than all the bombs or shells used during World War

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II, is it not unreasonable to risk a war whose sole possible benefits would be insignificant compared to the certain costs?

It is easy to elicit enthusiasm by contrasting the spirit of science with the unenlightened parochial spirit. Jets fly at over 500 miles per hour; tomorrow supersonic planes will fly at Mach 2 or 3; ballistic missiles cover nearly 10,000 miles in an hour; and customs officials continue to guard borders; armies, incapable of protecting populations, consume resources that would be better used to combat hunger or underdevelopment. How long will the contradiction between the universal diffusion of technology and the survival of traditional diplomacy persist?

The entire planet alone is scaled to the technology of the 20th century: the conquest of outer space testifies to this even more eloquently than thermonuclear bombs. It does not necessarily follow that the continuation of traditional diplomacy is merely a "survival." Or at least—before hastening to condemn—we must attempt to understand the anarchical order of the international system, as it has been for millennia and remains today (though not without substantial modifications due to changes in thought and events).

THE SOCIAL ANIMAL

Man is *naturally* a social animal (the word nature here being understood in the meaning given to it by biologists). Human young depend on their mothers for a long period; the family by itself is weak and threatened. The species can evolve toward the full realization of its potentialities only in and through societies capable of preserving what preceding generations have acquired, and, thus, of promoting the further accumulation of knowledge and power. The so-called archaic societies that came into being with the Neolithic revolution were limited. Each placed itself spontaneously at the centre of a universe it interpreted both arbitrarily and intelligibly. Defined by a system of values, a way of life, indeed a world view, each tended to regard the others as foreign and, therefore, strange, though this strangeness did not necessarily provoke hostility. In this sense, Bergson is wrong in affirming that collectivities are like wolves to one another (*Homo homini lupus*), while members of the collectivities are like gods to one another

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(*Homo homini deus*). The most closed societies were not devoid of internal conflicts and were not perforce dedicated to a struggle unto death with nearby or distant societies. So long as the strictly political organization—borders, laws, central power—is imperfect, the limits of the societies themselves do not stand out clearly, and often one hesitates over the meanings of the words used to designate its groupings (family, clan, village, tribe, and so forth). But these semantic uncertainties, reflecting ambiguities inscribed in reality itself, do not eliminate the major fact: mankind began by division and not by unity. Every human society grew conscious of its originality in developing a culture—it established itself by distinction from the others, proud, rather than anxious, to discover itself different from others.

The interstate relations one observes throughout the several thousand years of major history (of so-called higher civilization) are a work of culture, and as such they may be called artificial if one equates the nature of man or of societies with their initial state. Even biologists would condemn such an equation: man is an animal species which, being organized in stable groups, has a history. This history does not mark the end of the biological evolution of the species, but it is no less evident than that evolution. The history of civilizations and the evolution of the species react upon one another, whatever interpretation one makes of this duality, according to one's metaphysical or religious beliefs.

Conflicts between states, more or less regulated by tradition, custom, or law, form an integral part of civilizations; they belong not to the biological but to the human order. This proposition is not in contradiction with the theory common among the classic philosophers, according to which the relations between states derive from the *state of nature*. The latter stood in contrast to the civil society (*l'état civil*), and both sprang from culture, not from animal nature. The concept of nature, in this sense, is ambiguous because it contrasts at times with convention, at other times with civil society, and most times with both together. In contrast to conventions, the state of nature is characteristic of man qua man, leaving aside the infinite and arbitrary diversity of mores. Hence, natural laws are universal laws—those applying to all men, irrespective of the norms to which an individual is subject by virtue of his membership in a particular society. In contrast to civil society,

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the state of nature excludes a supreme authority, a tribunal entitled to render verdicts, a police authorized to enforce them: therefore each man is responsible for his own security, free in his decisions, including the decision to take up arms.

The concept of the state of nature represented an interpretation of the behaviour appropriate to historical man, a pessimistic or optimistic metaphysics. Some philosophers described the state of nature as the war of all against all; others, on the contrary, depict man as peaceful and benign outside of society. Some proclaim that the state of nature knows no other law than that of might; others, claiming that man by himself tends toward the fulfillment of his reasonable nature, placed the laws of nature above civil law. But all made a distinction between the state of nature where each man, separate or sovereign, can count only on himself, and civil society where law reigns, where justice is rendered by tribunals, where the police suppress violence.

This distinction does not at all suggest that the present style of interstate relations represents the survival of a primordial situation of individuals or societies—the war of all against all: archaic societies were not all bellicose, and the struggles in which they engaged were often ritualized to the point of being closer to our competitive games than to death struggles of the industrial age. Nor does this distinction imply that interstate hostilities derive through the mysteries of the collective unconsciousness, from the enmity that primitive man spontaneously felt for the foreigner: it is simply the product of historic experience, confirmed by the study of all civilizations. City-states and empires alike were established through violence; the maintenance of peace was the first task of those in power within politically organized units, but peace among these units was never imposed by the same method. All international systems have been anarchical, in the strict sense of the term: they have not been subjected to an *archē*. Once an *archē* is recognized, the political units are deprived of their constitutive principle—auto-nomy, in-dependence, the ability of making on their own decisions involving their destiny.

This distinction in essence does not exclude a similarity in the realm of practice. Within states, too, individuals and groups rival one another, and there is a permanent danger of recourse to violence. And it is true that there is not a single state which has not

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been established by violence, from narrower collectivities of differing cultures. The homogeneity of a people has been the work of centuries, meaning, most often, the work of force. Only the United States of America has a slightly different history. Leaving aside the wars against the Indians, then against Mexico and Spain, U.S. nationality was forged by a constitutional law established for nearly two centuries. Millions of immigrants freely decided to join this *commonwealth,* this community.

In short, the philosophical distinction between the state of nature and civil society expresses a permanent fact of history: men live in society, but there have always been many societies and not one society. Every historic society has been distinctive and in more or less regular relation with other societies. Within each of them, the rival ambitions of individuals or groups, ethnic heterogeneity, and opposition of interests created a permanent danger of illegitimate violence. Between societies, recourse to armed force was legitimate since, in the absence of civil authority, each could count only on itself to ward off perils and to survive.

It is scarcely necessary, in order to explain the endemic character of wars, to endow man with greater aggressiveness than that of other primates: the conditions, constant throughout history, of the political organization of mankind suffice to explain the precariousness of peace and the frequency of wars. Peace could be safeguarded only, and always temporarily, by the balance of rival powers or the victory of the strongest and the establishment of an empire.

The "natural" character of the specificity of interstate relations (legitimacy of recourse to force), as confirmed by historical experience, imposes no conclusion regarding the future of human society; it merely prohibits an illusory extrapolation. The transition from *many* sovereignties to *one* sovereignty is neither logically nor materially impossible, but it would be *essentially* different from the transition from city-state to empire. Empires eliminated or integrated sovereign states; they did not eliminate all external sovereignty. United under one sovereignty, mankind would no longer have any enemy—unless it be on another planet. This would be a mutation *of* history itself and not a mutation *within* history.

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A world state is not in contradiction with the biological or social nature of man, as it has been revealed throughout the centuries. If Rome was able to spread its domain to the British Isles and to Byzantium at a time when legions traveled by foot, modern techniques for movement on land, on sea, and in air make a planetary empire materially possible. What excludes such an empire today and for the foreseeable future are the historic protagonists. By historic protagonists I mean the politically organized collectivities, the minorities governing them, and perhaps the peoples themselves. Heads of state hold fast to sovereignty—that is, to their freedom of action internally and externally, of which the term sovereignty represents the juridical or ideological expression. Peoples respond to the call for "national independence," some because they have barely emerged from a colonial regime, and others because they are nostalgic for their lost grandeur, or because the official ideology depicts classes and states engaged in a death struggle.

If we use the word *nationalism* here to indicate the will of politically organized collectivities, established in a territory and subject to a state, to maintain vis-à-vis other similar collectivities a liberty theoretically total and at least equal to that of others, then we would have to say that the planetary expansion of technology and of modern economy does not result in a universal state. Peoples or states act on the stage of history like individuals who *refuse* to submit to a master and *do not know how* to submit to a common law. In seeking to establish or maintain a universal state one encounters the same obstacle. To establish a universal state, in the absence of consent, it would be necessary to break the resistance of states, as the resistance of the feudal barons was broken by the armed force of the kings, or that of the Greek city-states or of Macedonia was broken by the Roman legions. But the monarchic precedent has no value as an example so long as a universal sovereignty must encompass heterogeneous peoples; the Roman precedent might serve as a model, but it inspires terror. At what price and with what consequences would unity be arrived at through the defeat of all the pretenders to empire save one?

But let us suppose that the universal state has been established: it could survive only by the effective monopoly of legitimate violence. It would have to possess enough weapons to prevent provin-

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cial groups from resorting to force or, at least, to prevent the spread of conflicts, if these groups preserved an army. But could the army of the universal state succeed in *restraining* local armies by the threat of nuclear weapons alone (supposing that these were a monopoly of the universal state)? Or are we to imagine the estates reduced to the level of administrations, virtually disarmed? Under this hypothesis, one requires of these administrations (ex-states) a confidence in the loyalty of its people (ex-citizens) of which our period provides few examples. In both cases, one assumes that the main problem has been solved, namely, the consent of the peoples and the states to surrender to a universal state a portion of the autonomy that has been held essential over the centuries. But all indications are that they do not fear the nuclear apocalypse enough to abdicate their sovereignty.

Lord Russell gave mankind a deadline of a few decades, until the end of the century, to choose between a world-state and annihilation. But at the end of the second decade of the atomic age, a third path has appeared.

FORMS OF WARFARE

History has thus far refused to pose the ultimate choice between collective suicide and the abdication of states. It has gradually brought a certain order out of the anarchy common to all international systems, an order favouring the limitation of armed conflicts, subject to an oligarchy camouflaged by democratic symbols.

This order results in the first place from a quasi-control of interstate violence—a control as novel as the historic conjuncture itself. There are three sorts of weapons available today, corresponding to three combat methods: let us say, symbolically, the submachine gun, the tank, and the atomic bomb—the first being adapted to guerrilla warfare, the second to regular army fighting, the third to thermonuclear exchanges (or push-button warfare, to adopt the terminology of science fiction). In terms of power of destruction, there is nothing in common between the guerrilla fighter, the tank driver, and the crew of the Minuteman missile, any more than between a wrench used by a garage mechanic, a conveyor belt in an automobile factory, and the equipment of an atomic plant. But more recent techniques, while they may be most

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characteristic of the present age, do not eliminate former techniques, and this is for two reasons. Automation (where it is possible and profitable) is so expensive that it can only be partial and gradual. Large sectors of the economy continue to remain refractory to the new technology, and the mechanic's wrench, even the shovel and the pick, continue to remain symbolic. Similarly, the thermonuclear bomb and the ballistic missile have eliminated neither the machine gun of the guerrilla fighter nor the coolie who transports on his back the rice and munitions of the combatants.

The individual weapon—light, effective in short-term operations, in ambushes, and in man-to-man fighting—was the response of the colonized peoples to the colonial domination of the European states. The white man imposed his domination on the peoples of Asia and Africa thanks to the superiority of his technology and science, thanks also to his prestige. Once that prestige had been eroded by familiarity, domination tended to have no basis other than force. The Vietnamese, Indonesians, or Congolese could not defeat the regular armies of France, the Netherlands, or Belgium, but they could deny the colonial regime's security. If they have the sympathy and complicity of the masses, a few thousand guerrillas can strip the rich few of the desire and ability to rule. In the twenty years since the explosions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the machine guns of guerrillas have changed the map of the world much more than have tanks or atomic bombs. At Dien Bien Phu, these guerrillas had become soldiers, organized in divisions, who dealt a death blow to the French expeditionary force, worn out by seven years of struggle against elusive combatants. Thus ended an empire.

Wars, all limited and local, between regular or quasi-regular armies, have all ended since 1945 in armistices that have not been followed by peace treaties. The demarcation lines give sanction to the accidental results of combat operations at the time of the cease-fire: such is the case of the border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, between Israel and the Arab states in the Near East, and between North and South Korea after three years of fighting. The contrast is striking between the victory of the rebels over the Dutch or the French in Indonesia or Vietnam, and the stalemates or armistices without peace treaties at the conclusion of hostilities between regular forces.

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Need we add that the reason for this contrast is more political than military. The guerrillas won nearly everywhere because the "imperialists," morally and materially weakened by World War II, no longer believed in their mission, and because the empire becomes too costly when it entails economic obligations toward conquered peoples. Israeli tanks could have gone on to Cairo in 1956; if there had been enough of them, American tanks could have reached the Yalu. The Great Powers of the international system wanted, above all, to arrive at a compromise when they confronted one another directly or through satellites interposed prudently between them; most times they stopped military operations between secondary states as quickly as possible; they prevented weapons from fulfilling their secular function of deciding otherwise insoluble questions. By their intervention, they have perpetuated situations that, in other times, would have been deemed absurd: the division of Jerusalem [before the Israeli military action in 1967] or of Kashmir. The limitation of hostilities has seemed to be the prime object of the Great Powers during this period, if not of the interested parties.

Is the guerrilla fighter a vestige of the past who will disappear with the disappearance of underdevelopment itself? To be sure, when one observes the relations between Israel and the Arab states, the punitive expenditures undertaken by units of the regular Israeli Army—between 1949 and 1967—in response to operations by the fedayeen, one is tempted to draw a sort of correlation between the level of development and the nature of weapons, between the type of society and the mode of combat. This correlation is indeed linked to particular circumstances, without being entirely accidental. As soon as guerrillas have won the war, driven out the colonialists, and founded a state, the state seeks to create a regular army equipped with heavy weapons, tanks, pursuit planes, and bombers. Each new state does so because other states that have preceded it in the career of independence have done so before it. Concern for prestige? Not entirely. A regular army protects the new state against other guerrillas who might be recruited among the veterans or among those who expected that the end of domination would usher in a new era, a sort of golden age. It is also useful in the border disputes that threaten to break out after the end of colonialism and hence of anticolonialist solidarity. Finally,

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it must not be forgotten that even in industrialized countries, during times of oppression there have been snipers and guerrillas.

In truth, the guerrilla belongs to our age as he belongs to most ages of human history; but he assumes a novel form in the industrial age. He incarnates the antitechnical to the extent to which he defies the instruments of massive destruction developed by science, but he utilizes weapons and means of communication that have also been forged by the modern age, and he has likewise developed rational methods of action. If technology refers not only to the material objects made by machines but also to a form of thought—a sort of pragmatism pushed to its extreme—guerrilla warfare, as taught by the Chinese after long experience, is henceforth conducted according to technological principles. These entail a technique of organization, a technique for the psychological manipulation of the masses, appealing to terror and to hope. To be sure, the guerrilla, more often than the soldier in uniform, is left to his own devices; he must therefore be capable of initiative, and he must retain in solitude the sense of his own responsibility, as well as the consciousness of a solidarity with his dispersed comrades. But, the more guerrilla warfare becomes organized, the more the guerrilla resembles the soldier. The discipline he is subject to will never have the same physical immediacy as in regular armies, but its distant and diffused character is compensated for by its merciless sanctions. Leaders are nowhere and everywhere. There is, so to speak, no longer any question of the *degree* of crime or punishment. The difference between guerrillas and soldiers remains; the tendency toward their rapprochement grows out of a like desire for effective techniques.

As an isolated volunteer, the guerrilla seems superior to the soldier in human qualities. Although heroic, he is not necessarily holy: all depends on the cause for which he sacrifices his peaceful existence or his life. Since 1940, the guerrilla has symbolized the struggle against the Nazis, then against the "colonialists." He has profited from the sympathy of progressivist opinion despite the often inevitable cruelty of his means. He has been David against Goliath, the Pekinese or Kabyle peasant, barehanded against planes or tanks, the soldier in the shadows destined more for martyrdom than for glory. Should this same guerrilla serve a doubtful cause, or the population for the most part be against his cause, or should

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his victory bring to power a detested regime, he would become again, in the eyes of all defenders of the established order, whether Occidentals or Afro-Asians, what he has been in other times—the outlaw, closer to the bandit than to the solider, the man who kills unexpectedly and often randomly, the man who introduces a reign of suspicion and terror, who confuses the essential distinction between peace and war, between law and violence. When faced with mechanical monsters, he incarnates the grandeur of the resistant, rebel, or heretic. When faced with the norms of civilized existence, he incarnates the aggression—animal or human, primitive or permanent—that society must control in order to survive.

The triad of the submachine gun, the tank, and the ballistic missile with a thermonuclear warhead, of the guerrilla, the soldier, and the crew of the ballistic missiles buried in silos, will have tomorrow, as today, a historic significance. The complex dialectic linking each of these three types of weapons to the other two will continue symbolically, at least until mankind substitutes the rule of law for that of violence. Each of these three weapons, each of the three methods of combat will preserve its meaning. Nuclear weapons exclude a repetition of the total wars that have occupied the first half of the 20th century. Regular armies remain the guarantee of internal peace in all states that cannot do without an eventual recourse to force. At the same time, they provide strategists with a means of avoiding the alternative of all-or-nothing, of passivity or the apocalypse. States aspiring to play leading roles on the world scene can no more do without nuclear weapons than without conventional weapons. Guerrilla rebellion, the supreme and often the desperate response to injustice, poses an ironic challenge to the omnipotence of machines.

Does the dialectic of the three weapons serve to constitute an international order? During the postwar period it has been the principle of what has come to be called variously the Cold War or bellicose peace, precarious order or endemic disorder. Contemporaries have denounced this constant ambiguity; there is no outbreak of major war, but true peace is neither imposed by a victor nor arrived at together by rivals. In retrospect, the historian tends to place a more balanced judgment on the first two decades of the atomic age, and indeed he may even indulge in the secret hope that

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this ambiguous conjecture, this limitation of violence, should continue.

NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

For twenty years, from 1945 to 1965, only two states were worthy of the title of nuclear powers. Great Britain, while possessing nuclear weapons, has not conducted an independent diplomacy. France and Communist China have exploded atomic bombs, but do not possess the combination of bombs, missiles to carry them, and a network of alert and communication without which the weapons cannot really be effective military or diplomatic arms. At the time of the Korean War, the United States had only a limited stock of nuclear weapons, including neither thermonuclear bombs nor tactical nuclear weapons. From 1953 on, as Stalin's successors perfected and completed their new armaments, they spoke more and more willingly of peaceful coexistence. They were tempted, between 1958 and 1962, to obtain a modification of the status quo in Berlin through threat of force, under the protection of intercontinental missiles. They never risked carrying out their threat. When they were forced by a U.S. ultimatum to withdraw their ballistic missiles from Cuba, they immediately gave up their Berlin operation. The two major powers—thermonuclear duopolists—became aware of their common interest not to become involved in a war of annihilation; in other words, they understood that none of the stakes of their conflict was worth the cost of a war in which nuclear weapons would be used. Let us consider the terminology borrowed by rational strategists from economics: they compare cost and profit—that is, the losses in lives and goods that a war would entail on the one hand, and the possible fruits of victory on the other (the latter being appraised on the basis of a coefficient calculated in terms of the uncertainty of the outcome). The higher the losses, the fewer the advantages of victory, even if the risk of defeat is slight, and the more the rational strategist is inclined to prefer the drawbacks of peace to the risks of war.

On the whole, the optimistic argument based on "peace through fear" remains valid, no matter how many nuclear powers there are. States producing these weapons will discover at the same time both their power and their impotency, the capacity they have

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acquired to destroy and the vulnerability of their own population and cities. There is nothing to prevent us from conjecturing about the spread of wisdom that might accompany the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It would nonetheless be imprudent to overlook the circumstances that have favoured the logical use that the two major powers have made of their nuclear weapons. In the first place and above all, both the United States and the Soviet Union were victors in the war, satisfied with the result, having neither a defeat to avenge nor territory to conquer. The Soviet Union, seizing the opportunity to exploit its victory, had subjected 100 million Europeans to its Marxist-Leninist regime. The United States, despite the call for a rollback, resigned itself to this *fait accompli* and confined itself to preventing any further advance of the Soviet forces in Europe. The success of containment was acceptable to both of the major powers, since each could interpret it as a success: the Americans because they had achieved their stated goal, and the Russians because they had never wanted to do more than consolidate their hegemony over Eastern Europe, including East Germany.

To be sure, despite the fact that the stakes of their rivalry were not *national* in the narrow sense of the term (neither begrudged the existence and the territory of the other), the two major powers still remained enemies in that each claimed their ideologies to be universally valid. In certain cases, the most inexpiable struggles are those involving the confrontation not of national interests (a province, a border line) but rather this nonmaterial good—the glory of preeminence, the power, at last uncontested, of no longer having a rival at one's side. No one can say whether, in the absence of nuclear weapons, the victors of World War II would have resolved their conflict by force. There is little doubt that possession of these weapons contributed to a preference for peaceful solutions.

In many respects, duopoly is a less unpredictable situation than one involving numerous participants. The situation was all the more stable as long as each of the duopolists exercised virtually uncontested power within its own camp. The United States and the Soviet Union avoided direct confrontation as much as possible. West Germany, the state least satisfied by the status quo, has not had an autonomous diplomacy vis-à-vis Pankow or Moscow. In

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Asia, until the schism between the Soviet Union and Communist China, the leaders of the Kremlin, sole possessors of a nuclear force capable of counterbalancing America's, retained, in case of crisis, the means of influencing the decisions of the North Koreans and the Chinese. Thus the two major powers imperceptibly acquired the habit of pursuing their politico-ideological rivalry while keeping the risks of an "unthinkable war" at a minimum.

Technico-strategic precautions reinforced political prudence. Analysts in institutes and universities envisioned the possibility of a war involving the use of nuclear weapons which neither side desired. U.S. statesmen, especially, did their utmost to take precautions in order to attenuate such a danger. Security mechanisms were developed to prevent the accidental explosion of a bomb and to prevent an officer, no matter what his grade, from making the decision to utilize nuclear weapons without having received an order from the President of the United States (the latter alone has the legal authority to make such a decision and, thanks to electronics, these weapons are for the most part physically impossible to use without that decision), and finally to prevent extreme escalation if, by some misfortune, in spite of every effort, an atomic bomb should be set off.

These sophisticated technico-political precautions are the expression of a strategic concept that is not so much new as renovated. The two major wars of the 20th century had been, from a certain point of view, total wars: World War I, having broken out over an obscure conflict in the Balkans and spread through the alliance system, had, to the surprise of most of the generals and statesmen, lasted over four years, thanks to the improvised mobilization of all able-bodied men in combat units and factories. The close relationship between the military and industrial spheres foreseen by certain sociologists at the beginning of the 19th century was readily apparent. The diplomatic system of Old Europe, the centre of the world system, crumbled under the weight of the war and the revolutions it brought with it. World War II was still more total, since the Japanese attempt at empire building had accompanied that of the Third Reich, and the very existence of the sovereignty of the defeated states had been suspended for a period that the victors themselves reserved the right to determine.

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Public opinion and the private views of statesmen were haunted by the spectre of these total wars, and tended to be limited to an absolute alternative of peace or war. Since 1945, because of thermonuclear bombs, the efforts of strategic thinking, the Cunning of Reason, those responsible for world politics have finally understood the lesson of Clausewitz: absolute war—one resulting from unlimited escalation—is not a model, but a menace, a menace that can be warded off as long as the means of force remain in the service of policy, the "intelligence of the state." It falls to this intelligence to weigh the risks that must be run, and the sacrifices that it is legitimate to accept to attain a goal.

On the one hand, the blurring of the distinction between war and peace has brought about the bellicose peace: the permanent mobilization of the nuclear apparatus, the limited use of military force here and there throughout the world, the qualitative race for armaments, with each of the major powers devoting billions and billions of dollars to the development of bombs, missiles, planes, and ever more sophisticated conventional weapons. It has also made total war less probable—that monstrous and absurd war in which thermonuclear powers heap upon one another, as in an orgy, all the means of destruction at their disposal. The strategy of the flexible response has become a fact at times of crisis—the strategy of all nuclear powers, despite the fact that in periods of calm certain states will proclaim the doctrine of massive retaliation—futile talk so long as the hour of reckoning does not sound.

For twenty years, nuclear weapons have constantly been placed at the service of a defensive strategy; in their military concept they are not a primary but a final recourse. The very term *deterrent* suggests this defensive use. To deter someone is to prevent him from taking certain action under threat of sanctions. Why would the sanction be necessarily or immediately unlimited? For ten to fifteen years, the obsession over the preceding wars, the confusion over nuclear weapons, and the strategy of deterrence was such that the weapons themselves were called a deterrent, as if any weapon were not, in certain cases, a deterrent in the hands of a determined man. Neither of the two nuclear powers has ever tried, until now, to obtain a modification of the status quo at the expense of the other or the surrender of a nonnuclear power by the threat of using these weapons. In Cuba, the United States restored the *status*

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quo ante; in Berlin, the Soviets finally accommodated themselves to the military presence of the West in West Berlin.

Circumstances have likewise favoured limitations on the use of conventional weapons. The nuclear powers alone possessed large stocks of these, and after the Korean campaign they feared to use them wherever there was a possibility of escalation. Elsewhere, the states involved in conflicts possessed relatively few weapons. The United Nations served as an intermediary between the two major powers and the states directly involved, standing behind the peace efforts made by one or another of the major powers, or even by the member-states as a whole.

Finally, the submachine gun has been widely used to prosecute wars of liberation, and these have, for the most part, ended in the victory of the guerrillas. There have been exceptions, however—in the Philippines and in Malaysia. But these wars have tended to result in the independence of countries formerly subject to colonial domination. Now U.S. and Soviet opinion were in agreement with Afro-Asian countries in condemning en bloc, on principle, the governing of coloured peoples by white men (even though the same condemnation did not extend to the governing of Asian peoples by the Russians). The Europeans never went the whole way in using their military force in these colonial struggles. The French, who fought from 1946 to 1954 in Indochina, from 1954 to 1962 in Algeria, never attacked the logistical bases of the guerrillas in China, in Tunisia, or in Morocco. In one case, they did not have the indispensable military resources; in the other, they were paralyzed by a guilty conscience, by the opposition of their allies and that of a segment of French opinion. Nonetheless, in 1962, thanks to the fortified lines along the borders, the isolation of Algeria had succeeded in choking out the guerrillas. The French government consented to Algerian independence not because the guerrillas had won on the battlefield but because, politically, no other solution was feasible in the long run.

From the moment that wars of liberation take on as their objective not the winning of independence from a colonial state but the installing of a regime identified by U.S. public opinion with communism, the guerrilla ceases, in the estimation of that opinion, to be a freedom fighter and becomes instead the perhaps sincere but blind militant of a despotic party, and the rules by which wars are

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fought are, and will be, changed. North Vietnam experienced the horrors of large-scale bombing because it supported the action of the Vietcong in the South.

The dialectic of the three weapons has, for twenty years, maintained peace among nuclear powers, favoured decolonization with minimum diplomatic upheaval, and restrained the use of conventional weapons. Will this dialectic play the same role in the decades ahead?

DIALECTIC OF WEAPONS

As far as thermonuclear weapons are concerned, there are three sets of conditions necessary to the prolongation of "peace through fear": *technical*—the maintenance of the balance of terror; *strategic*—the acceptance by all heads of state of the doctrine of so-called graduated response, progressive retaliation; and *political*—the nature of the conflict and the stakes.

The concept of flexible response by a cool head during a period of crisis requires that nuclear weapons be sufficiently dispersed or protected so that a first strike cannot eliminate the capacity for retaliation by any one of the states involved. This kind of stability depends therefore on the qualitative armaments race so far as the main powers are concerned, and on the acquisition of a nuclear apparatus (weapons and delivery vehicles) by new members of the atomic club.

The two major powers of the two decades after 1945 are both opposed to the proliferation of atomic weapons—the United States, with an ostentatious passion, the Soviet Union more discreetly. According to the law of probabilities, does not the danger of an explosion increase along with the number of bombs—or even more, with the number of states possessing them? This is irrefutable reasoning on an abstract plane, but far from reality: it assumes that the problem is resolved—in other words, that other states have decided to leave to two, three, or four among them the exclusive possession of weapons that are considered decisive in any modern conflict.

In theory, according to strict Machiavellian logic, the United States and the Soviet Union could have or even should have opposed at all costs the development of Chinese nuclear capability.

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However, the informal Russo-American alliance against atomic proliferation does not suffice to eliminate politico-ideological enmity. Furthermore, just as the nuclear powers have never used their supreme weapons offensively to compel the surrender of a state without such arms by imposing a choice between submission and annihilation, so too they have never attempted by such a threat to prevent the development of a new atomic force. All indications are that they will continue to respect the sovereignty of states—whether out of weakness or because of their mutual political antagonism—and resign themselves to an evolution contrary to their common interest.

Proliferation probably will not stop with the fifth nuclear power (China), but this does not mean that it will be unlimited, at least in the foreseeable future. Switzerland and Sweden would use such weapons to protect their neutrality—in other words, they will not be playing for the highest stakes. India will one day follow the lead of China, Israel that of France or Switzerland. This proliferation will not be without risks: one would have to be blind or to believe in the rationality of all statesmen to deny this. But the error of too many specialists is to confuse these numerous and diverse threats with the probability of the unthinkable war. The danger is probably smaller for the superpowers of today than for less important countries, who will have joined the atomic club without sufficient resources.

Under what conditions is peace through fear most stable? Where the forces of reprisal are least vulnerable, the states have both the will and the means to apply the doctrine of graduated response, and the disproportion between the cost and the stakes, between the risk of war and the violence of enmity, is enormous. All the conditions that further peace through fear are met in the case of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Short of an improbable technical breakthrough, they will persist during the decades ahead. They will not be met to the same extent elsewhere, in Asia or the Near East. But the United States and the Soviet Union will not allow themselves to be dragged unwillingly into a war of annihilation. The dissemination of nuclear weapons increases, to a degree that cannot be precisely assessed, the danger that, one day or another, nuclear weapons will be used militarily on some battlefield or other. At least for the next twenty or thirty

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years proliferation should not threaten the military foundation of the present order—the existence of arms so terrifying that even those who possess them keep them on reserve to be used only as an ultimate course. The greatest threat to mankind, then, is not that a few more states should come to possess nuclear weapons but that statesmen should begin to make a different use of their weapons in the diplomatic game.

The foundation of the present order of power, this anarchical order that tends toward the limitation of violence, is in the final analysis *psychological.* One reads in a report made to UNESCO that war begins in the minds of men. Such a simplistic theory is more false than true; in our times, one is tempted to state that the citizens of one state detest those of another because they have fought or are fighting them, rather than vice versa. In any event, if diplomatic conditions require a reversal of alliances, a well-designed propaganda campaign is sufficient to overcome collective passions or to direct them toward another goal. On the other hand, when some states possess means of destruction against which all the others cannot protect themselves, and to which they cannot respond, the essential focus lies predominantly in the minds of men, especially in those few who are responsible for the diplomacy or strategy of the nuclear powers.

The strictly defensive or deterrent use of atomic weapons is dictated by a certain logic. It has been rightly said that the very limitless nature of these weapons renders their effective utilization difficult. It has been rightly said that there is no common ground between the capacity to destroy and the ability to convince, between *strength* as it is measured according to strictly military potential and the *power* of a state to obtain the submission or consent of other states. It has been rightly said that never before have states so superior in strength as the United States and the Soviet Union been defied with impunity by dwarf states like Albania and Cuba. It has been rightly said that from now until the end of this century no state will even come close to attaining the economic and military potential of either of the superpowers. China and India, both larger in population, have not even gone beyond the first phase of industrialization. All the other states either have a much smaller population (and among industrialized countries, the Soviet Union and the United States have a relatively

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high demographic rate of growth) or a much lower per capita income. An American writer caused a scandal in 1964 by declaring that by the end of the century the two superpowers of today would outstrip their potential rivals even more decisively. The statement nonetheless was incontestable, provided two conditions prevail: that the Soviet Union and the United States maintain the same internal coherence and political will within their borders, and that potential resources be identified with military strength and diplomatic power.

In reality, what ought to have caused an outcry was not the very plausible prediction of a continued or enlarged gap between the resources at the disposal of the two major powers and those of other states, but rather the transition from resources to power and strength. At the beginning of the 1960s, observers were struck by the disintegration of the blocs, by the impunity of the smaller states, by the apparent uselessness of nuclear weapons in daily relations or even in struggles for national liberation. It is to be hoped that this disproportion between the power of destruction and the power of persuasion might be prolonged and increased, but it is not determined solely by the nature of weapons or by the dialectic of the three weapons. For the time being, happily, statesmen are paralyzed by the "atomic taboo." The atomic weapon, like the gold reserves used to back currency, is buried in the ground and accumulated in stockpiles, although always ready to be used. To paraphrase Clausewitz, one might say that nuclear weapons allow firm commitments to be honoured and credit operations to be paid in cash. But nuclear weapons are not employed physically, any more than gold is removed from the storage vaults. The crisis—with its exchanges of threats and messages, its dialogue of affirmations of will—is the equivalent of what Clausewitz called commitment.

The true question concerning the future thus involves the continuation of this fragile order, founded at once on a strategic doctrine gradually and spontaneously elaborated by the protagonists of history, and on prohibitions arising out of the depths of the human conscience—or perhaps, one might say, out of the collective unconsciousness. Will the superpowers respect the imperative of the solely deterrent use of nuclear weapons? Will not the inclusion of new members in the atomic club push them to

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reestablish, through defense against ballistic missiles or civil defense, the margin of superiority that the progress of the Chinese and the Europeans threatens to reduce? Will the smaller nuclear powers be capable of the same moderation if their so-called retaliatory force is vulnerable? Will not the states that have reduced their conventional weapons to a minimum in order to acquire a nuclear force be driven some day to the choice between passivity (that is, defeat) or a violation of the atomic taboo?

Finally, and above all, a question that one hesitates even to pose can hardly fail to haunt the minds of those who are concerned about the future. As long as war is and remains an act of violence in which one collective person attempts to compel another collective person, the offensive use of the nuclear threat is morally and even materially difficult: if the person one is bent on bringing to surrender remains indifferent to the warning shots, if "Ruritania" allows first one, and then two of its cities to be destroyed rather than surrender, what choice do the superpowers have in ending destruction that becomes more futile than monstrous? It may be recognized once again that man is capable of preferring his reasons for living over his very life! The order of power in the atomic age is thus founded on the *atomic taboo,* the rational strategy of the major powers, and the courage of historic man. But what might happen the day when the states involved are no longer comparable to "collective persons," each seeking to obtain the submission of the other, but to a Hitler bent on exterminating an entire race deemed to be a noxious animal species?

Heaven forbid that there should ever be a statesman who would view nuclear weapons not only as deterrent weapons—that is, instruments to be used in human dialogue—but also as arms of extermination.

THE ORDER OF POWER

An anarchical order is normally inegalitarian to the extent to which, in the absence of a common law or an impartial police, the powerful prevail over the weak. Thus, Plato's Callicles deemed natural (in conformity with nature) the domination of the most powerful. According to Spinoza and Hobbes, in the absence of civil society power determines rights. Philosophers did not ignore

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the fact that at least a principle of equality exists between individuals. The weak man is still able, in certain circumstances, to kill the strong man. Man does not act as man when he kills his fellow as the hunter kills his prey: the essential quality of victory is lost when the defeated is no longer present to recognize his defeat.

The anarchical order of the international system has always been inegalitarian. In the most complex system, that of the Greek city-states or of the European states prior to 1914, the great powers constituted a closed club with membership reserved to sovereigns possessing a minimum of military strength. The question attributed to Stalin during the last war: —"How many divisions does the Pope have?"—roughly interprets a traditional doctrine. A great power would feel it had been offended if it were not consulted when an important affair was discussed. Eventually, the great powers settled affairs involving lesser powers among themselves; sometimes they imposed a status (neutrality) or borders upon smaller states solely to avoid or to settle their own conflicts.

Nuclear weapons have not decisively modified this customary order of power. The present order is both more and less inegalitarian than international orders of the past. It is less so for two reasons. The first is the egalitarian ideal of modern civilization. The likening of "political units" to "collective persons" is suggested by the language we use, by the reigning ideology, by our anticolonialist passion. No distinction is made between the liberation of peoples and the liberation of individuals (or rather, the former is placed before the latter). The separation of ethnic groups, as we have seen, is a means of eliminating inequalities among individuals belonging to one or another of them. The old principle of European *ius gentium* (international law), implying a certain equality between states—an equality arising out of the recognized sovereignty of all states—is reinforced and enlarged by the egalitarian design of our period. The international law of the last century did not exclude the protectorate, foreign concessions (so-called unequal treaties), or the managing of certain public services in an independent state by bureaucrats from other countries representing the so-called community of civilized nations. Again, following World War I, the mandate principle implied a hierarchy among states, in that the mandatory states were by this very fact recognized as worthy of administering "dependent peoples," of

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working for their welfare and development. The liquidation in two decades of almost all colonial administrations consecrated the triumph of the egalitarian idea on the world level, but at the same time it increased the real inequalities between states that were juridically equal, at least in their sovereignty, and it enlarged the divergence between the legal theory espoused by the United Nations and the realities of international politics.

The elimination of protectorates, mandates, or colonies, the equal voting right of "Ruritania" and the United States in the United Nations General Assembly, consecrates the triumph of the egalitarian ideal in our century. But this has not been the sole agent of our historic revolution. The unarmed member of the Resistance, or the man armed with a submachine gun, Gandhi or Giap, forced the Europeans to recall the ideal they had proclaimed in Europe; and nuclear weapons at first promoted the revolt of the coloured peoples because the two states that possessed them had no colonies in the ordinary meaning of the term (although the Soviet Union maintains a multinational empire carved out by great sweeps of the sword, while Latin Americans denounce U.S. hegemony, if not Yankee imperialism).

This double equalization—in refusing a hierarchy between ethnic groups or states and in the dialectic of the submachine gun and advanced weapons—is likewise a function of the heterogeneity of the international system, whose members are held to be equal, while from all points of view (extent of territory, volume of population, per capita income, degree of development) they have never been so unequal in any of the systems of the past. We observe the denouement of this paradox every day: a combination of formal democracy and real oligarchy, to borrow our nouns from the Greeks and our adjectives from Marx. The two major powers, and especially the United States, possess all means of force—both conventional and nuclear weapons, and they can mobilize immense resources to back their foreign policy.

Anarchy continues to exist because there are two of them, and they cannot even agree to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons which is clearly in their common interest. The authority exercised by each of the major powers on its bloc is directly related to the fear aroused by the other. Peaceful coexistence therefore actually produces a loosening of the blocs. Elsewhere, in the Third

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World, the will of the major powers encounters the revolt of the masses and the submachine gun of the guerrilla.

The power of the two oligarchs is neither assured nor unlimited. Between now and the end of the century, two evolutions—the one probable, the other as certain as a historic evolution can be—will tend to curtail that power. Nuclear weapons have not been used militarily, but without them the Chinese Nationalists would not retain Quemoy and Matsu, and American bombers would not attack North Vietnam. The United States owes its freedom of action in Asia and even in Africa to its nuclear supremacy. It is probable that the military gap between first-rate and second-rate nuclear powers will decrease within the next decades and, by virtue of this, the planetary system will be less unified than it is today. Even though they may not be capable of striking American territory, the Chinese nuclear force will exercise a certain deterrence on American diplomacy. The superpowers will have to resign themselves to giving up their presence in the four corners of the globe.

One aspect of the deterrence which is not in doubt is the rise of China; this will almost certainly bring about the dissociation of the Soviet camp and the "nationalization" of the Marxist-Leninist party religions. It is permissible to speculate on the consequences of this prime factor, on the realignments that it will give rise to, on the relative weight of East and West, of Asia, America, and Europe in the world of the year 2000. But such is not within the scope of this chapter.

Our objective was more modest. The order of power—that is, the interstate order—has always been anarchical and oligarchical: anarchical because of the absence of a monopoly of legitimate violence, oligarchical (or hierarchic) in that, without civil society, rights depend largely on might. We asked ourselves how this traditional order had been adapted to technological civilization. Our conclusion is that this order has been transformed, but not overturned. Pessimists prophesy the collective suicide of mankind failing a kind of historic mutation such as would be denoted by the renunciation of military sovereignty by states. Optimists believe in peace through fear, in the end of the domination of peoples by peoples, since domination does not pay.

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We have no grounds to decide in favour of one or the other. Mankind has always lived dangerously. The dangers are no longer the same, but they have not disappeared. One mankind, united under a single rational administration in order to exploit natural resources, would constitute one possible end of the human adventure. The adventure is still far from this final state, conforming not to *the* logic of history but to *a* partial logic that fascinates because it at once attracts and repels. Would man achieve fulfillment or perdition were he to arrive at the Promised Land of the world-state of technology?

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Emma Rothschild

What is Security?[1]

PRINCIPLES OR DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY are a well-established institution of international politics. They are of great importance, in particular, to the ceremonials of reconstruction after large international wars. When Descartes died in Stockholm in the winter of 1650, he had recently completed the verse text for a ballet called "The Birth of Peace," which was performed at the Swedish court in celebration of the Treaty of Westphalia, the birthday of Queen Christina, and the "golden peace" that was to follow the Thirty Years' War.[2] All the great postwar settlements of modern times have since been accompanied, at Vienna in 1815, at Versailles in 1919, and at San Francisco in 1945, by new principles of international security. One principle has been thought to echo to the next, across the turbulent intervening times. Harold Nicolson set out in 1919 for the Conference of Paris with a "slim and authentic little volume" about the Congress of Vienna; he addressed his own account of the Versailles proceedings, some years later, to "the young men who will be in attendance upon the British Commissioners to the Conference of Montreal in 1965."[3]

The Cold War was also a large international conflict. Like the two world wars and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, it came to an end with momentous changes in the political configuration of Europe, and it, too, has been followed by a new political interest in principles of security. The principles of the incipient post-Cold War settlement have no Woodrow Wilson (or no Castlereagh) and no imposing Congress. But they already have

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an epigram in the idea, much discussed since 1989, of the security of individuals as an object of international policy: of "common security" or "human security." This essay will look at the proposed new principles in a historical and critical perspective. They are not conspicuously new, as will be seen, and they suggest troublesome questions about what it means to have (or to act on) a "principle of security." They are neither concise statements of received wisdom (like Castlereagh's "just equilibrium"), nor inspirational (like the self-determination for "well-defined national elements" of Woodrow Wilson's Four Principles); they have not been embodied in new international organizations (like the settlement of 1945). But this disorderliness is also a strength; the international politics of the post-Cold War world is itself disorderly, verbose, and only intermittently inspirational. It is closer, in this respect, to the politics of the Congress of Vienna than to Versailles or San Francisco; it is particularly close, as will be seen, to the pluralist politics of the generation that preceded the new world order of 1815.

The war against the French Revolution has been taken as a standard, at least since Henry Kissinger's encomium to Metternich and Castlereagh, for the long Cold War. But it is the ideas of the Revolution itself, or at least of its early and liberal supporters, that have become newly conspicuous in the post-Cold War settlement. The "liberal internationalism" of the 1990s—a liberalism disengaged, in Stanley Hoffmann's words, from its nineteenth-century "embrace of national self-determination"—is close to the liberalism of Kant, Condorcet, or Adam Smith.[4] So is the commitment to an international "civil society."[5] "The essence of a revolutionary situation is its self-consciousness," Kissinger wrote; "principles," in such a situation, "are so central that they are constantly talked about."[6] My objective is to describe the distinctively self-conscious principles of the 1990s, and their possible political consequences. These principles are evocative, as will be seen, of the liberal ideas—including ideas of security—of the end of the eighteenth century. But they also hold out the promise of a different liberal theory; of a theory that is freed, in particular, from the dichotomies so characteristic of the 1815 settlement, of English versus French liberalisms, or of domestic versus international politics.

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EXTENDED SECURITY

The ubiquitous idea, in the new principles of the 1990s, is of security in an "extended" sense. The extension takes four main forms. In the first, the concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals. In the second, it is extended from the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the nation to the biosphere. The extension, in both cases, is in the sorts of entities whose security is to be ensured. In the third operation, the concept of security is extended horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question. Different entities (such as individuals, nations, and "systems") cannot be expected to be secure or insecure in the same way; the concept of security is extended, therefore, from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or "human" security. In a fourth operation, the political responsibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these "concepts of security") is itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market.

The geometry of the proposed new principles is in these terms of dizzying complexity. But something close to this scheme has become virtually a commonplace of international political discussions in the 1990s. The emphasis on the security and sovereignty of individuals, for example, was of conspicuous importance in the Eastern European revolutions, and in particular to Václav Havel (following John Stuart Mill); "the sovereignty of the community, the region, the nation, the state," Havel wrote, "makes sense only if it is derived from the one genuine sovereignty—that is, from the sovereignty of the human being."[7] The foreign policy speeches of the Clinton administration contained repeated references in 1993 and 1994 to extended or "human" security, including to "a new understanding of the meaning and nature of national security and of the role of individuals and nation-states."[8] The international Commission on Global Governance was the exponent, in 1995, of

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vertically extended security: "Global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states to the security of people and the planet."[9] The United Nations Development Program took as the principal theme of its 1994 Human Development Report the transition "from nuclear security to human security," or to "the basic concept of human security," defined as safety from "such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression," and "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions."[10] The United Nations Secretary-General called in 1995 for a "conceptual breakthrough," going "beyond armed territorial security" (as in the institutions of 1945) towards enhancing or protecting "the security of people in their homes, jobs and communities."[11]

These ideas of extended security are hardly new in the 1990s. They are a development, to take one example, of the idea of common security put forward in the 1982 Report of the Palme Commission. Common security was understood, in the Report, in a quite restricted sense. It was presented as a way for nations to organize their security in the presence of nuclear weapons: "states can no longer seek security at each other's expense; it can be attained only through cooperative undertakings." But the Report also pointed towards several more extensive conceptions. One was that security should be thought of in terms of economic and political, as well as military objectives; that military security is a means, while the economic security of individuals, or the social security of citizens "to chart futures in a manner of their own choosing," or the political security that follows when "the international system [is] capable of peaceful and orderly change" were ends in themselves. Another was that lasting security should be founded on an effective system of "international order." As Cyrus Vance wrote, "the problems of nuclear and conventional arms are reflections of weaknesses in the international system. It is a weak system because it lacks a significant structure of laws and norms of behaviour which are accepted and observed by all states." A third conception was that security is a process as much as a condition, and one in which the participants are individuals and groups—"popular and political" opinion, Olof Palme wrote in his introduction to the Report—as well as governments and states.[12]

The new security ideas of the early 1980s were the reflection, in turn, of many earlier discussions. "Over the past decade or so a

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vast array of public interest organizations have begun to put forward alternate conceptions of national security," Richard Ullman wrote in 1983 of the debate in the United States over extended or redefined security.[13] Such proposals were indeed an intermittent feature of the entire Cold War period, and even of the preceding postwar settlement. The historian E. H. Carr had thus argued in 1945, in *Nationalism and After,* for a "system of pooled security" in which "security for the individual" was a prime objective, and in which it would become possible to "divorce international security and the power to maintain it from frontiers and the national sovereignty which they represent." Carr's view of the previous 1919 settlement as "the last triumph of the old fissiparous nationalism"—"we shall not again see a Europe of twenty, and a world of more than sixty, 'independent sovereign states'"—was hardly prescient; nor was his confidence in the diminution of national sentiment in existing "multinational" states (the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union). But his "social" or "functional" internationalism is strikingly close, nonetheless, to the extended security of the 1990s: its premise is a "shift in emphasis from the rights and well-being of the national group to the rights and well-being of the individual man and woman. . .transferred to the sphere of international organization."[14]

PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY

The new political preoccupation with these old ideas corresponds, in the 1990s, to new political interests. "It is not profitable to embark on the fine analysis of a definition unless we have decided on the purpose for which the definition is wanted," John Hicks once said of the economists' dispute over the definition of capital.[15] One purpose of principles or definitions of security is thus to provide some sort of guidance to the policies made by governments. Principles of security may be derived or described by theorists, but they are followed or held by officials. This is what could be described as the "naive" view of the debate over principles of security, in that it assumes that principles are indeed important in the organization of policy. It is this view that was dismissed with condescension by Castlereagh in his famous State Paper of 1820 about the "principles" of intervention by one European power in

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the internal affairs of another (in this case, the constitutional revolution in Spain). Great Britain, Castlereagh said, "is the last Govt. in Europe which can be expected, or can venture to commit Herself on any Question of an abstract character. . . .This country cannot, and will not, act upon abstract and speculative Principles of Precaution."[16]

A second purpose of principles of security is to guide public opinion about policy, to suggest a way of thinking about security, or principles to be held by the people on behalf of whom policy is to be made. Castlereagh gave as the reason for his prudent "maxims" the peculiar circumstances of British politics: "a System of Government strongly popular, and national in its character," and one in which "public opinion," "daily Discussion in our Parliament," and "the General Political situation of the Government" are of decisive importance for foreign policy.[17] But public opinion is itself influenced by principles or concepts. Some crises are "intelligible" or recognizable to the public mind, in Castlereagh's description, while others are not, and the process of recognition is influenced by ideas about security. The quest for principles or epigrams of foreign policy has for this reason (among others) been of fairly consistent interest to nineteenth and twentieth-century statesmen, and to their intellectual adjuncts. Equilibrium was "Castlereagh's favourite word," according to J. A. R. Marriott.[18] Even the idea of nuclear deterrence was most compelling as a popular idea; an idea which provided "reassurance," to use Michael Howard's term.[19]

A third, related purpose of principles or definitions of security is to contest existing policies. To dispute the foundations of policy is one way—an often effective way in a strongly popular system of government—to subvert public support for policies to which one is opposed. The interest in new concepts of security was thus encouraged, in the late 1970s and 1980s, by quite disparate groups. Critics of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) nuclear weapons policies, for example, questioned whether current deployments and doctrines provided security, even against the threat of nuclear war, and supported different and less confrontational policies (such as "confidence-building measures"). Other critics were opposed to all "offensive" military deployments. Yet others, particularly in the United States, favored domestic over interna-

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tional commitments; economic and environmental security were described as more fundamental objectives than military security, and expenditure on defense was compared to expenditure on other, civil (and often domestic) objectives. The politics of extended security is substantially different in the 1990s, in that it has engaged the theorists as well as the critics of military establishments. If security is the objective of military and intelligence organizations, and if the sources of insecurity have changed in character (with the end of the Cold War), then a condition for redefining the role of the "security forces" is redefining security: to contest old policies and to promote new ones.

The fourth and crudest purpose of principles of security is to influence directly the distribution of money and power. A public interest organization concerned with environmental programs, for example, might hope that by promoting ideas of environmental security, it would bring about a change in government policy such that less money was spent on military deployments, and more on environmental programs. A change in the objectives of policy from military to economic security would bring a change in government expenditure from ministries of defense to ministries of commerce or of foreign relations. A change in the definition of military security to include the prevention of conflicts by the deployment of peacekeeping forces would bring an increase, or prevent a decrease, in expenditure on military forces. The keenest proponents of extended security, in the 1990s, include officials of organizations (such as the United Nations and its development agencies, or humanitarian, nongovernmental organizations) that would benefit from changes in international policy towards expenditure on civil objectives. They also include academics who have benefited from the fairly resilient support by US and European foundations for projects on extended security (including the projects for which this essay was prepared); several of these foundations, in turn, have had the objective of influencing or contesting existing security policies.[20]

The main concern of this essay is nonetheless with the first purpose of principles of security, as described above: with the naive, or naive idealist, position that principles, including abstract principles, do matter to international policy. Castlereagh himself, in speaking of the maxims of British prudence, was setting out the

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principles of a policy that repudiated abstract or systematic principles. Such principles are perhaps especially important to a government whose "general political situation" depends (in Castlereagh's words) on the "public mind." One of the presumptions of eighteenth-century liberal thought was that people tend to think in principles; Adam Smith suggested to statesmen that they "will be more likely to persuade" if they evoke the pleasure that people derive from beholding "a great system of public police."[21] As Friedrich Gentz wrote in 1820 of Castlereagh's memorandum, it was well suited to a government, such as England's, which "owes an account of its conduct to Parliament, and to a nation which is not satisfied with an order of business in the gazettes, which wants to know the why and the wherefore of everything (*'le pourquoi du pourquoi'*)."[22]

"Politics would be led into frequent errors, were it to build too confidently on the presumption, that the interest of every government is a criterion of its conduct," Gentz himself wrote a few years earlier. One reason was that "the true interest of a nation is a matter of much extent and uncertainty; the conception of which depends greatly upon the point of view in which it is contemplated, and of course upon the ability to choose the proper one." Another was the intertwining of the public and the private: "it must likewise be confessed, that even the immediate interests of states are oftener sacrificed to private views and passions, than is generally imagined."[23] There is a naive realism that is at least as misleading as the naive idealism of the unending search for principles, including principles of security.

WHAT IS SECURITY?

The idea of security has been at the heart of European political thought since the crises of the seventeenth century. It is also an idea whose political significance, like the senses of the word "security," has changed continually over time. The permissive or pluralistic understanding of security, as an objective of individuals and groups as well as of states—the understanding that has been claimed in the 1990s by the proponents of extended security—was characteristic, in general, of the period from the mid-seventeenth century to the French Revolution. The principally military sense of the

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word "security," in which security is an objective of states, to be achieved by diplomatic or military policies, was by contrast an innovation, in much of Europe, of the epoch of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. But security was seen throughout the period as a condition both of individuals and of states. Its most consistent sense—and the sense that is most suggestive for modern international politics—was indeed of a condition, or an objective, that constituted a *relationship* between individuals and states or societies.

"My definition of the State," Leibniz wrote in 1705, "or of what the Latins call *Respublica* is: that it is a great society of which the object is common security (*'la seureté commune'*)."[24] For Montesquieu, security was a term in the definition of the state, and also in the definition of freedom: "political freedom consists in security, or at least in the opinion which one has of one's security."[25] Security, here, is an objective of individuals. It is something in whose interest individuals are prepared to give up other goods. It is a good that depends on individual sentiments—the opinion one has of one's security—and that in turn makes possible other sentiments, including the disposition of individuals to take risks, or to plan for the future.

The understanding of security as an individual good, which persisted throughout the liberal thought of the eighteenth century, reflected earlier political ideas. The Latin noun "securitas" referred, in its primary classical use, to a condition of individuals, of a particularly inner sort. It denoted composure, tranquillity of spirit, freedom from care, the condition that Cicero called the "object of supreme desire," or "the absence of anxiety upon which the happy life depends." One of the principal synonyms for "securitas," in the *Lexicon Taciteum,* is *"Sicherheitsgefühl"*: the feeling of being secure.[26] The word later assumed a different and opposed meaning, still in relation to the inner condition of the spirit: it denoted not freedom from care but carelessness or negligence.

Adam Smith, in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments,* used the word "security" in Cicero's or Seneca's sense, of the superiority to suffering that the wise man can find within himself. In the *Wealth of Nations,* security is less of an inner condition, but it is still a condition of individuals. Smith indeed identifies "the liberty and

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security of individuals" as the most important prerequisites for the development of public opulence; security is understood, here, as freedom from the prospect of a sudden or violent attack on one's person or property.[27] It is in this sense the object of expenditure on justice, and of civil government itself.[28] There is no reference to security, by contrast, in Smith's discussion of expenditure on defense ("the first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies").[29] The only security mentioned is that of the sovereign or magistrate as an individual, or what would now be described as the internal security of the state: Smith argues that if a sovereign has a standing army to protect himself against popular discontent, then he will feel himself to be in a condition of "security" such that he can permit his subjects considerable liberty of political "remonstrance."[30]

The security of individuals in this sense—the sense of freedom from the prospect, and thus the fear, of personal violation—has been of decisive importance to liberal political thought.[31] The word "security" in fact assumed a new public significance in the early, liberal period of the French Revolution. The natural rights of man, in Tom Paine's translation of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* of August 1789, consisted of Liberty, Property, Security, and Resistance of Oppression. Security—or *"sûreté"*—was still a condition of individuals: it was a private right, opposed, during the Terror, to the public safety (*salut*) of the Committee for Public Safety. In Condorcet's outline of a new Declaration of Rights in 1793, "security consists of the protection which society accords to each citizen, for the conservation of his person, his property, and his rights." Security was conceived, still, in terms of freedom from personal attack; the constitutional scholar Alengry explained Condorcet's conception of security, in 1904, as "close to the Anglo-Saxon idea of *habeas corpus*."[32] It was to be ensured, henceforth, by society: by the "social pact" or the "social guarantee" of a universal civil society.

The guarantee of security was extended, in the reform proposals of the same period, to include protection against sudden or violent deterioration in the standard of living of individuals. Leibniz had urged the rulers of Germany after the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 to turn, once the (military) "security" of their countries was ensured,

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to a project of social insurance against accidents, an "*Assecurations-Casse*"; a republic or a civil society, he said, was like a ship or a company, directed towards "common welfare."[33] Condorcet's project of social security, almost a century later, had a wider political objective. The new schemes for social insurance, to be provided either by public or by private establishments, were intended to prevent misery by increasing "the number of families whose lot is secured," to bring about a different sort of society, or "something which has never before existed anywhere, a rich, active, populous nation, without the existence of a poor and corrupted class."[34] The economic security of individuals was itself of political significance, as the condition for an active political society. The central idea of liberalism, in Judith Shklar's description, is that all individuals should be able to take decisions about their lives "without fear or favor."[35] Fear, and the fear of fear, were for Condorcet the enemies of liberal politics. If people were so insecure as to live in fear of destitution, in his scheme, then they were not free to take decisions, including the decision to be part of a political society.

Individual security, in the liberal thought of the Enlightenment, is thus both an individual and a collective good. It is a condition, and an objective, of individuals. But it is one that can only be achieved in some sort of collective enterprise. It is quite different, in this sense, from the inner and introspective security of Roman political thought. It is different, too, from the security with which individuals can be endowed, by a benevolent or charitable or humanitarian authority. It is something that individuals get for themselves, in a collective or contractual enterprise. The enterprise is in turn something to be endlessly revised and reviewed. Security is not good in itself, without regard to the process by which it is achieved. The state (together with powerful small collectivities such as guilds or communities, operating under the protection of the state) can be a source both of insecurity and of a security that is itself oppressive.[36] Its most important function is to ensure justice for individuals: "of all the words which console and reassure men," Condorcet wrote before the Revolution, "justice is the only one which the oppressor does not dare to pronounce, while humanity is on the lips of all tyrants."[37]

The new idea of security as a principally collective good, to be ensured by military or diplomatic means—the idea that came into

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European prominence in the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars—was strikingly different. Individuals and states had been seen as similes for one another, at least since Grotius's earliest writings on natural rights; individuals were thought to be *like* states, just as states were like individuals.[38] The security of states against external, military attack, too—the "*Sicherheit*" or the *assecuratio pacis* of the Münster deliberations before the Treaty of Westphalia—had been a commonplace of political discussion in Germany throughout the eighteenth century.[39] Herder indeed spoke sarcastically, in 1774, of the continuing preoccupation with "Order and Security," with the security of Europe and the world ("*Ordnung und Sicherheit der Welt*"), and with "Uniformity, Peace and Security" ("*Einformigkeit, Friede und Sicherheit*").[40] But in France, as in England, the collective sense of the words *"sûreté," "securité,"* and "security" was an innovation, most conspicuously, of the very end of the eighteenth century.

It was in the military period of the French Revolution, above all, that the security of individuals was subsumed, as a political epigram, in the security of the nation. Rousseau described the social contract, much like Locke or Montesquieu, as the outcome of the desire of individuals for security of life and liberty: "this is the fundamental problem to which the institution of the state provides the solution."[41] But the ensuing collectivity was itself *like* an individual, with a unique or individual will. International order—like war, in Rousseau's description—was a "relation between states, not a relation between men."[42] For Kant, both individuals and states seek "calm and security" in law: in the case of states, in the public security ("*öffentlichen Staatsicherheit*") of a cosmopolitan system.[43] Condorcet himself, who was profoundly opposed to Rousseau's conception of a general will as the foundation of political choice (and to his idea of national education to inculcate patriotic virtues), was caught up in the new rhetoric of military security. He too spoke by 1792 of the security or *"sûreté"* of the collectivity: France would accept peace, he said, if it were compatible with "the independence of national sovereignty, with the security of the state."[44]

Paine's translation of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* in 1791 can be seen, indeed, as one of the last great uses of the word in the old sense. The great public uses of "security" in the new,

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national sense can be dated even more precisely. Before the Congress of Vienna assembled in 1814, the victorious Allies signed the First Peace of Paris with the newly restored King of France. In the words of the Treaty, France was once again to become, under the "paternal government of its Kings," a guarantee of "security and stability" (*"un gage de securité et de stabilité"*) for Europe. The object of the coming negotiations, the new French government stated at the formal opening of the Congress, was to "ensure the tranquillity of the world"; the epoch was now one in which the great powers had joined together to restore, in the "mutual relations of states," "the security of thrones" (*"la sûreté des trônes"*).[45]

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The new security principles of the end of the twentieth century constitute a rediscovery, of sorts, of this late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century politics. One of the celebrated political metaphors of the post-Cold War period is Gunter Grass's, of the unfreezing of the germs of European nationalism, conserved for half a century in the ice of Cold War confrontation. But there is another, less biotic metaphor, in which it is the politics of liberal internationalism that has been unfrozen: not after half a century, but rather after two centuries of confrontation, between militant (and military) revolution and militant conservatism. "It was the Revolutionary power more particularly in its Military Character," Castlereagh said in 1820, that was for the Alliance the "object of its constant solicitude," and against which, exclusively, "it intended to take Precautions."[46] The identification of revolution with its military character, or with its prodigious and offensive military success—the memory of Custine's and Napoleon's armies, and the transposition of this memory into the identification of Revolutionary France and Soviet Russia—has been a continuing preoccupation of subsequent politics. It is only with the final disintegration of Soviet military power, or rather with the disengagement, in the early 1990s, of Russian military power from the Soviet rhetoric of revolution, that the long militarization of continental political confrontation has come to an at least temporary end.

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It was "the problem of peace and war," for François Furet, that in the course of the French Revolution "prohibited, in people's minds and in events, any liberal solution to the political crisis."[47] The political prospects of 1791 are poignantly incongruous in the retrospect of two centuries of militarized or militaristic revolution: the proposed governments, for example, in which Condorcet was to be Minister of Finance, and Talleyrand Minister of Foreign Affairs.[48] But the liberal solutions envisaged in the early 1790s are perhaps more convincing now, at least in international relations, than they have been for much of the intervening period. This seems to be the opinion, in any case, of liberalism's opponents, if not of its (characteristically) muted supporters. "Liberalism is the real enemy" was the title of an article in 1992 by the English conservative critic Peregrine Worsthorne, in which he recounted the "regimental reunion" in East Berlin of "the remaining old guard of *Encounter*": the conclusion, he said, was that "worrying about communism intellectually—as against militarily—was a gigantic red herring, deflecting intellectual attention from liberalism, which was a much more dangerous enemy of civilisation."[49]

The two principal constituents of "human security" or "common security" in the 1990s—the insistence on human rights and the preoccupation with the "internationalization" of politics—were also the preoccupations of late Enlightenment liberalism. For János Kis, to describe something as a question of human rights is to identify it as of concern to the international community: "as human rights of a particular kind, minority rights belong under the protection of the community of nations."[50] "Our policies—foreign and domestic," Václav Havel says, "must grow out of ideas, above all out of the idea of human rights."[51] The opponents of such policies present them as the outcome, or last hurrah, of a half century of Western hegemony, of the epoch that began, for one leading political figure in Singapore, with the imposition on a temporarily powerless international society of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.[52] But the human rights of 1948 are also the rights of the American and French Revolutions, or what Condorcet, speaking of the influence of the American Revolution in Europe, described as "the natural rights of humanity." These rights begin with "the security of one's person, a security which includes the assurance that one will not be troubled by

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violence, either within one's family or in the use of one's faculties," and proceed, through "the security and the free enjoyment of one's property," to the right of political participation.[53] The new political rhetoric of human security in the 1990s is also the old rhetoric of natural or international rights.

The politics of "internationalization," in the post-Cold War period, is also oddly evocative of older political discussions. One of the preoccupations of liberal thought in the late Enlightenment was with the extension of rights to individual security, or rights of humanity, to individuals who were not citizens of the state in which the rights were being asserted: to women, to children, and to the propertyless and dependent within the territory of the state. Laborers, shop assistants, or women, in Kant's account, could not be citizens or "co-lawmakers." But they were nonetheless free (as human beings) and equal (as subjects); they were entitled to the protection of law as "co-beneficiaries," or partners in protection.[54] The next stage, in this extension of rights, or at least of the right to protection, was its further enlargement to individuals outside the state or political territory. If the public security of the state, in Kant's phrase, was to be achieved only in a cosmopolitan (a *"weltbürgerlichen"*) system, then individuals in one state must be co-citizens or co-partners, in some sense, with individuals elsewhere.

The international politics of individual security was indeed seen, much as it has been seen in the 1990s, as the consequence of an exorable "internationalization" of political, economic, and social life. If one thinks of the half century from the 1770s to the 1820s as a single epoch—the epoch of Condorcet and Talleyrand, for example, and not the epoch in which the Revolution "cut time in two"—then it was a period of intense interest in new international relationships of different sorts.[55] It was a time, for example, of tremendously increased information about events in other countries, and of quite self-conscious reflection on the political consequences of this information.[56] The dissatisfaction of the English public with cursory official gazettes—their interest in *"le pourquoi du pourquoi"*—was an essential element in Castlereagh's politics, as Gentz wrote. In Germany, too, the last quarter of the eighteenth century saw an explosion of journals concerned with "the internal affairs of states and with international relations."[57] Condorcet

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himself spent much of the Revolution as a journalist, for which he was excoriated by Robespierre: "hack writers hold in their hands the destiny of peoples," Robespierre said, and Lafayette, supported by Condorcet, would have risen to power surrounded "by an army of journalists," and lifted on "a pile of pamphlets."[58]

A second preoccupation was with the increase not only in international information—the knowledge that people in one country had of events in other countries—but also in international influence. The actions of people in one country actually caused events in other countries. Herder, in his denunciation of the international culture of information (what he described as the *"Papierkultur!"*), spoke of the "shadow" of Europe over the entire world, and of the "power and machines" of modern times: "with one impulse, with one movement of the finger, entire nations can be convulsed."[59] It was not only princes and sovereigns who exercised new, distant influence, but ordinary citizens (or ordinary trading companies) as well. "The prodigious increase of the commercial and colonial system in all parts of the world," Gentz wrote, was the most significant development "in the political world since the Treaty of Westphalia." It had transformed continents, and it also transformed Europe itself: "it has even been the groundwork in the interior of states, of a great revolution in all the relations of society."[60]

A third concern was with the increased effectiveness, in international relations, of official policy. Castlereagh concluded that the Spanish crisis of 1820 did not constitute "a practical and intelligible Danger, capable of being brought home to the National Feeling," and was not sufficient, therefore, to justify military intervention by the British. But he emphasized that Britain could indeed have undertaken such an effort if she had wished to do so. Britain had "perhaps equal power with any other State" to oppose an intelligible danger: "she can interfere with effect."[61] One source of this new power was Britain's own military superiority, following the defeat of France. But for other states, too, the possibilities of international interference were greatly increased. Condorcet, looking ahead in 1792 to the formation of an independent federation of small German states, pointed out that new canals would make possible the rapid movement (if requested for the defense of the new federation) of "troops" and "munitions" from France. He

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also foresaw a fearsome world of multiple military interventions: "There would be no more freedom or peace on earth, if each government thought it had the right to employ force to establish in foreign countries the principles which it considers to be useful to its own interests."[62]

The fourth and most evocatively modern concern was with the increased scope of international politics itself. Castlereagh insisted on the intelligibility of international problems as a precondition for international interference—on the requirement that they should mean something to what he describes repeatedly in his state paper as "public sentiment," "public opinion," "the public mind."[63] To have information about some foreign event is a necessary condition, evidently, if an individual (or "the public") is to recognize that event as being of political importance. To have the possibility or power to "interfere with effect" is also necessary; political obligations, like moral obligations, are bounded by the limits of the possible, or of what Castlereagh called the practical. To have the sentiment that one stands in some sort of causal relationship to the event in question—the relationship of influence, for example—is of further political importance. We are inspired to passion, Hume said, by that which "bears a relation to us" or is in "some way associated with us"; "its idea must hang in a manner, upon that of ourselves."[64]

The societies for the abolition of slavery in the 1780s and 1790s—Condorcet's *Amis des Noirs,* for example, in which the pamphleteer William Playfair saw "the first step" to revolution—provide a good illustration.[65] Slavery, even outside the colonial territory, was recognized as a political problem by British and French public opinion in part because it was so evidently related to British and French policy, to British and French laws and commerce, and even to the tastes of British and French consumers (the taste for sugar, which British abolitionists—or "Anti-Saccharites"—refused in one of the first political revolts of modern consumers).[66] This recognition of the political importance, or at least of the political intelligibility, of the destinies of distant individuals was indeed a principal indicator, in some of the greatest liberal thought, of political enlightenment itself. "The spectacle of a great people where the rights of man are respected is useful to all others," Condorcet wrote in his observations on the influence of the Ameri-

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can Revolution in Europe: "It teaches us that these rights are everywhere the same."[67] Kant used the same image of a spectacle, a few years later, in speaking of the French Revolution. An "occurrence in our own times," he wrote, has revealed a view "into the unbounded future." The occurrence was a disposition; it was the sympathy of disinterested spectators for the French Revolution, in which "their reaction (because of its universality) proves that mankind as a whole shares a certain character in common."[68]

EXTENDED SECURITY AND EXTENDED POLICIES

The obvious shortcoming of the new ideas or principles of security of the 1990s, as was suggested earlier, is their inclusiveness: the dizzying complexity of a political geometry (*"tous azimuts"*) in which individuals, groups, states, and international organizations have responsibilities for international organizations, states, groups, and individuals. This inclusiveness, or incoherence, was also a characteristic of the earlier liberalism of international (and individual) security. One much discussed problem was that of psychological incoherence. If the individual is expected to recognize the rights of all other individuals, however remote, then she may disregard other, less remote individuals, or find herself so overburdened by the process of (political) recognition that she does nothing about anything: this is the old charge against liberalism (Edmund Burke's charge, for example), of coldness, or irresolution, or both.

The second and more serious problem is of political incoherence. The principal connotation of individual security in modern political thought, as has been seen, is as a relation between the individual and the state: security is an objective of individuals, but one that can only be achieved in a collective or political process. Even the idea of national or state security, in the sense that became widespread after 1815, refers to a collective process in which the participants are themselves states: the Westphalian settlement, or Kant's cosmopolitan federation, or the equilibrium of Europe. But the "human security" of the new international principles seems to impose relations that are only tenuously political. The security of an individual in one country is to be achieved through the agency of a state (or a substate group, or a suprastate organization) in another country. The individual is thereby very much less than a

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co-lawmaker, in Kant's sense, in the political procedure that ensures security. She is less, even, than a co-beneficiary (like a wife or a shop assistant); she is not even a partner in being protected.

The nonpolitical character of the new principles poses evident problems. To have a right means very little, in the liberal political theory with which we have been concerned, if one is not conscious of the right. Adam Smith, like Hume, criticized the theory of a tacit or original contract for individual security on the grounds that it ignored the consciousness of individual political subjects: "they are not conscious of it, and therefore cannot be bound by it."[69] For Condorcet, if individuals were not conscious of their rights, or did not understand them, then their rights were not "real"; this was one of his principal arguments for universal public instruction.[70] But the beneficiaries of the new international policies are not especially likely to be conscious political subjects in this sense. The individual who is "troubled by violence" does not know who to ask for protection (which agency of the United Nations, which nongovernmental organization, and in what language?), and she has no political recourse if the protection is not provided. The interposition of poorly understood and only incipiently political rights is even more insidious, in some circumstances, if the assertion of a new international right has the effect of subverting a local and potentially more resilient political process. One of the charges made against the humanitarian policies of the 1990s is indeed that by depoliticizing procedures of emergency relief, they tend to subvert the local politics in which individual subjects are conscious participants, and which constitutes the only consistent source of continuing security.[71]

My suggestion, nonetheless, is that the new policies of individual and international security are likely to be a continuing feature of politics in the post-Cold War period. The effort to make sense of them, and in particular to make them less inclusive, is thereby of continuing importance. The changes that led in the late eighteenth century to a new preoccupation with internationalization—the increase in news, in economic and cultural interdependence, in the effectiveness of international intervention, and in the consequent political recognition of distant events—are also the preoccupations of the end of the twentieth century. There is very little, still, that corresponds to an international politics in which

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distant individuals are co-citizens, or co-participants. But there is an international political society, of sorts, and it imposes some form of reflection on the principles of international justice.

Policies for the prevention of violent conflict provide one illustration. The idea of the prevention of nuclear war, as distinct from the deterrence of nuclear offense, was of central importance to the Palme Commission's idea of common security. A similar distinction can be made now between the cooperative enterprise of prevention and the frightening or forceful enterprise of deterrence: the deterrence of injustice or insecurity, or the enforcement of rights. The discussion of new policies for collective security has been concerned to a considerable extent, since 1991, with principles of "intervention": with the circumstances under which (in Condorcet's terms) governments should employ force to establish principles in foreign countries. If there are well-trained international forces, it is argued, prepared to intervene at the early stages of crises, then military conflicts will be less likely to begin; if conflicts do begin, they will end earlier and with less violence.[72] This is deterrence, of a new, enlightened, and internationalist complexion. But it is not the same enterprise as prevention, or as the effort to ensure, whether with military or nonmilitary instruments, that there will be no need to intervene.

One of the distinctive characteristics of prevention is that it takes place under conditions of imperfect information, or before one knows with certainty that a particular conflict (or a particular disease, in preventive public health) will occur. This makes it a very difficult objective for international cooperation. It is easier, often, to agree that a particular international problem is intolerable—that something must be done about it—than to agree either on predictions as to the probability of future problems, or on general principles of international policy. There are different explanations for the interest of people in one country in "doing something" about injustice or insecurity in other countries: that the problem is something they know about, for example; that it is something they care about or identify themselves with; that there is something they can do about it. But these explanations, or criteria, are difficult to describe in a circumstanceless, universal idiom. One does not know that one cares about something, or reflect on what one has it in one's power to do, until one knows

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about some particular injustice or crisis: until the crisis, that is to say, has already been described, or until (as Castlereagh said) it is no longer a question of venturing to commit oneself on an "abstract" question, and there is something "intelligible and practicable" to be done.

It is particularly difficult, therefore, for countries to agree in advance on the "resort to force" by the international community. As Castlereagh also said, of the prospect of "unanimity and supposed concurrence upon all political subjects" among the allies of 1820, "if this Identity is to be sought for, it can only be obtained by a proportionate degree of inaction in all the States."[73] There is thus no evident relationship between the extent of consensus about a particular military intervention and the efficiency of the intervention in question. It is indeed often much easier to intervene efficiently at a very early stage in a conflict, or when there is considerable uncertainty about its future course; it is much more difficult, at that stage, to agree that intervention is needed. The choice or use of nonmilitary instruments is, under these circumstances, of considerable importance. It is difficult to conceive of agreeing, in advance, to have military force used against one. This was one of the (several) unconvincing features of early post-World War II schemes for international government, in which recalcitrant participants were to be sanctioned by the punitive use of force, including nuclear weapons. It is less difficult, perhaps, to agree on less coercive policies. National states do not, after all, rely only or even principally on the use of force to ensure security for their citizens. The incipient international society, too, should have recourse to civil policies for preventing conflict.

Nonmilitary policies can be constructive as well as coercive. They include, for example, policies for recognizing (or refusing to recognize) new sovereignties. Recognition can be made conditional on guarantees for individual rights, including the rights of members of minorities and other groups; countries can agree in advance to give themselves a space for reflection, of the sort that was missing in the early stages of the current Balkan crisis, at the time of the European Community countries' decision to recognize Croatia in 1991. They can also agree on policies to support individual rights, as distinct from punishing violations of these rights. These are policies in which people in the countries where rights are

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at risk are co-participants with people elsewhere. It is expensive, in many cases, to guarantee minority rights, to build schools in which children can be educated in their first language, or to provide trilingual education for all children. Such policies could also pose familiar problems of "moral hazard" (in that they would tend to reward countries in which the rights of minorities are thought to be at risk). But international expenditure on education is nonetheless an important component of policies for individual security. It would be in the spirit of the plans of the 1780s and 1790s: of Condorcet's project of public instruction, for example, in which children would be instructed in their own language, in an international language, and in a third language of local importance.[74] The international society of the 1990s should be in a position, eventually, to provide material support for these old liberal projects.

Policies for demilitarization provide a related illustration. The new security principles have been presented, since the end of the Cold War, as especially suited to a period of postwar reconstruction. The problems of demobilization in the 1990s are indeed similar to, and in some respects even more serious than, those of earlier peace settlements. The period of intense economic (and political) mobilization lasted for about four years in World War I, for about seven years before and during World War II, and for twenty-three years, intermittently, during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; the Cold War mobilization lasted for more than forty years, and it is correspondingly difficult to undo. But in other respects the present postwar period is strikingly different. The Cold War was indeed a long international conflict, but it was not a conflict that ended in the exhaustion, celebration, and revulsion from the use of military force that was characteristic of 1815, 1919, and 1945.

The God of War is defeated in Descartes' ballet of 1649, and the personification of Earth, whose limbs have been torn apart in an early scene, reappears restored and renewed. The Cold War has been followed, in contrast, by a rediscovery of military force—by a demobilization of certain (principally nuclear) forces, and by remilitarization of international relations. On the one hand, the military forces of the two superpowers are more "usable" (in the Gulf, or in Chechnya). On the other hand, military conflicts within or between other, lesser powers are uninhibited by the prospect of

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an eventual superpower confrontation. The promise of the end of the Cold War has been understood, since the earliest negotiations for nuclear disarmament, as the promise of a world of peaceful political competition.[75] It is the demilitarization of the long conflict between a proto-revolutionary "Left" and a proto-reactionary "Right" that has made possible the revival of liberal internationalism. But the post-Cold War conflicts have turned out to be at least as violent as the many small wars of the previous generation. They are newly visible to (Western) public opinion, at least in the case of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia; they constitute a new challenge to the incipient institutions of international order in that they have demonstrated the powerlessness of even a relatively united international community, undivided by the superpower competition.

The process of demilitarization is, under these circumstances, of high priority for policies of human, individual, or common security. It is of particular importance in states that are themselves at peace, but that are the source of means of violent destruction elsewhere. Individuals in Russia, the United States, France, or the United Kingdom "bear a relation" to distant wars (in Hume's phrase) in that they are residents of states that license or encourage very large-scale arms exports. One way to make conflicts less violent is thus to sell and produce less military equipment. Both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia have been important locations, for many years, of military-industrial transactions. Yet the effort to reduce transfers of conventional arms is of strikingly little political interest in the post-Cold War world. "The right inherent in society to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions," for John Stuart Mill, included a right to impose precautions on the sale of articles, such as poisons, of which both proper and improper use could be made (or which are "adapted to be instruments of crime"). The seller, he says "might be required to enter in a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quantity and quality sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he received."[76] There are similar precautions in respect to articles that are adapted to be instruments of war: they should be an important component of government and other groups' policies for international security.

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CIVIL SOCIETY STRATEGIES

The most troublesome illustration of the new policies has to do with nongovernmental organizations, or with what has been described rather grandly as the "civil society strategy."[77] The dislike of government power has been at the center of all liberal thought. Its "historic beginning," in L. T. Hobhouse's description, is to be found in protest, even in "destructive and revolutionary" protest, against the "modern State."[78] Condorcet's idyll, at the height of his revolutionary career in 1792, was of the "virtual non-existence" of government, or of "laws and institutions which reduce to the smallest possible quantity the action of government."[79] This dislike has been accompanied, for many liberals, by a liking for that which is not government, and in particular for elective or voluntary associations, for the "professions," "divisions," "communities," and "callings" that the not notably liberal Adam Ferguson described in his *Essay on the History of Civil Society*.[80] (The electiveness, at least for early liberals, was more important than the nonidentity with government. For Adam Smith, as for Turgot and Condorcet, the coercive nongovernmental organizations of the eighteenth century—apprenticeship guilds and corporations, for example—were even more insidious than government itself.[81])

Relations between nongovernmental organizations (and nongovernmental individuals) have been of central importance to the internationalization of political life in the late twentieth century, as in the late Enlightenment. The increase in news and information is the work of nongovernment, of very large private companies, very powerful individual proprietors, professional societies with their codes of conduct, public relations companies, and so forth. So also, to a great extent, is the increase in economic and cultural influence. The power of individuals in one country to cause economic and social change in other countries is the work of private companies (including the companies that export military equipment) far more than of governments: much as it was, indeed, at the time of Grotius's defense of the (Dutch and English) view "that private men, or private companies, could occupy uncultivated territory."[82] The increased effectiveness of policy is itself a characteristic of the policies of nongovernmental organizations as much as of governments and international organizations. There are pri-

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vate organizations who negotiate cease-fires and hostage exchanges: private charities (and large airlines) deliver emergency humanitarian relief, and compete with government agencies for public (or government) funding to do so.

The novel aspect of nongovernmental organizations in the 1990s is their new political self-consciousness, or self-importance—the beginning of a political theory of the "NGO." The nongovernmental organization is identified, in such a theory, as the uncorrupt, the uncynical, or the unbureacratic. Relations between individuals in different societies—including the relationship between recipients and donors of foreign assistance—are supposed to be conducted, wherever possible, through NGOs rather than through governments (even when the NGOs are licensed by governments, funded by governments, and organized by past and future government officials). The "civil society strategy," in this setting, consists of the effort to organize international relations on the basis of exchanges between organizations. It "assumes that formal democracy is not enough." Its objectives include "funding independent media" as well as "judiciary and police," "developing charitable and voluntary associations," and "developing nongovernmental channels" for government assistance.[83] At its most specific, it involves material support from private foundations in the United States to voluntary organizations and professional societies in Russia.[84] At its most imposing, it involves the effort "to provide more space in global governance for people and their organizations—for civil society as distinct from governments."[85]

The new international politics of civil society, like the politics of individual security, is founded on old and important political ideas. The most profound of these ideas, and one that has been conspicuous in all the great peace processes of the twentieth century, is the idea of multiple, overlapping identities. The engagement of individuals in organizations, professions, clubs, and societies has been seen, at least since Montesquieu, as a principal sign of civilized and peaceable political life. For Turgot the characteristic "of being citizens" was to be found, above all, in the "free associations" or "societies" of which "England, Scotland and Ireland are full."[86] This peaceable citizenship was thought to provide some sort of security, in turn, against international conflict. E. H. Carr spoke before the end of World War II of "a system of

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overlapping and interlocking loyalties which is in the last resort the sole alternative to sheer totalitarianism." His "social" or "functional" internationalism was to be founded on what was earlier (and later) described as civil society: "local loyalties, as well as loyalties to institutions, professions and groups must find their place in any healthy society. The international community if it is to flourish must admit something of the same multiplicity of authorities and diversity of loyalties."[87]

World War I, too, was a period of anxious reflection on the politics of civil society. Leonard Woolf, in a report prepared in 1916 for the Fabian Society, saw in the "extraordinary and novel spectacle" of international voluntary associations the prospect of "true International Government." The increase in such organizations, some of which (like the "Association Internationale pour la Lutte contre le Chômage") included as their members "states, municipal authorities, private individuals, and every sort and kind of national group, society, and association," corresponded to the newly international life of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Woolf wrote that "A man's chief interests are no longer determined by the place he lives in, and group interests, instead of following geographical lines, follow those of capital, labor, professions, etc." Like Gentz, a century earlier, he looked with some coolness at the assertion of national interest: "Over and over again, when we analyze what are called national interests, we find that they are really the interests, not of the national, but of a much smaller group." The geometry of the new international security, as in the 1990s, was to be distinctively variable. In the association against unemployment, for example, Woolf found "both forms of representation, the vertical or national and geographical and the horizontal or international, provided for."[88]

Woolf describes himself as trying to edge away from the "terrible precipice of Utopianism" (or from what Carr, during the next world war, identified as the "idealistic view of a functional internationalism," which "would be utopian if it failed to take account from the outset of the unsolved issue of power"). He concedes that the delineation of the "international" is a matter of practical politics, and he takes as an "actual example" the situations of "the Bosnian" and of "the Englishman" in Ireland: "it is impossible to say exactly when the Balkans became, and when Ireland will

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become, an international question."[89] But his own political ideas, of the reinforcement of the "system" of international conferences to protect the security of national minorities, and of international cooperation to protect the economic security of individuals and groups, were themselves put into a sort of practice in the postwar settlement. One of the principal themes of reconstruction after World War I, in the words of the Peace Treaty, was to prevent "such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled"; the decision of the Great Powers to begin their Versailles deliberations by considering international labor legislation "produced a degree of surprise that almost amounted to bewilderment."[90]

The idyll of multiple, minimal identities is of poignant importance to European political thought. It is described elegiacally in Robert Musil's description of the "negative freedom" of "Kakania," or of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of 1913: "the inhabitant of a country has at least nine characters: a professional, a national, a civic, a class, a geographic, a sexual, a conscious, an unconscious, and possibly even a private character to boot. He unites them in himself, but they dissolve him. . . .This permits a person all but one thing: to take seriously what his at least nine other characters do and what happens to them."[91] But the innocuousness of the unserious is too slight, in the end, as the foundation of civilized life. Musil's prewar world is also the world of which Freud wrote in 1915 in "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death" that its loss was the source of "our mortification and our painful disillusionment." "The citizen of the civilized world," Freud said, must now "stand helpless in a world that has grown strange to him," with his great European fatherland disintegrated and "his fellow-citizens divided and debased." "We had hoped, certainly, that the extensive community of interests established by commerce and production would constitute the germ of. . .a compulsion" towards morality, Freud said of the civil society of the prewar world; he found, instead, that "nations still obey their passions far more readily than their interests. Their interests serve them, at most, as *rationalizations* for their passions."[92]

The elective institutions of civil society were not enough, in the 1910s, to prevent the violent enmity of war, and they are not

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enough, in any liberal theory, to ensure the security of individuals. The new political theory of the NGO—the self-identification of nongovernment groups as the privileged source of human or individual security—is in this respect particularly odd. The organizations that constitute international civil society can play many important political roles. They can provide the international (and local) information that is at the heart of the new politics of security; they can cooperate in the schools, museums, and rights organizations that contribute to policies for preventing violent conflict; they can put pressure on governments to reduce arms production and exports; they can make possible the process of international political discussion, which is a precondition for international politics. But one of the things they cannot do is provide security. The essential characteristic of security is as a political relation, which is not voluntary, between the individual and the political community. Security (or the opinion of security, in Montesquieu's account) is the condition for political freedom. But it is the political choice to live under the rule of law that is in turn the condition for security.

The doubting mood of the late Enlightenment tends to make one skeptical, in general, of the presumption that NGOs are preternaturally other-regarding or uncorrupt. Adam Smith reserved his coolest dislike, and his most cheerful demonstrations of hidden self-interest, for the ostentatiously public-spirited: parish overseers, university teachers, or Quaker slave-owners. The new principles of security of the 1980s and 1990s have been put forward with special enthusiasm by NGOs, and they are consonant with the not particularly hidden self-interest of these organizations. The "civil society strategy," too, can be seen as the outcome of a coalition between governments that wish to disengage from foreign assistance (despite the opposition of substantial minority opinion) and organizations with an interest both in improving other people's lives and in their own advancement.[93] NGOs are also, of course, a kaleidoscopically heterogeneous political form. "Independent media" are identified as a suitable object of support in a civil society strategy, and the presumption (in the case of assistance to the former Soviet Union) is that they are to be independent of the state. But are they also to be independent of large international oligopolies? Or of large and powerful proprietors? "War between

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two nations under modern conditions is impossible unless you get a large number of people in each nation excited and afraid," Leonard Woolf wrote in 1916.[94] News media, dependent and independent, are rightly thought (as Condorcet thought, and as Robespierre denied) to constitute the core of a free civil society. They play a central role in (for example) the prevention of famine. But they play a central role, too, in the frightening process whereby very large numbers of people become excited and afraid.

The main objection to NGOs as a source of security is even more foundational. It may be reasonable to assume that individuals in NGOs are more public-spirited, in general, than individuals in the public or the private for-profit sector (if only because of the relentless vilification of public service in the 1980s and 1990s, and the similarly relentless glorification of the pursuit, within the private sector, of individual profit). But the serious problem with the new political theory of NGOs has very little to do with the psychological circumstances of individuals. It is a political problem, and it follows from the defining characteristic of the NGO as a voluntary organization. There is a stark inequality of voluntariness, in particular, between the "donors" and the "recipients" of security. An international relief charity operating in the zone of a civil war or a distant famine, for example, is made up of individual volunteers (including people who have volunteered to be employed at low salaries) and funded by voluntary contributions (including voluntary contributions, from governments, of tax revenues). The individuals who receive relief are in circumstances of the most extreme lack of voluntariness; they are as far as one can be from the self-sufficiency of the individual will that is at the heart of, for example, Kant's political theory.

The oscillation between the public and the private is a continuing and prized quality of civil society. The new, multiple woman of late twentieth-century political thought (the new *mulier civilis*) is a doctor, let us say, as well as a Belgian, a Protestant, a volunteer, a mother, a member of an international organization, a Walloon, a professional in private practice. Her theory, above all, is to be found in Albert Hirschman's *Shifting Involvements*, with its evocation of public action, overcommitment, and private disappointment.[95] But the richness of her public life is juxtaposed, under certain circumstances, to the impoverishment of politics in very

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poor countries (or even in very poor parts of rich countries). African Rights, in its harsh criticism of international "humanitarianism" in Somalia, contrasts the public accountability of official agencies with the voluntariness of NGOs: "while agencies such as UNICEF and WHO have a duty to be present, the presence of NGOs is a privilege." The relationship between people who provide and people who use "social services and health care" is thus one of "goodwill" rather than of "contract." Individuals become "passive recipients" of charity, and they are thereby made even more insecure: "the insecurity of the relationship that results can also undermine the effectiveness of the programme."[96]

The resilience of the metaphor of the political contract is associated, in eighteenth-century liberal thought, with the implied equality of the contracting parties, with the circumstance that the parties to the contract or agreement are all more or less the same sort of men, whose "intentions" and "reasonable expectations" can be the subject of reasoned discussion.[97] The earlier world of "status" (or of security as something to which one is entitled by virtue of one's status) was a world in which men were unequal by their birth. In the imagined world of Condorcet and other late eighteenth-century liberals, men and women are equal at birth, and their subsequent equality as reasoning parties is made possible by public instruction. This is enlightenment in the most literal sense, or freedom from the darkness in which one cannot see through other people's intentions. But the world of "goodwill," or of security as something that people enjoy not through status, and not through contract, but rather through the good offices of civil society, is inimical to this politics of enlightenment. The insidious characteristic of guilds, for Adam Smith, was that they were protected by "public law," yet were impervious to public scrutiny. Only a beggar, he said, "chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens."[98]

The international civil society, in a liberal theory of this sort, is a source of enlightenment, civility, or of the investment in schools and museums that might tend to prevent conflict, but not of individual security. To the extent that civil society and the politics of states (or empires) are opposed to each other, as strategies or as models of postwar reconstruction, then security, both individual and collective, belongs to the domain of the political. "Civil soci-

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ety and markets alone did not assure the stabilization of Western democratic societies after 1945," as Charles Maier has said, and "they seem increasingly unlikely to do so after 1989."[99] They are even less likely to assure the invention of democratic society, or the common security of individuals.

FREE AND EQUAL DISCUSSION

Liberalism is a political theory, not an idiom of political discussion. The word "liberalism," according to Judith Shklar, "refers to a political doctrine, not a philosophy of life. . . .Liberalism has only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom."[100] The new politics of individual security (of "personal security" for Boutros Boutros-Ghali) is in this sense a perfectly liberal enterprise. It is most new, and most odd, in its international extent, in its insistence that the persons whose freedom is to be secured include very remote persons, or political foreigners. The liberal wishes to secure certain political conditions for himself, and for persons whom he recognizes to be co-participants in a political enterprise (to be the same sort of men). The international liberal has the same objective, but he recognizes the oddest sort of people—here, there, and everywhere.

It has been suggested that the "civil society strategy" is an insufficient source of individual security because it is insufficiently political. The civil society is (by self-definition) nongovernmental; individual security is (by the definition of liberal political theory) both the objective of and the justification for government. The civil society is the domain of the voluntary; individual security is the justification for coercion. But the nongovernmental society is itself of notably increased political importance in the post-Cold War world. The new political theory of the NGO is indeed the assertion of a new politics: the assertion that the "we" of civil society, or the nongovernmental and the noncoercive, is a constituent, and even a defining constituent of political life.

The presumption of this essay has been that the idea of an international politics is, if not straightforward, at least recognizable in a general sense. But the connotation of the political—and thereby of the "political conditions" that Judith Shklar refers to as

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the overriding aim of liberalism—is the subject of familiar, persistent disagreement. In one sense, the political is indeed the domain of organizations, individuals, and their political discussions. This is the sense asserted in the new theories of civil society; it is Cicero's sense, too (or one of Cicero's senses), of society as a place of teaching, learning, communicating, discussing, and reasoning, and of citizenship as a matter of public places, temples, streets, laws, voting rights, friendships, and business contracts.[101] In a different sense, however, the political is the domain of formal (and coercive) political arrangements, of the "formal democracy," which in the civil society strategy is "not enough," and of the state more generally, with its laws, treaties, and declarations. In a further sense, the political is the domain of political power, or the extent of what states can do, or can arrange to have done.

A great deal of modern political thought is concerned, as it was between the 1770s and the 1820s, with the relations between these three domains: with the circumstance that the different domains of politics are not coextensive, but change in extent over time. The fundamental characteristic of the state is as the location of political homogeneity; the nation is defined by homogeneity of birth, race, blood, culture.[102] But political homogeneity is a matter of (political) culture, of discussing and reasoning, as well as of formal political arrangements. The extent of political power is very much less than the extent of formal political arrangements, for some states, and very much greater for others. Condorcet's prospect of governments that impose principles by force in other countries was made possible by the new political power of several European governments. This power had rather little to do with formal political engagements. It was instead a consequence of technologies (such as canals), economic circumstances (such as the power to raise taxes or borrow money), and political and military conditions (such as the absence, at the time, of powerful opponents). Castlereagh proposed to limit Britain's policies of intervention—her policies beyond the domain of formal political arrangements—to the "intelligible and practicable." The intelligible corresponds to the political in Cicero's sense, of the subject of discussion and concern within a political society. The practicable is the political in the sense of present power, or of that which corresponds to the

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circumstances of political power, at the present time and as understood by the presently powerful.

The great liberal theory of the nineteenth century assumed a more orderly relation between these three domains of the political. John Stuart Mill argued, in support of "free and popular local and municipal institutions," that "the management of purely local business by the localities" should be subject only to the most general superintendence by "general government," including the provision of information and the residual power of "compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for their guidance"; the result should be "the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency." Formal political arrangements were to be organized in an orderly hierarchy of interests and duties, and the domain of these arrangements was coextensive with the domain of political power. The wider political culture, too, was both influenced by and an influence on formal political arrangements. Mill was uncompromisingly opposed—and in this he followed closely Condorcet's arguments on public instruction—to the idea of political education. But he saw in the practice of local politics the source of the "habits and powers" that are the foundation of a "free constitution."[103]

Mill's conception of political order has been of profound importance to subsequent liberal thought. It is even reflected, in the European law of the 1980s and 1990s, in the idea of "subsidiarity." There is an orderly and liberal core to this turgidly obscure notion: there are different levels of government, of differing generality, and each political function is to be undertaken at the lowest (or least general) level that is compatible with efficiency or practicability.[104] It is this hierarchy of political processes that has broken down in the new international politics of the 1990s. There are two reasons, in English political thought, to respect some version of the principle of subsidiarity. One is the Burkean or historicist respect for convention; certain functions have in the past been performed by certain levels of government, and the costs of constitutional change are likely to be prohibitively high. The other, which is closer to Mill's, is founded on reason: the functions of government should be subject to continuing review in the light of changing circumstances, and they should be assigned to the least general level that is efficient in these conditions. The rationalist view of

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subsidiarity is the more compelling one. But it imposes an unending reflection on constitutional principles, much as Leonard Woolf's system of conferences imposed an unending reflection on the delineation of the international. It also imposes a great deal of reflection on changing international circumstances; on the circumstances that have changed so prodigiously in the 1980s and 1990s.

The politics of individual security, inside and outside Europe, is a case in point. On the one hand, because of the increase in international information, the general interest in the security of distant individuals is great; people know about distant horrors while they are still happening, or while there is still time to prevent them from happening. On the other hand, because of increased information, again, and because international interventions are no longer inhibited by the prospect of intercontinental military conflict, the power of distant states is also relatively great in relation to these horrors. The power of local states, meanwhile, is very much diminished in many modern local conflicts. The distant states may therefore be more "efficient" in protecting personal freedom, to use Mill's term, than the local, formally constituted political authorities. The counterpart of the *mulier civilis* (the new political woman of civil society) provides a dismal illustration. If one is a Bosnian Muslim woman, then one's security is not protected by virtue of one's political identity as a resident of a local community, as a citizen of the old Yugoslavia, or as a citizen of the new Bosnia. One's other identities—as a European, as a member of an international religious community, as an individual with rights, or as a woman with rights—provide weak protection. But the European Union, NATO, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the UN High Commission for Refugees may actually have more power to ensure one's personal security than any local or municipal political institutions.

The difficulty, in very general terms, is of a divergence between the different domains of the political. The extent of international political discussion and power has increased enormously. But (formal) political institutions—the hierarchy of international, national, regional, and local government—have increased only minimally, and in many cases have become, as in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Chechnya, drastically less efficient. One prospect, therefore, is of an extension and improvement in the formal institutions of

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international government. This is the point of policies for the prevention and demilitarization of conflict, and it is of particular importance in relation to policies for individual or common security. Formal (contractual) commitments to international programs of political and educational investment, formal restrictions on military transactions, formal agreements in respect of the recognition of sovereignty, and formal procedures for the protection of internationally recognized rights constitute the germ (to use Freud's word) of a compulsion to international government. I am not referring to Leonard Woolf's "true International Government" of 1916, made up of voluntary associations; I mean something even more currently unfashionable, in the form of international laws and international authorities with the power of compelling other officers to obey those laws.

The state, including the incipient international state, has been the object of criticism in the 1980s and 1990s by an imposing political coalition of the Right and the Left. Its commitments are very often no more than scraps of paper; there is "overwhelming evidence that modern national governments cannot and will not observe international treaties or rules of international law when these become burdensome or dangerous to the welfare or security of their own nation," E. H. Carr wrote in 1945.[105] But there is little alternative, at least in policies for individual or common security, to the reconstruction of state authority. The single most important element in this reconstruction, for international state institutions, would be the power to raise tax revenues, or at least to receive, "automatically," some share of the revenues raised by national, regional, or local governments. The most important form of coercion, in the historical development of national states, was the coercive power of fiscality; it would be the most important power of international institutions as well.

In *The Man without Qualities,* Musil says that the timid diplomat Tuzzi "regarded the state as a masculine subject one did not discuss with women," and the political objective of rediscovering the state is quite remote from the objectives of the new, multifarious civil society.[106] But the state itself is distinctively multifarious in the post-Cold War world. One consequence of the extension of international political society, or of political discussion, is thus a new disrespect for the prior wisdom of states and their officers.

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When Castlereagh speaks of different policies as "practicable" or "impracticable"—or when Mill speaks of the "efficient" dissemination of power—the tone is of privileged insight into government finances and opportunities. This tone of effortless self-confidence has been repressed, perhaps beyond recovery, in the past decades of criticism of all the nonmilitary activities of the state (at least in England, the United States, and the former Soviet Union). The state is also a largely and increasingly feminine institution at the end of the twentieth century. The traditionally masculine functions of collecting taxes and organizing wars have been conspicuously in retreat. It is the traditionally feminine state functions of local government, education, and social security that are most resilient; it is these functions, too, that would be reproduced in the new institutions of international government.

The international politics of individual security would be more orderly, in some respects, if the institutions of formal political commitment were extended in this way. But the international political society will still impose a new and prodigious tolerance for political disorder. There is some interest, among the theorists of civil society in the 1990s, in the Stoic metaphor of political identity as an array of concentric circles, in which the individual feels progressively less committed to her progressively more general political identities (as a member of a family, a local community, a region, a nation, an international community, and so forth). Adam Smith took some interest in this metaphor, too, at least as a way of questioning the Stoic idea of universal political benevolence.[107] But the modern identities with which we have been concerned suggest that the array of commitments is very much less orderly than the metaphor would indicate. It is a set of ellipses, perhaps, or an Epicurean universe, in which the location of the "I" swerves and lurches over time. It leads to a politics, in turn, that is subject in a quite novel respect to whim and to chance.

"Men are vain of the beauty of their country, of their county, of their parish," Hume says in his account of the relation between objects and passions; they are also vain of climate, of food, "of the softness or force of their language," of the qualities of their friends, of the beauty and utility of distant countries (based on "their distant relation to a foreign country, which is formed by their having seen it and lived in it"). But the modern politics of related-

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ness is more disordered, or more accidental, than in even Hume's imagination. For Hume, "a beautiful fish in the ocean, an animal in a desert, and indeed anything that neither belongs, nor is related to us, has no manner of influence on our vanity."[108] In the modern theory of international (environmental) security, even the beautiful fish is related to international politics. It is quite plausible, for example, that the individual participants in the new civil society should feel related, and even passionately related to far-off fish in distant oceans. It is plausible, too, that these voluntary passions should come and go with the accidents of information. One joins the society for the protection of fish because one happens to have lived, as a child, near the zoo. Or one votes for a party that supports environmental assistance because one saw a television program about fish the night before the election.

The accidental politics of the 1990s poses new and serious difficulties for political theory and practice. Some of these difficulties were anticipated in earlier periods of political turbulence: Condorcet, for example, devoted great ingenuity to devising constitutional schemes whereby decisions could be drawn out, delayed, or reversed. Other difficulties are very largely new: they are such as to set the impartial regulation of broadcasting and of the new television, communications, and newspaper oligopolies at the very center of present politics. But the most disturbing of the new requirements is to discover a new tolerance for the accidental in politics. This is a very Humean politics, and Hume indeed observed (in his account of accidents from the point of view of the theory of knowledge) that "the custom of imagining a dependence has the same effect as the custom of observing it would have."[109] Politics, like everything else in life, is a kingdom of emotions and customs, of the aesthetic and the accidental. A politics of this sort is profoundly disconcerting in the terms of even the most minimal liberal thought. For liberalism, like the new politics of the 1990s, is about security: about ensuring the conditions for personal liberty. And security requires the predictability and repetitiveness that are the endless propensities of the state. That is why the rediscovery of the (international) state is at the heart of the politics of individual security. But the state to be rediscovered will be a very different sort of state—more Humean and more complicit in an unpredictable political society.

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"All the Gods who are deliberating on peace" in the last part of Descartes' ballet about the Treaty of Westphalia decide that Pallas, or wisdom, is their only recourse: "Our interests are so diverse/ That we are not to be believed/In anything to do with glory/And the good of the entire universe." Pallas is the personification of Queen Christina, and she combines "prudence" with "valour," and is thereby free of the risk of "too much assurance" or "too much warmth."[110] These quite minimal political virtues are also the useful virtues of the present postwar world. It is the disengagement of politics from militarism, or from military assurance, that has disengaged the old liberalism of the late Enlightenment. There is a "crisis of liberal internationalism" in the 1990s, and there is an even more serious crisis of conservatism, which revered nothing in the state, excepting only its military power.

The disorderly world of the new international politics—of politics in the sense of an international political society—is full of danger for this sort of conservatism. But it is full of hope for liberals. François Guizot, one of the great nineteenth-century liberals (and conservatives), wrote of the "epoch of transition" of the 1850s that democracy "is habitually dominated by its interests and passions of the moment" and is, of all social powers, the "most obedient to its present fantasies, without concern for the past or the future."[111] But this disorder is also the condition for the entire, subversive enterprise of political liberalism. In Mill's famous words, "liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion."[112] We have very little idea, still, of what free and equal discussion amounts to, between groups and societies as well as between individuals. But we are in the process of finding out.

ENDNOTES

[1]Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the initial meeting of the Common Security Forum in 1992, and at the 1993 Oslo meeting of the Commission on Global Governance. I am grateful for comments from James Cornford, Amartya Sen, and Gareth Stedman Jones, and for discussions with Lincoln Chen, Marianne Heiberg, Mary Kaldor, and the late Johan Jörgen Holst. I would also like to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for support to the Centre for History and Economics and to the Common Security Forum.

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[4]Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism," *Foreign Policy* (98) (Spring 1995): 163.

[5]Michael Ignatieff, "On Civil Society," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (2) (March/April 1995): 135–36.

[6]Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 3.

[7]Václav Havel, *Summer Meditations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 33. Mill talks of "the sovereignty of the individual over himself," and of the condition that "over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." See John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London: Penguin, 1974), 69, 141.

[8]See, for example, the speech by President Clinton at the United Nations on 27 September 1993, and speeches by Under Secretary of State Timothy E. Wirth at the United Nations on 30 March 1994, and at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on 12 July 1994.

[9]The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 78.

[10]United Nations Development Program, *Human Development 1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3, 22–23.

[11]"The United Nations was founded 50 years ago to ensure the territorial security of member states. . . .What is now under siege is something different," or "personal security"—Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Let's get together to halt the unravelling of society." *International Herald Tribune,* 10 February 1995.

[12]The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), ix, xvi, 4, 139. The word "survival" was evidently thought to have particular appeal in the United States, since the edition published in England had a different title: *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament* (London: Pan Books, 1982).

[13]Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), 38.

[14]E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945), 36, 58, 51, 67–71.

[15]John Hicks, "Maintaining Capital Intact: a Further Suggestion," *Economica* IX (New Series) (34) (May 1942): 175; a *Begriffsgeschichte,* or a history of concepts, is also a history of who it is who has the concepts.

[16]"Lord Castlereagh's Confidential State Paper of May 5th, 1820," in Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783–1919,* vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), app. A, 632.

[17]Ibid., 627–29, 632.

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[18]Sir J. A. R. Marriott, *Castlereagh: The Political Life of Robert, Second Marquess of Londonderry* (London: Methuen, 1936), 299.

[19]Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (2) (Winter 1982–1983). Common security, too, was presented as a "slogan," a "way of thinking about security," or as a source of "the words that convince and reassure"; see Emma Rothschild, "Common Security and Deterrence," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Policies for Common Security* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 92, 101.

[20]See Stephen J. Del Rosso Jr., "The Insecure State: Reflections on 'the State' and 'Security' in a Changing World," *Dædalus* 124 (2) (Spring 1995): 187–93.

[21]Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 184.

[22]Letter of 15 June 1820, in *Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie*, vol. II (Paris: E. Plon, 1877), 62–63.

[23]Friedrich Gentz, *On the State of Europe before and after the French Revolution*, trans. John Charles Herries (London: J. Hatchard, 1804), 386.

[24]Letter of 1705 in *Die Werke von Leibniz*, vol. IX, ed. Onno Klopp (Hannover: Klindworth, 1864–1873), 143.

[25]Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des lois* (1748), bk. XII, chap. II (Paris: Garnier, 1973), vol. I, 202.

[26]"*securitatem autem nunc appello vacuitatem aegritudinis, in qua vita beata posita est*"—Cicero, "Tusculan Disputations," V. 42; *Lexicon Taciteum*, ed. Gerber and Greef (Leipzig: 1903). Tacitus does also use "*securitas*" in something closer to the modern, collective sense when he speaks of giving "safety and security" to Italy ("*salutem securitatemque Italiae*"): Hist.III.liii.

[27]Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 156, 290; Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 412.

[28]"Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all." Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 715. It is interesting that Condorcet, writing in the same year, had a different view: "It is not only to defend those who have something against those who do not that the laws of property are made; it is above all to defend those who have a little, against those who have a lot." Condorcet, *Réflexions sur le commerce des blés* (1776), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet*, vol. XI, ed. A. C. O'Connor and M. F. Arago (Paris: Didot, 1847–1849), 189.

[29]Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 689. Smith does say later, in discussing expenditure on justice, that when defense becomes very costly, it becomes necessary "that the people should, for their own security," contribute through taxes to the sovereign's costs. Ibid., 718.

[30]"The security which it gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy, which, in some modern republics, seems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen."

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Ibid., 707. The individual security of the sovereign is again a Roman preoccupation: Seneca, addressing the Emperor Nero in *De Clementia,* commiserates with Nero for his misfortune in not being able to walk in the city unarmed, but assures him that he would be better protected by the love of his fellow citizens than by mountains and turrets; a policy of clemency would provide "more certain security," or the security that comes from a mutual contract in security ("*securitas securitate mutua paciscenda est*")—Seneca, *De Clem.,* I.viii.2–6, I.xix.5–6.

[31]As Stephen Holmes says, "security was the *idée maitresse* of the liberal tradition." See Stephen Holmes, *Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy* (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 245.

[32]"*Projet de Déclaration des droits naturels, civils et politiques des hommes*" (1793), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet,* vol. XII, 418–19; Franck Alengry, *Condorcet Guide de la Révolution Francaise* (Paris: Giard and Brière, 1904), 405.

[33]"*Patriotische Aufsätze in Folge des Ryswycker Friedens—Assecuranzen*" (1697), in Leibniz, *Werke,* vol. VI, 231–33.

[34]"*Sur les caisses d'accumulation*" (1790), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet,* vol. XI, 402; see Emma Rothschild, "Economic security and social security," paper prepared for the UNRISD Conference on Rethinking Social Development, Centre for History and Economics, Cambridge, March 1995.

[35]Judith Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., *Liberalism and the Moral Life* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 21.

[36]For Condorcet or Smith, as for Hayek in *The Road to Serfdom,* there is a good and a bad variety of individual security, associated respectively with "the commercial and the military type of society." The good security, for Hayek, includes "the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all"; the bad security is "the security of the barracks." See Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 120, 126–27.

[37]"*Réflexions sur le commerce des blés*" (1776), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet,* vol. XI, 167.

[38]Richard Tuck, "The State System as a Mirror of the State of Nature," Centre for History and Economics, Cambridge, 1989.

[39]Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1972).

[40]J. G. Herder, "*Philosophie der Geschichte*" (1774), in J. G. Herder, *Sämmtliche Werke,* vol. V, ed. B. Suphan (Berlin: 1891), 521, 548; see also 498, 556.

[41]Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "*Du Contract Social*" (first version) in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Oeuvres Complètes,* vol. III (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 290. See also Rousseau's descripion of the social pact: "The first object which men have proposed to one another in the civil confederation has been their mutual security, that is to say the guarantee of the life and liberty of each by the entire community." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "*Fragments Politiques,*" in Rousseau, *Oeuvres Complètes,* 486.

[42]"War is thus in no respect a relation between men, but a relation between States, in which individuals are only enemies by accident, in no respect as men or even

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as citizens, but as soldiers." Rousseau, "*Du Contract Social*," 357. Hume expressed doubt, considerably earlier, about the respects in which nations could be considered to be like individuals: "Political writers tell us, that in every kind of intercourse, a body politic is to be considered as one person; and indeed this assertion is so far just, that different nations, as well as private persons, require mutual assistance; at the same time that their selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord. But though nations in this particular resemble individuals, yet. . .they are very different in other respects." David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 567.

[43]Immanuel Kant, "*Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*" (1784), in Immanuel Kant, *Werkausgabe*, vol. XI, ed. W. Weischedel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968), 42–44; *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 47–49.

[44]"*Projet d'une exposition des motifs*" (1792), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet*, vol. X, 454.

[45]Paris Peace Treaty of 30 May 1814, Statement of 18 October 1814, in *Acten des Wiener Congresses*, vol. I, ed. Kluber (Erlangen: 1819), 9, 36.

[46]"Experiments" in constitutional reform, and even the extension of "Democratic Principles" ("then as now, but too generally spread throughout Europe") were thus not in themselves a sufficient reason for international intervention. Castlereagh, "State Paper," 626–27.

[47]François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 253.

[48]Elisabeth and Robert Badinter quote a manuscript note of Condorcet's from 1791, in which the composition of two different cabinets is considered, with reshuffling of Sieyès, Rochefoucauld, and Roederer, but with "Talleyrand and Condorcet keeping the same portfolios." Elisabeth Badinter and Robert Badinter, *Condorcet: un intellectual en politique* (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 347.

[49]Peregrine Worsthorne, "Liberalism is the real enemy," *Sunday Telegraph*, 18 October 1992.

[50]János Kis, "Program of Action in Favour of Hungarian Minorities Abroad," in János Kis, *Politics in Hungary: For a Democratic Alternative* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 213.

[51]Havel, *Summer Meditations*, 98.

[52]William Safire, "Singapoverty," *The New York Times*, 2 February 1995.

[53]"*De l'influence de la révolution d'Amérique sur l'Europe*" (1786), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet*, vol. VIII, 5–6, 14. The language of 1948 is similar: "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience. . . .Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law." *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (December 1948) (New York: United Nations, 1986), art. 1 and 6.

[54]They were "*Schutzgenossen*": Immanuel Kant, "Theorie und Praxis" (1793), in Kant, *Werkausgabe*, vol. XI, 150–51; Reiss, ed., *Kant's Political Writings*, 77–78.

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[55]The object of the leaders of the French Revolution, in Tocqueville's famous phrase, was to "cut in two their destiny," or to separate "by an abyss" what they were to become from what they once had been. A. de Tocqueville, *L'ancien régime et la révolution* (1856), ed. J.-P. Mayer (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 43.

[56]Adam Smith wrote scathingly in the *Wealth of Nations* of the citizens of prosperous empires who in wartime "enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in the newspapers the exploits of their own fleets and armies." Smith, *Wealth of Nations,* 920.

[57]Henri Brunschwig, *La crise de l'État Prussien à la fin du XVIIIe siècle et la genèse de la mentalité romantique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947), 36–42; see also Richard van Dülmen, *The Society of the Enlightenment: The Rise of the Middle Class and Enlightenment Culture in Germany,* trans. Anthony Williams (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 83–92, 165–72.

[58]Speech of 28 October 1792, in *Oeuvres de Maximilien Robespierre*, vol. IX (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958), 48–49, 53.

[59]Herder, "*Philosophie der Geschichte*," 545–46.

[60]Gentz, *On the State of Europe,* 38–39.

[61]Castlereagh, "State Paper," 632.

[62]"*Aux Germains*" (1792), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet,* vol. XII, 155–56; "*La Nation française à tous les peuples*" (1793), in Ibid., vol. XII, 510.

[63]Castlereagh, "State Paper," 627–29.

[64]Hume, *Treatise,* 303, 307.

[65]William Playfair, *A letter to the Right Honourable and Honourable the Lords and Commons of Great Britain, on the advantages of apprenticeships* (London: T. C. Lewis, 1814), 31.

[66]See J. R. Oldfield, *Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery: The mobilisation of public opinion against the slave trade 1787–1807* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 57–58, 139–41, 177–78.

[67]"*De l'influence de la révolution d'Amérique*," in *Oeuvres de Condorcet,* vol. VIII, 13.

[68]Immanuel Kant, "The Contest of Faculties" (1798), in Reiss, ed., *Kant's Political Writings,* 182, 184–85.

[69]Adam Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence,* ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 403, 318–21.

[70]"*Sur les Assemblées Provinciales*" (1788), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet,* vol. VIII, 471–75; "*Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l'Esprit Humain*" (1793–1794), in Ibid., vol. VI, 244.

[71]See Jennifer Montana, "Human Security," Common Security Forum, Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, June 1995; African Rights, *Humanitarianism Unbound?,* African Rights Discussion Paper No. 5, 11 Marshalsea Road, London SE1 1EP, November 1994.

[72]See Brian Urquhart, "A UN Volunteer Military Force," *The New York Review of Books,* 10 June 1993.

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[73]Castlereagh, "State Paper," 629, 631.

[74]"Sur l'instruction publique" (1791–1792), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet,* vol. VII, 534–41.

[75]This was Olof Palme's position, for example, at the signing of the first Helsinki accords in 1975: when Giscard D'Estaing said that the countries of Europe could now stop quarrelling, Palme argued that "now we have agreed not to kill each other, we can really begin to quarrel."

[76]Mill, *On Liberty,* 167.

[77]See Ignatieff, "On Civil Society," 135–36.

[78]L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1919), 18–19.

[79]"*De la Nature des Pouvoirs Politiques dans une Nation Libre*" (1792), in *Oeuvres de Condorcet,* vol. X, 607.

[80]Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 217–20. See also Sunil Khilnani, "The Development of Civil Society," World Institute for Development Economics Research and Centre for History and Economics, 1994.

[81]See Emma Rothschild, "Adam Smith, Apprenticeship and Insecurity" (Cambridge: Centre for History and Economics, 1994).

[82]Tuck, "The State System," 8.

[83]Ignatieff, "On Civil Society."

[84]See Kennette Benedict, "A Cold Peace: US-Russian Relations in a New Era," The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, February 1995.

[85]Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood,* 256.

[86]A. R. J. Turgot, *Oeuvres de Turgot et Documents le Concernant,* vol. I, ed. G. Schelle (Paris: Alcan, 1913–1923), 587, 592.

[87]Carr, *Nationalism and After,* 49, 59.

[88]L. S. Woolf, *International Government* (New York: Brentano, 1916), 152, 170, 352–53, 357. The association against unemployment, for example, "numbers among its members": 8 governments, 59 towns, 12 unemployment funds, 8 provinces, 15 scientific societies, 6 employers' federations, 30 labor federations, and individuals from 23 countries.

[89]Woolf's "practical standpoint" thus leads him to ask "whether there is, this side of the year of our Lord 2000, the slightest possibility of the British Empire and Russia entering an international system in which the future position of Indians, Irishmen, and Finns in the respective Empires is to be decided at some sort of international conference." Woolf, *International Government,* 34–38, 357; Carr, *Nationalism and After,* 50–51.

[90]Quoted in Douglas Galbi, "International Aspects of Social Reform in the Interwar Period" (Cambridge: Common Security Forum, Centre for History and Economics, 1993); the reference to peace and harmony is in the preamble to part 13 of the Treaty.

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[91]Robert Musil, *The Man without Qualities,* vol. I (1952), trans. Sophie Wilkins (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 30–31.

[92]Sigmund Freud, "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death" (1915), in Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition,* vol. XIV, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), 280, 285, 288.

[93]African Rights, in its critique of "Post-Cold War Humanitarianism," says that "Western donors' strategic and commercial interest in poor countries is declining; their chief concern is increasingly to avoid bad publicity at home from humanitarian crises once they have hit the television. . .relief agencies are expanding into a void left by the contracting power of host governments and the declining political interest of western powers." African Rights, *Humanitarianism Unbound?,* 6.

[94]Woolf, *International Government,* 133.

[95]Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[96]African Rights, *Humanitarianism Unbound?,* 18, 23. Gareth Stedman Jones quotes the view of Sir Charles Trevelyan, "the doyen of relief experts and a veteran of the Irish famine," on charity to the London poor in 1870: "By passing through official hands. . .the gift loses the redeeming influence of personal kindness and the recipient regards it, not as charity but as a largesse to which he has a right." This is also the relationship described by Marcel Mauss: "to give is to show one's superiority. . . .To accept without returning or repaying more, is to face subordination, to become a client and subservient": Gareth Stedman Jones, *Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984), 244, 252–53.

[97]See, for example, Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence,* 87–102, 318–21.

[98]Smith, *Wealth of Nations,* 27.

[99]Charles Maier, "Stabilizing Europe, 1918–1945–1989: Three Post-war Eras in Comparison" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for European Studies, paper prepared for a conference at the University of Keele, March 1995), 34.

[100]Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," 21.

[101]"*docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando*"—Cicero, *De Officiis,* I.50, I.53.

[102]Istvan Hont, "State and Nation in the French Revolution" (Cambridge: Centre for History and Economics, 1995); "The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: 'Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State' in Historical Perspective," in *Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?,* ed. John Dunn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

[103]Mill, *On Liberty,* 181, 185–86; on Mill and Condorcet, see Emma Rothschild, "Condorcet and the Conflict of Values," *Historical Journal* (forthcoming).

[104]"Community institutions should only be given the powers they require to perform those tasks which they can carry out more effectively than the individual Member States. . . subsidiarity is a principle based on political pragmatism and aimed at organizing Community activity effectively by bringing it closer to the

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concerns and aspirations of citizens." European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, "Report on the Commission report to the European Council on the adaptation of Community legislation to the subsidiarity principle," 29 March 1994. I am grateful to Eleanor Sharpston for discussion on this point.

[105]Carr, *Nationalism and After,* 30–31.

[106]Musil, *The Man without Qualities,* 211; the chapter, which is about a discussion of "the idea of a Global Austria," is called "Antagonism sprouts between the Old and the New Diplomacy."

[107]Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* 227–37; Cicero, *De Officiis,* I.54–59.

[108]Hume, *Treatise,* 303, 306–307.

[109]Ibid, 222.

[110]Descartes, *La Naissance de la Paix, Ballet Dansé au chateau Royal de Stockholm le jour de la Naissance de sa Majesté* (Stockholm: Jean Janssonius, 1649), 4, 11.

[111]François Guizot, *Sir Robert Peel: étude d'histoire contemporaine* (Paris: Didier, 1856), 353.

[112]Mill, *On Liberty,* 69.

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Henry A. Kissinger

We Live in an Age of Transition

MANY DECADES AGO, longer than I care to admit, as a young professor I went to hear a lecture by Harold Macmillan, then recently retired as Prime Minister. He began the presentation of his distilled wisdom by saying: "As they left the Garden of Eden, Adam turned to Eve and said, 'we live in an age of transition.'" That is also the theme of my remarks.

I grew up intellectually in the age of the "special relationship," which I believe to have been vital to the creation of the postwar international order. It was not a favor the United States granted to Britain; rather it was earned, first by conduct during the war and later by the enormous contribution in helping shape the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and what generally came to be identified as the Cold War pattern of international relations. Britain brought crucial qualities to that relationship: experience in a multipolar world, a global orientation of mind, an experienced leadership, a commitment to security, overseas ties of not insignificant proportions, and the English language—which today you hear practiced on American television by those who are genuine and those who engage in wishful thinking.

All of those were great assets. But we are facing a new environment, and I would argue that the qualities that had made the special relationship work—broadened now to a European-American relationship—may be even more essential than they were before. This is not sufficiently said, and even when the words are uttered they express little more than respectful deference to yesterday's

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liturgy. Yet if there is to be a European-American relationship in the twenty-first century that goes beyond occasional consultation and a very active commerce, it must be based on something more than a recollection of times past. It must address the common interests of the two worlds, interests that were not extinguished when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

The United States faces an unprecedented situation where historical roots need always to be recalled. It is the only major country in the world whose history can be precisely dated; populated almost exclusively by immigrants, it has never had a powerful neighbor along its borders, and has never had to face the problems of security confronted by less favored nations. The Americans' perception of their foreign policy was always one of nearly limitless choice and, above all, of having the ability to participate or to withdraw from international engagements at will. Every American initiative of the postwar period was presented to the American public as having a terminal date, after which America could again withdraw, allowing the underlying harmonious pattern to reassert itself.

This explains why almost all of America's foreign policy has traditionally been presented in alternately psychiatric and theological terms: either as a means by which relations among nations could be conducted as they might be if they were relations between individuals, and, when that did not seem possible, as a crusade to destroy or, even better, to convert antagonists to the American perception of international affairs. In that sense, the Cold War and victory in the Cold War were a culmination of the American approach to international affairs.

How many historical incidents, if any, can be recalled of a nation's leaders and allies stating goals that, some forty years later, were practically all achieved? That is the position in which we now find ourselves. And it is occurring at the precise moment when, in the United States, the now dominant leadership groups have altogether different geographic origins from those that shaped the postwar period. A comparable "generation gap," caused by other factors, exists in Europe, and both need to be understood in thinking about the future relations of the two sides of the Atlantic.

The foreign policy of the United States during the Cold War was formed largely by the so-called Northeastern "establishment."

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Present-day leadership and foreign policy direction are drawn mostly from the West, the Southwest, or the South. America's relations with Europe are much less organic today than they were during the generation of Acheson, McCloy, and the other fathers of Cold War policy. This does not mean that the current group is hostile to internationalism; only that it is less identified with recent European history. The previous establishment drew from appeasement the lesson that the democracies around the Atlantic had to be unified; there is no comparable imperative for the new American leaders.

The present generation, with no personal experience of World War II, having never established the kinds of European ties that bound an earlier generation to the Old World, accepts the Vietnam War as its Epiphany. Very few of those who now hold major positions in Washington saw combat in Vietnam; a whole generation of university students stayed aloof, either openly resisting the war, or taking what they thought to be legitimate exemptions from compulsory military service. The Vietnam War, seen by them and by many others as a terrible mistake—the defining experience of their generation—guides much of their thinking about war and peace. Whether their experience in respect to Vietnam has incapacitated them for reflecting objectively about the new post-Cold War world, as many who deplored America's role in World War I used its injustices and cruelties as an excuse for the brands of nonintervention common in the 1920s and 1930s, is a proposition rarely considered. American policy, whether in the Balkans or the Carribbean, in Africa or Asia, can only be understood in the context of a generation that views the contemporary world through a lens largely provided by a local and unsuccessful conflict, Vietnam.

As a result, America is presently going through what I believe to be only the beginning of a national debate. And I really have no right to speak here of an American point of view because the American point of view is still being formed. The seminal debates have not yet taken place. For the first time in its history, America must conduct a global foreign policy without an overwhelming ideological enemy, without a clear-cut strategic plan, and in a world that it can neither dominate nor withdraw from. Thus, the classic maxims of American foreign policy—the invocation of an

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overwhelming ideological challenge in the face of which foreign policy can be transmuted into large-scale enterprises to remedy the immediate crisis—also do not apply.

It is said that the United States is the only superpower left. That is a simplistic description of the situation. It may be the only military superpower left, but the issues susceptible to solution by military action are in decline. The kind of power in which the United States excels is less and less relevant to most foreseeable international crises. On the other hand, in economics, even in technology, the world is becoming much more evenly balanced. Even a cursory glance at the condition of the dollar makes it clear that the relative economic position of the United States is not what it was even a few years ago. Indeed, we are now living in a world composed of six or seven major global players.

In such an international order, the United States faces the more or less traditional foreign policy problem of global players of operationally more or less equal strength. There are only two roads to stability: one is hegemony; the other is equilibrium. Hegemony may not be possible and in any case runs counter to the convictions and public morale of the American people; equilibrium, or the balance of power, is a concept passionately rejected by the American intellectual community as contributing to endless tensions—an attitude Americans have fortunately been able to transcend through much of their history. To say in America that we must define a national interest is considered a revolutionary, if not a reactionary, proposition. And even if one could formulate it as an acceptable formula, the national interest is almost always defined in sweeping, ideological terms. Still, the future of the world will have to be based on some concept of equilibrium or some balance among its various regions.

It is impossible for every participant in an international system to be always perfectly satisfied; that happy condition has never been achieved by humanity. Still, it may be possible for the major regions of the world to be not so dissatisfied that they seek to overthrow the international system by violence, terrorism, economic warfare, or certain other methods so well elaborated in our century, which have proved so destructive. This is the first requirement of the moment, transcending in importance any of the individual crises that so preoccupy the mass media and that occasion-

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ally prove useful to politicians who wish to demonstrate their resolve.

In the conduct of policy, I would define the American interest both negatively and positively. Negatively, it is against the American interest that any major region of the world, including either Europe or Asia—and surely both together—should be dominated by a country or group of countries that can then organize themselves to pursue objectives inimical to the United States. Second, the United States must accept to participate in a world community where global concerns, whether in respect to economics, communications, or technology, are acknowledged.

Theoretically, the United States could pursue policy on a global basis in the manner employed by Britain in Europe throughout most of the nineteenth century: adopting a posture of "splendid isolation," maintaining good relations with everybody but throwing its weight to the side that confers certain advantages at a specific moment (which, in the British case, was generally the weaker side). This would be a latter-day version of balance-of-power diplomacy. While that is theoretically possible, I do not believe the United States has the philosophy, the personnel, or the resources to do this on consistently a global basis, or even to elaborate it as a philosophy. Therefore, the more realistic approach to America's foreign policy problem in the post-Cold War world is to recognize that there are fundamental differences in America's relations with Europe, with individual countries in the Old World, and with those that exist in Asia.

Within Europe, the conflicts, rivalries, and historic memories have not wholly evaporated. Still, a strategic conflict among the European powers is out of the question. Whatever the differences in approach among the core countries of the European Union and the so-called rim countries, they are not likely to lead to military conflict.

Such is not the case in Asia. We can talk—as we do periodically—about a Pacific Community, but anybody studying the relations of Japan, China, Korea, the Asian part of Russia, and even India must acknowledge that, at this stage, their relations are more like those that existed between nineteenth-century European states than between twentieth-century European states. And, if we move to the area to the south of Europe, the growth of fundamentalism

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there poses not just an indirect but an explicit challenge to world order of a kind that does not exist in the heart of Europe. By linking religion and politics in a missionary concept that purports to be the only valid answer to contemporary political, social, and economic issues, in certain respects an explicit reaction to the material philosophies that have been dominant in the West, it challenges Western values across the board.

For this and many other reasons, just as at the end of World War II, the United States and the countries of Europe need to fashion a special kind of relation with each other. It is not so much that both have a common enemy, but that each is confronting comparable problems, both at home and abroad, and these can best be redressed by parallel approaches. It is not just a matter of deciding whether NATO ought to be extended into Central and Eastern Europe or how Russia's legitimate security concerns ought to be regarded, but how the old alliance, which contributed so much to the stability and prosperity of the Atlantic world for half a century, is to be made relevant to the political and economic requirements of the new era. Many parts of the world that drew few benefits from the Soviet-American "standoff" are legitimately demanding today that their interests be considered in something other than a purely military dimension.

At the end of World War II, Britain was the only major European country to have escaped occupation, to manage to preserve its institutions, and to be able to make the transition from power to influence in an extraordinary manner. It took exceptional self-discipline and skill for a nation that had been at the center of world affairs to shift its emphasis in the way that Britain did in the decades after 1945. While the Gaullist approach to the United States was to make disagreements extremely painful, the British approach was to make differences extremely embarrassing. In the long run, through a network of institutions and consultations, a general community of interests was engendered, with enormous benefit to both the United Kingdom and the United States.

Since then, many of the tacit bargains upon which Europe, America, and the European-American relationship were constructed have been altered. The end of the Cold War has been the capital event of recent years. When the division of Germany ended, the world in which France enjoyed a certain political leadership on the

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European continent, with Germany boasting a certain economic leadership, and America linked to both through its security role, could not be maintained in its old form. West Germany, organically linked to the United States by NATO and to the European Union by France, became an even more consequential European power after unification. Britain, extremely helpful in establishing the overall framework, remained ambivalent about the European Union.

But if a part of the international order is to free itself from reliance on largely strategic considerations, it must use the American relationship with Europe (and the Western hemisphere). This is less an institutional challenge than one of applying the principles of the special relationship between America and the United Kingdom to the North Atlantic area. I do not agree with those who say that America should shift its "special relationship" to Germany. That would not be helpful to Germany and it would not be meaningful for the United States. It is not in the American interest to seek a special continental partner. Nor do I know of a single German leader who aspires to such a relation. What is really needed today is for both the United States and the European Union, together with those democratic states who are not EU members to fashion together a global policy, geared not to enemies—the security danger linked to potential threats—but to global opportunities. These are still insufficiently perceived. Provincialism is not an American monopoly.

Historically, there have been two approaches to European-American relations. One was the Gaullist approach for which in its time I have had considerable sympathy. It reflected the necessities of a country that had passed through tremendous difficulties in the War and during decolonization, that desperately needed to reaffirm its identity. The second approach was that of Great Britain, a nation more secure in its identity, which sought to establish a pattern of cooperation that would be difficult to challenge. Over time, it came to reflect the convictions of both sides that their common interests transcended all their minor differences. The British approach reflected a historic tradition of global foreign policy; the French approach was geared more to calculations of the margins on which stability depended in Central Europe—particularly so long as Germany was divided. The British approach

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was to establish its identity by explicitly postulating common purposes; the French approach has been to emphasize distinctness. During the Cold War, when the United States had the dominant role in security, when there was only one visible international challenge, it made some sense to define European identity by trying to wrest it from the United States. Today, nothing is easier than to induce America to turn away from Europe; nothing is simpler than to convince Americans that they have no special interest in Europe. The tasks before Europe are now so manifold that they do not have to be granted by the United States. Issues such as participation of the Central European countries in the European Union will be resolved by the Europeans themselves. There is no need for the United States to take a position or to involve itself. Whether Europe follows a multiple geometry—which I prefer—or becomes more closely integrated cannot and should not be affected significantly by American pronouncements.

What is important today is that there not be too rigid separations between areas thought to be exclusively European and others that are deemed exclusively American. What we ultimately require is a dialogue between opinion as it has emerged in Europe and what is beginning to emerge in America. The inventiveness of the immediate post-World War II years needs to be looked for, but in contexts very different from those that existed when Stalin and his Communist successors ruled in the Kremlin. The Western civil war that started in 1914 and ended in 1945 owes much to the fact that the United States and its European allies and friends took counsel together, were prepared to express their differences, but were able in the end to collaborate, to act together.

In the United States, it is imperative that priority be given to European relations. This has been lacking, not only in terms of day-to-day policy, but also in the failure to take longer-range perspectives and to act on them. Thus, for example, the debate about NATO membership ought not to be permitted to fester indefinitely. That issue ought to be resolved one way or the other, everyone realizing that these are no longer the days of the Cold War; hence it is no longer possible to build an Atlantic relationship exclusively on security issues.

What we now need to do more urgently is create some goals for the North Atlantic nations so that we are able to act again within

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a common framework. We should seriously begin to examine some form of North Atlantic free trade association, a free trade agreement that would go beyond any that now exists. Whatever America builds in the Western Hemisphere needs to be related to this Atlantic enterprise, enabling us—in the foreseeable turmoil in other parts of the world and in the shifts of emphasis that will inevitably arise as new powers emerge—to act with purpose and direction.

A succession of American leaders of both political parties, many not known for excessive sentimentality (a trait not common to those who rise to the Presidency), have over a period of more than a generation considered it natural that, on major issues, Britain and the United States should cooperate. The level of consultation, though never formalized, was central to the formation of policy in both parties in both countries. Now, the challenge is to see whether this can be done in terms of European-American relations as well, where Britain's experience can make a signal contribution. Europe no longer needs to wrest its identity from the United States. In the world of the 1990s, both know their strengths and their weaknesses. It serves no purpose to dwell endlessly on either. The more imperative issue is whether they appreciate their common interests and are seeking to foster new forms of cooperation to serve those interests. The nations of the North Atlantic, representing a comparable civilization in a world in which democracy and economic progress remain our hope but not our guarantee, are required to do again, this time on a global basis, what they attempted so successfully to do a generation ago.

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We must, of course, consider the integrating influence of the industrial system of the latter part of our century. Whatever the arguments in favor of the maintenance of the nation-state, it is, economically speaking, becoming increasingly difficult for the latter to preserve its complete independence unless it is very large or (paradoxically) very primitive. The great "automated" factories of our age require huge "home markets" if they are to sell their goods at a profit. In the long run the maintenance of tariff barriers around medium-sized states can produce only unemployment and economic distress. But if customs unions are formed then more and more "integration" becomes inevitable. The nation-states concerned may try to resist this process; but the only choice in front of them, assuming the process of industrialization continues, is between union among themselves or absorption by one of the existing super-states.

Lord Gladwyn

From "World Order and the Nation-State—
A Regional Approach"
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Gilles Kepel

Islamists versus the State in Egypt and Algeria

BOTH THE EGYPTIAN AND THE ALGERIAN STATES are challenged by Islamist political movements whose power has increased greatly in recent years. The ideological family to which these movements claim to belong may be traced to a common source, the "Society of Muslim Brothers," created in Egypt in 1928–1929 by Hassan al-Banna. The sociocultural and age groups most often represented in the movements consist of "counter-elites" trained in the applied sciences (medicine, engineering, computer science, etc.), but also the urban underprivileged. Both states in recent decades have undergone parallel and painful transitions from planned to market economies, from "socialist" authoritarianism to some sort of political pluralism and freedom of the press. While the Egyptian state has managed to maintain itself as a state and to control the entirety of its territory, despite sporadic violence in the Upper Valley, the Algerian state has been unable to control political violence, to restore public order in many areas of the country, into which neither the armed forces nor the police dare to venture anymore.

Within the Islamist movement there are different factions—some favor participation in the political system and try to reach agreements with segments of the ruling elite while others wish to topple the state apparatus. Though their methods differ, all Islamist groups share a common political philosophy: an "Islamic state" should supersede the present "Westernized state." The main characteristic of this future "Islamic state" should be the implementation of *shari'a*, a judicial system tracing back to the sacred texts of

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Islam. Though interpretations vary widely on what this implementation would actually mean, such a political perspective is seen as a radical departure from the present state organization.

In order to understand to what extent the Egyptian and Algerian states are challenged by their Islamist oppositions, it is necessary first to delineate the doctrinal bases of their critique of the independent state, and then to observe how it was implemented in each country.

PRISON AS A METAPHOR FOR THE STATE

Egypt is still, up to a certain point, a reference model for Islamist movements of the Sunni persuasion: it was in this country that they originated and worked out their opposition against a postcolonial independent state that was not applying Islamic principles—the first of which is the *shari'a* or judicial system based on the *sole* inspiration of the Sacred Texts. At the time of the coup of the free officers, in July 1952, by which Nasser and his friends came into power, the Muslim Brothers[1] were expecting a lot from the new regime; they considered it their secular arm and saw themselves as inspiring great political decisions. Nasser stamped out their pretensions in the autumn of 1954, sending several of their leaders to the gallows, imprisoning many others in the desert, forcing the remainder to go into exile.

Nasser's actions had three consequences: The Brothers, able to line up as "martyrs," became the incarnation of the radical opposition to the dictatorship embodied in the state; the exile of many to the oil kingdoms enabled the Brothers to create on the Arab peninsula major economic networks, extremely useful in financing Islamist movements after the 1970s. In Algeria, exiled Muslim Brothers teachers played a significant role in the training of future leaders of local Islamist movements.

Finally, and above all, the camps produced the most important contemporary Islamist thinker, Sayyid Qutb.[2] Before being sent to his death by Nasser in 1966, he formulated the theory of opposition to the independent nationalist state still used today by militants all over the Sunni Muslim world. According to Qutb, the countries claiming to be Muslim do not stem from Islam, since *shari'a* is not applied, but from the *jahiliyya* (a term signifying a

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state of "ignorance" or "barbarity," which, according to Muslim doctrine, was characteristic of Arabia before the revelation of Allah to the Prophet Muhammad, in the seventh century A.D.). In order to return to the real Islam, it is necessary to overthrow the *jahiliyya* state, in which man reigns, to build instead the Islamic state, in which God reigns. Qutb was hanged before he could explain how this overthrowing of the *jahiliyya,* the "impious" state, was to be implemented—whether by force, preaching, social work, or political participation. This encouraged the rise of the various contemporary Islamist factions, each with its own distinctive strategy for achieving its ends.

When Qutb worked out these ideas in Nasser's prison camps during the mid-1960s, the prestige of the Egyptian state and its *rais* (and the effectiveness of police repression) were at their peak. It was not until after Nasser's death in 1970, when Sadat proceeded to free the prisoners, that the Islamist visions of the world overflowed jail boundaries. The new *rais,* inclined to use to some degree Islamist proselytism—which he valued as a conservative world view—sought to employ it against the Nasserian Left.

The bipolarity of the world, then at its height, saw the United States encouraging all who might cooperate to undermine the influence of the Soviet Union in the region. The leniency of Sadat towards the Islamist militants was echoed in the same years in Algeria where Boumedienne[3] encouraged the conservative religious establishment, hoping to control the communists of the Avant-garde Socialist Party (PAGS) and the leftists inspired by May 68 in France who were anxious to hasten agrarian reform. Similarly, in Tunisia, Bourguiba, despite his being a convinced secularist, looked with pleasure on Islamist students displacing leftists (mostly French-speaking) on the university campus. Saudi Arabia, the banker of conservative-style re-Islamization and the faithful ally of the United States, contributed to the policy later by sustaining the United States in its support of the Islamist guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan who were resisting the Soviet invasion.

Still, the development of Islamist movements in Egyptian society at the beginning of the 1970s cannot be seen as mere state manipulation, or as the consequence of American support. It arose from intrinsic causes—which would reappear, with a shade or two of

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difference, in other countries of the Sunni Muslim world a few years later, with results that are still being felt.

The first generation, which had never known colonialism and was impervious to rhetorical legitimation of the state elites originally based on the anticolonial struggle of the past, arrived at adult age—and in the labor market (or, more exactly, the unemployment market)—during this period. The leaders, who had monopolized control of the state apparatus for over two decades, were called to account by these young people, who disparaged their management of society, and emphasized the discrepancy between their grand promises and the reality of underemployment. This generation of young adults, the result of the population explosion and the drive from the countryside to peripheral urban life, were literate, or at least the males were. They felt acutely their "relative frustration." The cultural capital they had acquired, at the cost of considerable sacrifice, gave them only limited access to a saturated job market, to decent living conditions. The city centers were overpopulated, and the young were crammed into shantytowns. Their discontent undermined the foundations of the social ideals imported from the West (in their liberal or socialist avatars), which had provided the knowledge instilled in schools by the state education system. In many young people's eyes, this was mere mendacious speechifying, scarcely expressing the reality of their own decline and misery. They turned to another vision of the world, easily accessible to them, the Islamist ideology elaborated by Qutb and his friends.

Seeking justification in the Sacred Texts for the overthrowing of a state they considered iniquitous, and hoping to build an Islamic state on its ruins, this became the foundation of Islamist opposition to the "Westernized" state in Egypt, Algeria, and a number of other Arab and Muslim countries. Combining an ideological configuration, born of the thinking of Qutb, with a set of structural changes in the economic, social, political, and cultural fields, painfully experienced by the masses of the population, this "getting into step" has been taking place in Egypt since the beginning of the 1970s. It has undergone significant changes since then, becoming conspicuous in Algeria about ten years later. In both countries, it took hold a quarter of a century after actual national Indepen-

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dence (1952 in Egypt, 1962 in Algeria), when a generation that had never known colonization came of age.

EGYPTIAN ISLAMISM BETWEEN RADICALS AND CONSERVATIVES

The Egyptian Islamist movement has two main factions, the first born of the former "Society of Muslim Brothers." Having no wish to topple the state, they apply the *shari'a* as a way to share power. Generally members of an urban middle class of tradesmen and professionals, they are kept away from access to the state by the ruling elites (whether military or civilian), whose own authority goes back to the early post-Independence period.

At the other extreme is a group of young university graduates who are having difficulties in gaining positions of economic or political power, who combine with a mass of outcasts who live on the outskirts of the towns, estranged from the labor market. It is among these that the most radical militants are recruited, those with a wish to change thoroughly the social hierarchy. Their opposition will frequently express itself—where there is no real democratic discussion—in various acts of violence.

Until the assassination of Sadat, it was mainly this second, more radical, faction that attracted public attention[4]; it was socially visible. This faction, itself divided into several branches, the most important being *gama'at islamiyya* (Islamic associations), was implanted in university circles, where it was noted for its social work on behalf of students. Remedial school teaching, the providing of low-cost "Islamic outfit" for female students, and making available free transport were characteristic activities. Because they drove left-wing militants from the campuses, to the great satisfaction of the state authorities, they were initially welcomed by the state. Only gradually did the state realize that the *gama'at* were a more serious challenge than the left-wingers had ever been. When they attempted to restrain the group's activities, a radicalization took place, and a number of the more militant went into hiding.

These clandestine militants were also fragmented; there were two main subgroups: some, hailing from the "Society of Muslims," led by the agronomist Shukri Mustapha, left the cities—following the example of the prophet Muhammad, who fled from a hostile Mecca to Medina—hoping to return victoriously to "im-

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pious" Cairo, to conquer the state by bringing Islam to it, as Muhammad had recaptured idolatrous Mecca in order to promote the triumph of Allah. The group was disbanded in 1977, its principal leaders hanged.

Another form of radical militantism found its expression in the movement that assassinated Sadat—"the *jihad* (holy war) organization." Its ideologue, an electrical engineer, Abdessalam Farag,[5] author of the pamphlet *The Neglected Duty,* wrote that it was useless to wear oneself out in social works or in an imaginary Medina in the caves of Upper Egypt. The only way to establish an Islamic state was to strike the "impious" state at its head, to assassinate the *rais*—in the hope that the Muslim masses of the Egyptian people, once rid of the pharaoh, would follow the militants. They achieved their aim in part: Sadat was assassinated, but his vice president, Muhammad Hosni Mubarak, succeeded him without further turmoil. The radical forms of Islamist opposition to the Egyptian state under Sadat had not succeeded, though they had managed to cast a shadow over the legitimacy of the state.

THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE

Under Mubarak's presidency, the conservative Islamist faction that originated from the Muslim Brothers acquired increasing influence. An Islamist, urban, lower middle class emerged that would rather militate for a steady Islamization of the state than pursue armed *jihad* in order to topple it. It consisted of two layers born of the socioeconomic changes of the 1970s. The first was comprised of the university students who had joined the *gama'at islamiyya* and, after graduation, took over the professions—medicine, law, journalism—as they had taken over the student associations ten years earlier.

The other group consisted of a number of emigrants who left in the 1970s to find employ on the Arab peninsula, and who began to return to Egypt in the 1980s. They left with cultural assets, which, in the Nile Valley, gave them access only to the very lowest remuneration in the public sector. On the peninsula, however, they had been able to valorize these assets, becoming teachers, experts, and professionals. They returned considerably richer, having climbed the social ladder. Many underwent a religious trans-

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formation. They left as "sociologic Muslims" and returned practicing the forms of piety current in Saudi Arabia, where the Wahhabite conception of Islam is fully applied. Its extreme moralism, with multiple prohibitions (particularly as regards the place of women in society, the wearing of the veil, etc.), finds nothing in the *shari'a* at all incompatible with the upholding of established social hierarchies, free enterprise, capitalism, and privileged international alliance with the United States.

For Mubarak's regime, the emergence of this Islamo-conservative, urban, lower middle class increased social stability and made possible the integration of less wealthy and potentially more turbulent groups through the employment, services, and charitable activities created by their socioeconomic network.

On an ideological level, this new sociocultural group found its spokesmen in a number of conservative preachers, whose ideology resembled that of the Muslim Brothers. The regime considered them useful brokers of social peace. As long as they did not directly challenge the state in political matters, but saw in the *shari'a* the opportunity to improve society morally, restraining deviant behavior, they were welcome; until the summer of 1993, there was a sort of power sharing between the ruling state elites and these conservative ulemas, who were given a free hand in matters of social and cultural relations. Their demands for the Islamization of society led them to demand that works that were thought to infringe on the ethics of Islam be censored, and this included materials as different as the original text of the *Arabian Nights* and the novels or essays of secular Egyptian writers. In effect, the Egyptian state used the conservative Islamists and their ulema spokesmen[6] to strengthen its own legitimacy. But such a strategy would not prove successful in the long run; it did not prevent the resurgence of radical Islamist violence directed against the state and the symbols of its power.

TO TOPPLE THE STATE

In the last years of the 1980s, radical Islamist unrest surfaced again, particularly in the Upper Nile Valley and in the Fayoum oasis where sheik Omar Abd el Rahman had settled. Released from prison after being found not guilty of Sadat's assassination,

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this ulema-turned-radical resumed his preaching, the central theme of which was the impiety of the state, the necessity of toppling the state in order to install the Islamic state. For the radicalized Islamist militants who came together, two main options emerged. For some, among whom the principal figure was Commander 'Abbud el Zumur, the mastermind behind Sadat's assassination who remained in prison, the aim was to infiltrate the army to start the final *jihad* against the impious state. This movement, predicated on political patience, known as *tanzim al jihad,* considered haphazard acts of violence or random assassinations to be useless. Such acts would only expose the perpetrators to repression, ultimately hindering them in their grand design, the toppling of the state.

Quite different were the tactics of the *jama'a islamiyya,* its central figure being sheik Omar Abd el Rahman. Less well structured than the *tanzim al jihad,* the *jama'a* is a collection of associations and movements directed by self-proclaimed "emirs" in various towns and large villages in Egypt. Accused of being behind the attacks against tourists, harassing the military and the police, and assassinating the secularist writer Farag Foda, their political "impatience" expresses itself in incongruous and wild ardor. These young militants, wishing to break away from the state, throw themselves wildly into an activism that, with its feats of arms, "martyrs," and "plunder," is linked to a tradition of dissidence in which the distinction between honorable banditry, plain banditry, and armed resistance becomes vague. Moreover, by setting in motion a provocation-repression cycle, the *jama'a* hopes to mobilize the victims of state repression, which, in the Upper Nile Valley, is at times more akin to a vendetta than to peacekeeping.

The militants of these two movements now number hardly more than a few thousand, but they have become a heavy burden on the state, obliged to devote considerable energy to fight them. No less importantly, the state has had to bargain for increased support of the conservative religious movement, which has exacted a high price for its backing, meting it out with a stinginess proportional to the weakness of the state.

During the summer of 1993, the violence of the armed groups affiliated with the *gamaat islamiyya* and the *jihad* increased twofold: attempts on the lives of the Ministers of Interior and of

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Information, but also of the Prime Minister, almost succeeded. Many policemen were assassinated; Copts, Christian Egyptians, were subjected to racketeering in the Upper Nile Valley, having to pay a special tax (*jiziyya*) in return for "protection" by armed militant Islamists.[7] Attacks on tourists threatened to ruin the winter season—causing losses estimated at 800 million dollars for 1993 alone. The concessions made to the conservative ulemas have been of little use to the state, and have not contributed very much to civilian peacekeeping. The challenge to the state continues unabated.

THE STATE STRIKES BACK

Faced with an intensification of violence, with the ulemas close to the Muslim Brothers creating a climate encouraging to the militants of the *jihad* and the *gamaat islamiyya,* the state chose, at the end of 1993, to break its gentleman's agreement with the conservative Islamist movement, to favor instead the secularist intellectuals who had access to the media, particularly television. A proliferation of films, soap operas, newspaper articles, and books are today attacking the armed militants, the "bedouin Islam" of the Saudis, described as strangers to the traditions of Egypt. The conservative ulemas and Muslim Brothers were denounced as "terrorists" in June 1994 by the Minister of Interior, no longer prepared to mollify them.[8]

The Egyptian military and police, focusing on the repression of the armed radical Islamists, are aware that the opposition claims that there are more than twenty thousand political prisoners, that the number of dead from "law and order" operations is extremely high. The strategy has been successful because it has targeted militants belonging to groups without ties to or protection from the wealthy or the powerful: unemployed youths, students, and sons of rural families from Middle Egypt or from the towns on the outskirts of the cities.

It is a quite different matter, however, for the government to treat the conservative Islamist movement, the Muslim Brothers, and the various ulemas gravitating around them. Their social base is not the haphazard peripheral neighborhoods and the wretched villages of the Valley, but the new, comfortable apartments that

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the Egyptian emigrants returning from the Arab peninsula have built for themselves.

What is the likely outcome of the fight between the state and the Muslim Brothers? Unlike the armed militants, the Brothers have important networks within Egyptian society; they enjoy tremendous support in the Arab peninsula. The state cannot simply confront them, but has to mobilize political support against the institutions available to the Brothers: thousands of charity organizations, socioeconomic groups, led by doctors, lawyers, and journalists. Without solid political backing, Mubarak could find himself in a situation like that of Sadat during the "autumn of wrath" in September 1981; while the opposition had been imprisoned, one month later, the *rais* was assassinated.

In its fight against the Brothers, the Egyptian state is not without advantages—all the more important if we consider the situation in Algeria. In the first place, the financial situation in Egypt has never been better. The support it gave the anti-Iraqi coalition during the Gulf War had its reward: a cancellation of the major part of its debt. Important assets controlled by Egyptians abroad (unofficially valued during the war at over 80 billion dollars) have been invested in the country, allowing the Egyptian pound, convertible currency, to appreciate against the dollar. Even if the economy remains very dependent on Western, principally American, aid,[9] these investments have promoted new enterprises in the agricultural and food industry, in services particularly, satisfying the needs of a solvent consumer market. This class of entrepreneurs, to this date, has been ready to support the state in its battle with the militants.

Within the wider mass of the population, the state has managed to turn to its advantage the general reprobation that followed the murdering of foreigners, an unprecedented form of criminality in the history of Egyptian tourism, which led to the ruin of a great many families, at all social levels. They were living in one way or another on the tourist manna, the returns from which were vital to them. It is unlikely that they will refuse to support the state when it tackles the Brothers and its offshoots, accused of having backed the armed Islamists.

However, the game is not yet over: the enrichment of a group of entrepreneurs who expect to benefit from a publicly-announced

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privatization policy only exacerbates and emphasizes the extent of the social inequalities. While it is much easier to drive, telephone, and shop in Cairo today than it was ten years ago, the infrastructures of the lower-class districts are crumbling. By setting up a charity network to repair the social fabric, to palliate the glaring deficiencies of the state's services—to provide health, education, and transport—the Islamist militants are attracting new sympathy, building on a base they originally established in the 1970s.

It is likely that the conflict between the state and the Islamists will be resolved in the context of this competition. The Egyptian state, unlike the Algerian, has at its disposal financial assets that it can redistribute to stimulate some sort of incipient prosperity among the poor. Whether or not it does so will depend on how it balances the short-term interests of groups eager to accumulate immediate profits and the long-term interests of entrepreneurs and ruling elites who expect a return on their economic and political investments, who expect the state to be strong.

FROM OPPOSITION TO CIVIL WAR: THE STATE AND THE ISLAMISTS IN ALGERIA

In Algeria, the principal re-Islamization movement, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was proclaimed in the Ben Badis mosque in Kouba in March 1989, several months after the popular uprising of October 1988, which caused the authoritarian state, controlled by the National Liberation Front (FLN) since Independence, to totter. In record time, the Islamist party succeeded in exercising undisputed leadership, acquiring control of the social fabric, dominating the political scene. By annexing the majority of mosques and preachers to its cause, it defused all interpretations of Islam other than its own. On the social level, the FIS used a strategy implemented by the local Islamic associations that had preceded it: it assumed responsibility for many of the daily problems that assail Algerians, compensating for the shortcomings of the state, acting as its substitute, and reorganizing society around the mosques for the dispensing of goods and services. These social policies translated into the "tidal wave" political victory of the FIS at the local elections of June 1990, which enabled it to control a large majority of town halls. It was followed by an even more conspicuous

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success at the end of December 1991 in the first round of the legislative elections, subsequently annulled by the military in January 1992.[10] These exceptional successes, indisputable evidence of the strategic effectiveness of the militants, expressed the exasperation and fury of many who called for vengeance, who refused to accept the existing order.

RETHINKING STATE LEGITIMACY

The FIS, able to transform the original 1989 revolt into a radical project of social change, has a vision of the world that was originally held by only a few thousand militants, but has suddenly acquired a mass dimension, carrying a redefinition of Algerian identity. They succeeded because of what had happened in the preceding decades. The Algerian leaders, by imposing a one-party dictatorship, by eliminating all militants inspired by democratic ideals, putting them into jail or forcing them into exile, failed to achieve their purposes. President Boumedienne, in encouraging the taking over of the state by a circumscribed ethnic group—the Eastern Arabic-speaking population—at the expense of the Berber and the French-speaking populations and the Independence war veterans from Central and Western Algeria, only exacerbated the problem.

In this way, a feeling of the hijacking of the state, a betrayal of the "revolution of 1954" and the "principles of November" was perpetuated. It existed in a confused and clandestine manner, since its open expression was strictly forbidden. Appropriating this feeling of betrayal, while at the same time giving it a special interpretation, was the great source of strength of the FIS ideology. Indeed, according to the FIS, the *jihad* for independence, in which religion in its Islamist acceptation would have played a major role, had been warped by the "children of France"—as they dubbed the ruling elites—preventing it from succeeding in establishing an Islamic state.

For the younger generations, who had no knowledge of the actual facts, who had access only to official versions, the betrayals of the post-Independence period and the hijacking of the state remained a "confused certainty." It was easy to substitute the Islamist overwriting of Algerian history for the censored memory

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of the state: in an era of deep social discontent, like that which prevailed in Algeria from the mid-1980s, there was room for a "rectification" of ideology, blaming all the ills of society on the hijacking of the state. The FIS reduced this complex betrayal to a very simple one: the "original *Islamic* ideals had been violated."

"The Algerian State of 1962," Abbassi Madani, the principal leader of the FIS, declared, "had nothing to do with what had been conceived on the first of November 1954, for which we had taken up arms: an independent State founded on Islamic principles. The State that has arisen before our eyes was founded on secular socialist principles. This was a serious deviation. . . .We entered an era of despair, failure, and disaster." Ali Benhadj, the star preacher of the FIS, proclaimed: "If my father and his brothers (in religion) have expelled France, *physically,* with its oppression from Algeria, I, with my brothers, intend to devote myself, with the arms of faith, to banish it *intellectually and ideologically,* to break with its supporters who have sucked its venomous milk."[11] The state, a Westernized entity, was to be broken by committed believers in Islam.

Between Independence and 1989, the development of the Islamist movement in Algeria proceeded slowly and was barely visible. A faction of the FLN, nicknamed "the bearded FLN" by Algerian wits, represented the socially and morally conservative fringe of the party, working for greater Arabization (or "de-Francization") of society. Their aim was to amalgamate as closely as possible official socialism with the principles of the *shari'a.* As in Egypt, it was on the moral and cultural level that this movement first showed itself; it increased in size and importance as soon as the state needed it to counter the influence of the radical Left, which tried to control the agrarian reform in the early 1970s. It was not until the beginning of the next decade that the Islamist movement managed to achieve its first autonomous breakthrough by distancing itself from the state.

BREAKING AWAY FROM THE STATE

The first Islamist demonstration demanding the application of the *shari'a* had taken place in 1982 on the campus of the University of Algiers, landing its leaders, including Abbassi Madani, in prison.

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In the same year, a group of Islamist militants went underground: led by Mustapha Bouyali and known as the Armed Islamic Movement (or Algerian Islamic Movement), it held out for five years against the forces of the state. Its influence at the time remained limited, but a number of the present-day leaders of the most radical wing of the Islamist movement have come from Bouyali's entourage, notably Ali Benhadj, the most charismatic of the FIS leaders and the most popular among the underprivileged. To counter the influence of these incipient movements—which in the mid-1980s were far from having the broad political reach of their Egyptian counterparts, not to speak of their experience of confrontation with the state—the regime made a number of concessions, particularly in the field of morality and personal status.

These, however, were not sufficient to defuse a movement that was providing important social aid through a network of charitable associations, seeking to tackle problems arising from the crisis of the second half of the 1980s, created by the collapse of the oil market. Life in Algeria had been relatively easy up to that period, thanks to oil income: hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) constituted more than 90 percent of the value of Algeria's exports. That income had made it possible for the state, without taking into account costs and competitiveness, to set up "heavy industries" on the Soviet model, with low productivity and high subsidies. These policies caused the ruin of agriculture; home-grown products, replaced by imports financed by the oil industry, speeded up the rural exodus to the shantytowns of the urban peripheral zones. Until the mid-1980s, income from oil allowed the state to purchase social peace, providing numerous cushy jobs, subsidizing consumer goods. From then on, the fall in oil prices put a stop to all such mass subsidizing.

The increased wealth had not come about through work and enterprise; fortunes were made through commissions on imports and exports. Fraud and waste were common. The state found itself suddenly without the means to hand out additional resources. In this respect, Algeria is much more vulnerable than Egypt: the latter has the advantage of an "income basket" (oil, the Suez canal, emigrant remittances, foreign aid, tourism, and the like). One can be substituted for the other. When Egypt's income from tourism fell in 1991 in the aftermath of the Gulf War, and again

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in 1993–1994 because of the murder of foreign tourists by Islamist militants, the country was less affected than might have been expected; the losses were partly compensated for by other income. In Algeria, where oil is the primary resource, the "remittances" from emigrants—which amount to over a million people in France—form only a marginal investment in a country that does not inspire confidence, where a massive drain of capital is taking place. When oil shares fell markedly in the mid-1980s, the population of the huge city outskirts was impoverished; conditions deteriorated rapidly, contributing to the uprising of October 1988. In these circumstances, the charitable networks and the solidarity and mutual aid organizations set up by the Islamist militants worked to patch up the social fabric; from 1989 onwards, the FIS could use these interventions to its advantage.

Despite the events of October 1988, which marked the first massive popular rejection of the FLN state, and despite the successes of the FIS, culminating in its short-lived victory in the first round of the legislative elections in December 1991, the state remained in the hands of an oligarchy, co-opted individuals, sociologically divided from the rising generations fashioned by the demography and culture of an independent Algeria. The FLN state, like the former socialist countries it had taken as its model, had produced a *nomenklatura*. Their continued access, within an impoverished economy after the collapse of the oil market, to a reserve of lodgings, services, travel, and currency inaccessible to the common people was galling to those who could not claim such luxuries. The privileges of this caste, which had sequestrated for its own use the state born of independence, fed the hostility of two classes of the Algerian population: the underprivileged and the new elites.

The underprivileged, known in Algeria as the *hittistes*,[12] live in sordid, overcrowded council estates or, for the latecomers from the *bled*, in shantytowns on the outskirts of towns or in the partly ruined medinas of the former city centers. For this class, which survives on meager salaries, the enemies are the men in power who have secured the former villas of the French colonists, but also their playboy children (or *chi-chi*) driving Volkswagen Golfs and GTIs. For those who enjoy privileges they are deprived of, including the use of the French language and culture (which in spite of

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the official Francophobic slogans of the state still guarantees access to the most lucrative positions), there is only "hatred," which, in the present context, is translated into murderousness. These are the individuals who voted for the FIS in 1990 and 1991, who saw an opportunity to voice their rejection of the FLN state, who through the Islamic associations linked to the FIS had undertaken to restore a network of district associations, dispensaries, and social services, centralized on the mosques. Their vision of the world, inspired by Islamist militants through sermons delivered in the prayer halls, came to sudden but very short-lived prominence.

ARMED ISLAMIST DISSIDENCE AND THE SHAPING OF A COUNTER SOCIETY

The dismantling of the FIS at the beginning of 1992, which diminished the chances of its rising to power, deflated the mass movement that had guaranteed a tribune for the underprivileged. While some have joined the various movements for armed struggle that have gone underground and have channeled their hatred into attacks against the representatives of the police, the state apparatus, or French-speaking intellectuals who have nothing to do with the state *nomenklatura* and are simply lumped with the elite, others have lost hope in the future of the Islamist movement. Many have dropped into delinquency and social deviance, particularly characterized today by drug abuse and the criminal activities associated with it. Violence is now common in many working-class Algerian districts, caused primarily by the armed bands of drug peddlers and the armed Islamist networks: unpoliced, these zones escape the effective control of the state.[13] They are becoming deviant enclaves, redolent of the ghettos in American cities.

The re-Islamization movements recruited an important segment of their militants and their executives from young elites trained in mass educational institutions set up after Independence. These young graduates, facing a shortage of work opportunities that might, in other circumstances, have satisfied them, given their qualifications and aspirations, see most executive posts blocked by the *nomenklatura*. Many members of this "counter-elite" have joined the ranks of the so-called "Algerianist" faction of the FIS. Its key figure, petrochemical engineer Abdelkader Hachani, per-

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suaded his party to participate in the legislative elections of 1991, despite the imprisonment of its principal leaders, Abbassi Madani and Ali Benhadj. Aspiring to manage the state, to replace the worn-out elites of the FLN, they wished to Islamize Algerian institutions, changing the political vocabulary, encouraging the social promotion of graduates from the younger generation. Their program lacks a revolutionary dimension capable of offering the underprivileged masses more than the vague promises of "social justice according to the Koran." Having no intention of toppling the state, but only of "Islamizing" it from the inside, many of these "Algerianist" Islamist executives, elected as representatives of the FIS in the first round of the legislative elections, went into exile in Europe and the United States immediately after their party was dissolved. Their attitude toward the armed groups that have joined the terrorist spiral is ambiguous. First alleging that they were controlling the underground from abroad, they alternately dissociated themselves from certain assassinations (while casting the responsibility for the violence on the forces of repression) while claiming to be the authors of others. By their contacts in the West as well as in certain factions of the *nomenklatura* left over from the FLN, they have not abandoned hope of appearing to be the only solution before chaos if the present repressive policy leads to no significant results. In the United States and in certain European countries, they lobby regularly in government circles. In Algiers, their contacts with the most Islamizing branch of the FLN point to various possible future groupings around a conservative re-Islamization project that would preserve the essential part of the present social hierarchies, allowing a certain rota of elites, and addressing the underprivileged in the language of social justice, as given in the Koran.

The 1994 negotiations between representatives of the Algerian state and some of the FIS leaders who belong to that faction paved the way for such a possible outcome. Both sides have had to take into account the strength of their internal opposition. In the state camp, a number of officers in the armed forces remain hostile to any substantial concession to the claims of the FIS; they threaten their partners with the prospect of armed upheaval in Kabylia (a mountainous, non-Arabophone area close to Algiers where hostility to the FIS is at its strongest). Such a rising would lead to the

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destruction of Algerian territorial integrity. In the Islamist camp, many of the young *hittistes,* who had taken to the streets or the mountains in fear that any compromise would be made at their expense, considered that for all their fighting and suffering they deserved to control the future Islamic state in Algeria. Little trusting the established FIS leadership, as incarnated in Abbassi Madani, it is impossible to know how they will eventually act.

When the tentative negotiations in the autumn of 1994 failed, violence gained a new momentum. In contradistinction to Egypt, the harshness of the Algerian repression—implemented essentially by the military—did not manage to restore state control in many areas. By the end of 1994, violence had taken precedence over any ideological claim by either the Islamist opposition or the army. Both camps remained deeply divided, and their leadership was obscure.

The state, unable to recapture the urban middle class which had voted for the FIS, had refused it any real share in economic or political power. The state *nomenklatura,* estranged from society, sees no way to end the violence. Neither the military nor the Islamist armed movements are able to destroy their adversaries. It is likely to be a very long time before the state as such—whatever its ideology, Islamist or "Westernized"—is restored in Algeria.

Translated by
Juliet Kepl

ENDNOTES

[1]The Society of the Muslim Brothers was founded in 1928–1929 in Isma'iliyya by Hassan al-Banna. See Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and Olivier Carré and Gerard Michaud, *Les Frères musulmans* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983).

[2]See Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993); and Olivier Carré, *Mystique et politique* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1984).

[3]See Ahmed Rouadjia, *Les Frères et la Mosquée* (Paris: Karthala, 1990).

[4]On the Islamist movement during the 1970s, see R. Sid Ahmad, *Al Nabi al Mussalah* (The Armed Prophet), vol. 3 (London: Riyyad al Rayes, 1990, and Beirut: Riyyad al Rayes, 1993).

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[5]Translated into English by Johannes J. G. Jansen, *The Neglected Duty* (London and New York: Macmillan, 1986).

[6]On the political role of the ulemas, see Malika Zeghal, *Entre politique et religion: itinéraires contemporains des ulamas d'Al Azhar (1952–1993),* Ph. D. thesis, Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris, 1994.

[7]On the violence directed against Copts in the Upper Valley, see Claude Guyomarch, "Assiout: épicentre de la 'sédition confessionnelle' en Egypte," in Gilles Kepel, ed., *Exils et Royaumes* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1994).

[8]See *Al Mussawar,* 3 June 1994, 364, which publishes police information relating to the uncovering of a "secret apparatus" of the Muslim Brothers.

[9]See Louis Blin, "Le renouvellement de l'accord entre l'Egypte et le F.M.I. et ses conséquences," *Egypte-Monde arabe* 15–16 (1993).

[10]The FIS obtained 4,331,472 votes (54.25 percent of the voters who went to the polls and 33.73 percent of registered voters) in the local elections of June 1990 and 3,260,222 votes in the first round of the legislative elections of December 1991 (47.27 percent of the votes and 24.59 percent of registered voters). This gave it the control of the majority of local councils and 188 representatives elected in the first round (as opposed to sixteen for the FLN). Cf. Jacques Fontaine, "Les élections législatives algériennes," *Monde arabe/Maghreb-Machrek* 135 (January-March 1992): 155. The results were disputed by the FIS, which estimated that it had obtained, in 1990, 82.51 percent of the votes. See *Al Munqidh,* special ed., 28 dhou al qi'da 1410.

[11]Interview with Slimane Zeghidour, *Politique Internationale* (Autumn 1990): 156, 180.

[12]This Franco-Arabic term (from *hit*: wall) depicts the young unemployed leaning against the wall; they are supposed by Algerian wits to be "holding up the wall" to prevent it from falling down.

[13]On those areas that have escaped state control, see Meriem Vergès, "La Casbah d'Alger," and Luis Martinez, "Les Eucalyptus: banlieue d'Alger dans la Guerre civile," in Kepel, ed., *Exils et Royaumes.*

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But there is another possible answer concerning the purpose of awakening consciousness, which appears to me to be in full accord with our own desire to know. It could be that the technological dream entertained by our time is really just a dream, a series of changes and transformations in our world, which, when compared to the actual realities of our life, has a phantom-like and arbitrary character. To be awakened to consciousness could also mean to become aware of how little things change, even where everything appears to be changing. What is involved is not a plea for the preservation of the existing order. The concern is simply with a readjustment of our consciousness. The conservative, like the revolutionary, seems to me to require a similar rectification of his understanding. The unavoidable and unpredictable realities—birth and death, youth and age, native and foreign, determination and freedom—demand the same recognition from both groups. These realities have measured out what men can plan and what they can achieve. Continents and empires, revolutions in power and in thought, the planning and organization of life on our planet and outside it, will not be able to exceed a measure which perhaps no one knows and to which, nevertheless, all are subject.

Hans-Georg Gadamer

From "Notes on Planning for the Future"
Dædalus 95 (2) (Spring 1966)

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Jennifer A. Widner

States and Statelessness in Late Twentieth-Century Africa

IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD TODAY, the central issues on the political agenda are the sustainability of the welfare state, democratization, and the reduction in tariff barriers and other forms of protection. These discussions presuppose that governments have the capacity to implement policy change and institutional reform, if the right political coalitions can be engineered, if sympathetic technocrats can be insulated from popular pressures, or if leadership that shares in "the Washington consensus" can be identified. At issue is building support for a particular set of policies.

By contrast, in Africa, as in Central Asia, the problem is really one of state effectiveness. For example, while private trade often flourishes in parallel markets, contract enforcement through courts is unreliable, making investment in fixed assets prohibitively risky. Parallel political authorities—warlords, kingdoms, new religious groups—often make stronger claims on obedience than do nation-states and compete with nation-states as centers of revenue collection and regulation. Pervasive personal insecurity, a result of the spread of cheap and therefore "democratic" weaponry such as grenades, AK-47s, and land mines, undermines norms that support savings, maintenance, and investment. At issue in these cases is not policy per se but the very existence of states.

This problem received its most vivid portrayal in a controversial article in *The Atlantic Monthly* that projected an apocalyptic vision of Africa.[1] Robert Kaplan argued that south of the Sahara to speak of states and national borders was meaningless. Life was a

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Hobbesian war of all against all; there were no Leviathans. To the extent that it had once been possible to speak of states, whether the empires or kingships of the past or administrations built on colonial forms, these had become ineffective and increasingly yielded to parallel political authorities, such as emirates, or to roving bandits—militias, gangs, or local mafias. Migrations to escape conflict spread hunger, disease, and despair. As if on cue, Rwanda provided a vivid illustration of Kaplan's remarks.

To those who study Africa, Kaplan's essay, "The Coming Anarchy," elicited a decidedly mixed reaction. The police blotter description of familiar countries said nothing factually wrong, but it did not capture reality either. For example, it overlooked the serious debates professionals, religious leaders, youths, and farmers pursued within their communities in an effort to diagnose the malaise and to decide what to do. It obscured the sea change in elite attitudes in some countries, where books such as Axelle Kabou's *Et si l'Afrique refusait le développement?*, an attack on old notions of dependency, had become the work most frequently checked out of university libraries. Nonetheless, the article did draw attention to a deeply disturbing, widespread, secular trend: declining levels of institutional performance across the continent and, in some cases, social collapse.

The reaction of many to the state failure and the erosion of social order in Africa will be to turn away. US Special Envoy to the Sudan, Melissa Wells, has thoughtfully remarked that the spectacle of spreading conflict in central Africa may engender such despair that it will lead many to redraw the definition of humanity, removing many people from the world community because the awfulness of the conflict is too much for our moral imaginations. Such mental and political sleight of hand will have a profoundly corrosive effect on the political values of Western society. It is the responsibility of scholars to make this problem intellectually more manageable, so that it will become possible to address the problems of the spirit that will inevitably arise.

This essay takes a first step in that direction. One aim is to sketch the patterns of performance among countries, distinguishing cases of collapse from failed states and singling out a few exceptions to the trends that Kaplan observed. A second is to inquire into the origins of deteriorating institutional performance,

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identifying what is distinctive about the context of state-building in Africa today and the challenges these circumstances pose for decisionmakers. A third aim is to ask whether "failed states" and "collapsed states" are aspects of the same or different problems. A fourth is to offer some tentative directions for policymakers.

PATTERNS OF PERFORMANCE

Institutional performance in Africa has varied across countries and, within national boundaries, between types of activity. Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko has flamboyantly exemplified the "failed state" in Africa, with fewer kilometers of passable road and lower standards of living than existed at the time of its Independence. Military and police commanders are able to exercise little control over the behavior of their subordinates, who routinely engineer "construction projects" to channel traffic to informal toll collection points, extract what they can from local populations, and occasionally instigate looting to provide a pretext for their own raids on private food stores. Chad, Sierra Leone, and Equatorial Guinea also fall into this category of "failed states."

At the other end of the spectrum lies Botswana, which has, for the period beginning in 1966, one of the highest average annual rates of gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the world. Located in war-ravaged southern Africa and long subjected to refugee flows and cross-border incursions from forces fighting in South Africa and Zimbabwe, Botswana's government has successfully handled tasks that have posed severe challenges to others. For example, Botswana is a mineral producer and faces all the problems commodity price shocks can create for such economies. Unlike others in Africa, however, it has consistently avoided the problems of Dutch Disease, managing its resources to maintain a stable macroeconomic environment and to promote agriculture and livestock production. When diamond prices fell in 1981, and Botswana faced a major stabilization problem, the country's leaders successfully negotiated a series of unpopular temporary measures, including a currency devaluation, consumption taxes, and a wage freeze. The effectiveness of the Botswana government is also evident in its response to the climatic problems. The most severe drought to hit Africa since the Independence era struck Botswana

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in the mid-1980s; residents lost more than 80 percent of their crops for five years in a row.[2] Although this drought was more severe than many that have afflicted the Sudan and other famine prone areas, the effects on mortality were so small as to be unmeasurable. The government had anticipated the weather pattern and planned ahead; it mobilized effectively to feed the population.

Evaluating state capacity is not an easy task. Effective government has two components: efficiency and responsiveness. Governments can be efficient but wholly unresponsive to the demands of those who use their services. Their decisionmakers can take resident priorities seriously, but they lack the capacity to implement policies. Both dimensions are important to consider.

Effectiveness is itself complex. It may be subject to short-term fluctuations because of sudden changes in contextual factors (an in-flow of refugees that taxes services, for example). Thus, a single data point may be fairly meaningless. It may also vary across types of activities. The ability to control rent-seeking by public officials may or may not correlate with the ability to carry out the terms of agreements, to provide public goods, or to administer fee-for-service programs. Some states may perform well on one dimension and not on another. While Zambia suffers from low institutional performance in many spheres of activity, its judiciary is generally considered more independent than many others in Anglophone Africa. To take another illustration, although the customs service in Côte d'Ivoire is the site of high levels of corruption and currently exercises a stranglehold over the country's economy, some other parts of the government—the "grands travaux," or public works, for example—have historically operated along more bureaucratic, less personal lines. Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta, Côte d'Ivoire before the late 1970s, and Cameroon in some policy spheres and periods have all offered examples of comparatively effective states. Civil servants in these countries have proven, at times, both responsive to the demands placed on them and capable of carrying out the tasks assigned to them, without succumbing to interference or a fear of taking responsibility.

Finally, effectiveness is best measured not by outcomes or broad economic indicators but by outputs, standardized for funds available. It is difficult to infer levels of institutional performance from

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rates of GDP growth or broad measures of development. One reason for this difficulty is that many factors may intervene between government actions and results, including climate change, price shocks, refugee flows, and epidemics. What matters in thinking about effectiveness is how much residents get for the money states spend, not whether the policy choices of decisionmakers were wise.

Data on governmental outputs in Africa are scarce. There are, however, indicators and proxy measures that permit rough generalizations. First, weak states are usually unable to check predatory behavior by the people in their ranks. One sure symptom of poor institutional performance in African contexts is police and military harassment of civilians. The lower the level of effectiveness, the more evident this behavior. So-called strong states are able to pay security forces on time, maintain discipline, and keep police and military personnel from preying upon civilians. By contrast, in countries such as Zaire, troops live off of the land, imprison citizens in order to extort money from their families, and exact bribes from relief officials as a condition for landing supply planes. A sign of declining institutional capacity in Côte d'Ivoire at the end of the 1980s was the proliferation of roadblocks manned variously by customs officials, the police, the gendarmerie, the army, and the forest police. At one point, the sheer numbers, estimated at about fifteen hundred, increased the costs of transport so much that truckers' unions went on strike in protest. The government's response was to form *escortes dounanières*, convoys from the port to the northern border with a customs agent riding shotgun. One of the heartening signs of the effectiveness of Yoweri Museveni's government in Uganda is the near absence of a military or police presence on roads in the parts of the country that are at peace.

Second, social spending in Africa has mainly taken the form of investment in education and health, with an emphasis on universities and curative, hospital-based care—both usually luxuries of the urban elite. In both spheres, problems of effectiveness are evident. Controlling for money spent on primary and secondary education, exam success rates are low, and the number of school age children in each level of the educational system is stagnant or

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only slowly increasing. And, controlling for money invested in care, basic health indicators tell a similar tale.

During the 1970s, spending on education, as a proportion of total government expenditure, generally varied from a low of about 6 percent to a high of about 22 percent. Countries like the Sudan and Liberia populated the lower range, while Botswana and Kenya inhabited the upper end. Real per capita spending on education was highest in Botswana, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Swaziland and was lowest in Chad, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone. As the 1980s progressed, real spending on education per capita and education as a proportion of total government expenditure declined in many places—most notably in Zaire, where it diminished to about 4.5 percent of the government budget, and in Zambia, where it dropped to 9 percent. In a few places, efforts to develop human capital intensified, and attention to education increased. For example, real per capita spending doubled in Botswana between the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, then increased further as the 1980s progressed.

Although expenditures are not a measure of effectiveness, the willingness to invest a relatively higher proportion of revenues in education usually correlates with higher levels of performance in other areas. In terms of the proportion of the GDP invested in education, many African countries compare favorably with their counterparts in Southeast Asia and in other parts of the developing world. Even in dollar terms, some African countries spend more on education per pupil than do other developing countries. For example, during the 1980s, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Zimbabwe spent over $100 per pupil, while Indonesia spent between $60 and $70 per pupil.[3]

The quality of education for the dollars spent is what matters, however, and the rapid expansion of opportunity has often not been accompanied by a parallel increase in the preparedness of teachers or in the availability of books and other materials in many countries. Diminishing effectiveness is evident in declining proportions of test-takers who pass international exams, such as the Cambridge overseas school certificate, the Baccalaureate, or the London GCE "O" levels. For example, in Malawi the proportion of test-takers who succeeded in the Cambridge overseas school certificate exams fell from 81 percent in 1980 to 52 percent in

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1990. In Burkina Faso, passage of the Baccalaureate fell from 37 percent to 28 percent.[4] More effective states succeed in keeping a higher proportion of students who start primary school in school through the primary grades. For example, primary school dropout rates in Botswana in 1985 were 11 percent, as compared to 83 percent in the Central African Republic and Chad and over 60 percent in Malawi, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, and Somalia.[5] Finally, although expenditures on university-level education have increased in many countries and higher education often absorbs a high proportion of education budgets, in most countries the proportion of the age group enrolled was nearly the same in 1989 as it was in 1965.

Expenditures on health care have generally hovered at between 2 and 6 percent of the GDP. Trends in real per capita spending on health have paralleled trends in investment in education within countries: countries that have spent relatively more on education have also spent more on health. Effectiveness varies in this sector too, although measurement is complicated by direct international community provision of some services. Child immunizations are one indicator, although international efforts in some places confuse matters, and they vary by type, with high rates of protection against tuberculosis not necessarily matching comparable rates of immunization against polio or measles, for example. The highest rates of immunization of children under the age of one year at the end of the 1980s were in Botswana, the Gambia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The lowest rates were in Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, and Somalia.

Third, there are other output indicators for which we lack adequate comparative data. One is the pothole and gully measure. Those who travel in Africa know that the extensiveness of the network of passable, graded rural access roads is a good indicator of how effective governments are. These routes are often more important measures of effectiveness than the kilometers of paved road in a country because they reduce the costs to farmers of transporting fertilizers and harvests, make travel and information flow easier, and provide a means of projecting extension services to outlying areas. If a high proportion of roadbeds are washed out or the number of potholes make the roads nearly impassable, it is

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a fair bet that governments are not performing effectively on other dimensions.

Fourth, to pay for these activities, governments have to seek revenue. Since Independence, tax bases in most of Africa have been relatively narrow, and considerable attention is currently being devoted to broadening these while lowering overall rates. The long dependence on a narrow base is partly a function of overall levels of economic development, but state effectiveness is also a contributing factor. Governments that can monitor financial flows, investment, profits, and the behavior of their own tax collectors are in a better position to broaden their tax bases than are those with little capacity in this regard.

By comparison with governments in other regions, African states rely heavily on taxation of international trade. For the period from 1966 to 1982, trade taxes, including import and export duties, accounted for more than 40 percent of the revenues of most countries. Taxes on incomes and on corporate profits and transactions have accounted for about 25 to 30 percent of the revenue—more in oil-producing countries. Governments have also imposed levies on producers: between 1966 and 1982, states acquired, on average, 25 to 30 percent of their revenues in this manner.

Fifth, corruption may be both a cause and an indicator of poor performance. Some forms of corrupt practices—payments to expedite services, for example—are fairly ubiquitous in developing countries. One sign of ineffectiveness is when the sums charged by civil servants inflate rapidly, or the numbers of services and policy spheres subjected to these practices expand. There appear to be tipping points between fairly clean, effective government, on the one hand, and highly corrupt, ineffective government, on the other. Institutional performance was quite high in some countries, such as Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, for the first fifteen years after Independence. In both cases, heads of state established and enforced norms regarding the use of public office for private benefit. Neither exemplified "clean government," but in both countries corrupt practices were constrained. By the 1980s, in both countries, there were sharp increases in levels of public corruption that correlated with other measures of declining effectiveness.

In some countries we observe not ineffective government but the collapse of political order. In these cases the authority of the

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government is under siege or has disintegrated completely into civil war. This category includes Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, and the Sudan; Chad might be added to the list; Burundi, eastern Zaire, Togo, and the Congo are also possible candidates. Not all of these were clearly "failed states" before the outbreak of violence. In fact, with donor assistance Rwanda had built a very good road network and had performed comparatively well on a series of indicators in the years before the violence of 1994.

PROXIMATE CAUSES OF VARIATION IN PERFORMANCE

The causes of state failure in Africa are of two types. Some are proximate and account for the kinds of variations observed within the region. Others are slightly more distant and help account for the broader trends.

Leadership

In Africa, there are cross-national differences in the degree to which there are professionals or others who have an interest in more effective national government and other state institutions. Sir Seretse Khama and Quett Masire, Botswana's first and second Independence leaders respectively, both held distinctive positions in society. This helped support a broad national perspective. Seretse Khama had offended his lineage by marrying a European woman and so was unable to hold traditional office. He instead directed his talent to the civic realm but never suffered the entanglement in ethnic politics that made it difficult for many other leaders to mediate between parallel sources of political authority. Jomo Kenyatta's position in Kenya bore some similarities. A moderate nationalist, Kenyatta found himself wrongly imprisoned as a leader of the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya and made a martyr to the cause, without a clear power base. Upon taking office as his country's first president, he was forced to mediate between Kikuyu squatters and Kikuyu agricultural entrepreneurs, while also balancing the demands of the country's many other cultural communities. Until illness sapped his strength, he managed a delicate system of compromise and mediation. By contrast, the leaders of many other countries were under no such pressures.

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Personnel and Management

Writing about the American state, Steven Skowronek has noted that "the state is not only an arrangement of institutions and procedures; it is also an intellectual enterprise."[6] The talents and attitudes of civil servants make a difference in the way governments operate. There are several human factors that set Africa's failed states or low-performance cases apart from those that are more effective. One relates to recruitment and management. Until very recently, when international organizations brought pressure on heads of state, the civil service was an employer of last resort. Some governments, including Kenya, long absorbed into their ranks university graduates who could not obtain private sector employment. Merit mattered little in selection or advancement. Indeed, today, performance criteria are used infrequently as a management tool in the public sector.

Training is also an increasing problem, with several dimensions. First, updating of knowledge and skills is difficult. Governments do not have the resources for continuing the education of personnel, although donors have recently made money available to some for this purpose. Second, preparation of a committed cadre to staff the ranks of government institutions in the future is in severe jeopardy because of the crisis in education systems. Student strikes over issues ranging from removal of subsidies to local political conflicts have closed the universities' doors. There are few affordable textbooks, and, since 1979, most libraries have been unable to maintain their collections. Classrooms are overcrowded and often lack supplies. Teachers are often unprepared or uninterested, preferring the income that consulting for aid donors provides. Third, those who do have exceptional skills or have won scholarships outside the country are quickly recruited away from government by the private sector. Civil service salaries are usually not competitive and are not a vehicle for retaining personnel. This is not all bad, but it does make it difficult to sustain an esprit de corps among public sector managers.

Perhaps most important, senior officials often do not make an effort to inform civil servants about policy changes or to build a sense of role. One is struck by the difference between Botswana and contemporary Kenya in this regard. When Botswana intro-

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duced its own currency in the mid-1970s, the government sponsored a series of briefings and meetings to explain the changes. Ministry of Finance officials spoke with parliamentarians, civil servants, and local elected officials to try to make the change go smoothly. In Kenya, by contrast, civil servants so fear that they will lose their jobs or suffer political retaliation for decisions they make that bureaucratic immobilism has set in.

Overextension

One sure way to reduce state capacity is to take on too many new tasks too quickly. Many governments in Africa did just that during the 1970s. The 1970s saw several commodity booms. Africa's oil producers, including Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon, benefited from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo and the price hikes that occurred in 1973 and then again in the late 1970s. Growers of coffee, tea, and cocoa (especially Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon) saw windfalls from "the beverage boom," the sharp increase in prices for these crops in 1976 as a result of poor weather conditions in Brazil.

Partly in the expectation that they could maintain high commodity prices through participation in international pricing pacts and partly out of the need to accommodate the younger men clamoring to join their countries' elites, many African governments took out extensive loans for development projects in this period. Côte d'Ivoire made huge investments in its northern departments, for example, lavishing money on the creation of sugar schemes that even on paper promised unfavorable returns on investment.

The influx of funds and the acquisition of new responsibilities created a number of lasting problems that undermined state effectiveness. First, it was difficult to monitor the uses to which monies were put. Not surprisingly, the rise of corruption in many countries corresponded with this period. There were simply insufficient numbers of accountants and managers to trace the flows. Second, governments created many new public enterprises in this era, using funds generated by the boom or borrowing in anticipation of still higher prices. There was a significant increase in the range of activities for which governments assumed responsibility without a

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parallel development of systems for monitoring and controlling the activities of new personnel hired to carry out these tasks.

Third, rapid rates of promotion within the civil service in some countries had a number of deleterious effects on state capacity. Employees had little opportunity to develop competence in their areas and, indeed, had little incentive to try to demonstrate strong performance, given the very high probability of promotion in any case. Such policies also meant that it was very difficult to develop a sense of professional identity. Few civil servants held their positions long enough to develop standards of practice. This undermined institutional memory and information flow.

Institutional Capacity and "Civil Societies"

The African and American experiences in building government capacity share some similarities that may be instructive in understanding current patterns. During the late nineteenth century, the economic and social conditions in the United States were undergoing a transformation: "The close of the frontier, the rise of the city, the accentuation of class divisions, the end of isolation—these changes raised demands for national governmental capacities that were foreign to the existing state structure and that presupposed a very different mode of governmental operation."[7] With high rates of urbanization, increasing internal stratification, decreasing land availability, and declining soil fertility, Africa today is at a similar historical juncture.

In the United States, various social groups were important in forcing a redefinition of the domain of government:

> The challenge of building a new kind of state in America was taken up in the post-Civil War era by an emergent intelligentsia rooted in a revitalized professional sector and a burgeoning university sector. . . .The emergence of this interest in a reconstruction of American government was grounded in a general reorganization of American professional life. . . .The intimate connections in leadership and support that would be forged between these professionalization movements and the various campaigns for structural reform in American government mark the efforts of an alternative governing class to remake the state in its own image.[8]

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The timing of changes in state structure and effectiveness thus related not only to shifts in broad underlying conditions but also to the emergence of pressure groups who supported new institutional arrangements.

Such constituencies for reform exist in Africa today, but in many places there are sharp limits on the clout new pressure groups can assemble. Beginning in 1989, a wave of political liberalization swept across Africa. By 1992, over 50 percent of the countries south of the Sahara had engaged in political reform, reducing press censorship, convening national conferences to redraft constitutions, and in many instances conducting multiparty elections. The pressure for such change came primarily from two groups: older politicians (often exiled, jailed, or marginalized) and professionals. As long as public officials could be bought and justice was personal—and as long as these practices bankrupted the public treasury—it was difficult, if not impossible, for these men and women to use their highly specific skills and knowledge.[9] Not surprisingly, the democracy movement in Africa, led by these groups, has had at its core an attack on corruption and mismanagement. Indeed, these themes were usually more important than demands for democratic participation.

Whether the champions of greater government effectiveness and fairness will succeed in redesigning states in Africa is a more difficult question and one that awaits an empirical test. The talent and interest are there, but the protagonists often lack both the coherence of the American professional movements and an independent source of information and ideas to use in monitoring government activities. US reformers found help in universities and in a muckraking press. These are currently weak in most African countries.

If improved institutional performance rests in part on the vigilance of interested publics and coordination of lobbying efforts among these, then some countries are better positioned than others to realize improvement in institutional capacity. Countries that have independent sources of know-how, examples from other parts of the world, and monitoring capacity—whether in the form of universities, an alert press, think tanks, or business associations—are more likely to show higher levels of effectiveness than others, although these provide no guarantees. (Uganda descended

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into more than twenty years of corrupt government and civil war while having the best university in Africa.) These circumstances may constitute necessary but not sufficient conditions for improved effectiveness.

Perceptions of Political Stability

Even where leaders have strong mediation skills, their ability to effect the kinds of compromises necessary to implement policy change is strongly related to popular perceptions of their power. Mediation entails asking for short-term sacrifices in exchange for long-term benefits. Willingness to enter into such agreements and to abide by them thus depends on whether the parties involved believe that the negotiator will be able to deliver the promised benefits. Where leaders are perceived to face serious challenges from other contenders for power, or where they are believed to be untrustworthy, mediation is likely to fall apart. Under these conditions, norms are very difficult to sustain. If this logic holds, then we should expect to observe sharp decreases in state effectiveness after the first signs of challenge or dishonesty, as was true in the case of Ghana during the 1960s. Where new aspirants to political power arise with economic development or change, even heads of state who initially appeared quite strong and were able to maintain fairly effective government may end up presiding over sharp increases in effectiveness, as did Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire.

THE CHALLENGES OF STATE-BUILDING IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

There are several larger challenges that state-builders face in contemporary Africa that set them apart, to varying degrees, from their counterparts in early modern Europe and Asia. Charles Tilly has suggested that sixteenth-century Europe, the period of state-building, had several characteristics that set it apart from other parts of the world.[10] These included, first, a degree of cultural homogeneity—similarities in language, law, religion, landholding, agricultural techniques—not known in other regions. This homogeneity meant that policies had similar effects across wide expanses of territory; it lowered the odds that a policy would succeed in one place and then fail utterly in another. Second, throughout Europe, a peasant economy prevailed. Those who had access to

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land controlled labor. These first two circumstances generated a third: relatively uniform but highly decentralized political structures, which promoted widespread resistance to the expansion of state power. To survive under this condition, states had to be more efficient.

Historically, the context of state-formation in Africa has departed from the European model in a number of important ways. Until recently, a critical feature of the social setting in Africa was the relatively high ratio of land to labor. Population densities were quite low and soils were very fragile. People shifted cultivation between plots of land as fertility levels on any one plot diminished. Political centralization—state creation—was a challenge under these conditions. Unlike sixteenth-century European equivalents, then, empires, kingships, and chiefships in Africa, as well as the colonial and independence governments after them, had to contend with a population from whom resources were not easily wrested. If households did not like the exactions imposed by officials, they could simply migrate. They did not need to exercise voice or rebel.

Although ecological conditions and population densities have changed, there are other circumstances that continue to render Africa a difficult setting for state-formation.

The Family and the State

The peasant economy in Europe rested on the nuclear family as the basic social unit. In most parts of Africa, however, unilineal descent systems linking much larger groups of kin have prevailed. There are two main implications of this difference. First, territorial division was much easier in Europe than it is currently in Africa south of the Sahara, where kin groups often cover extensive geographic areas and promote high levels of cross-border, informal exchange and interaction outside the surveillance of central government officials. This weakens the state's ability to collect revenue and to mobilize armies. Indeed, there are many examples in twentieth-century African history of migrations across national boundaries to escape demands states have placed on populations.

Second, this social context has made the depersonalization of administrative staffs difficult. Public employees everywhere are under pressure to find jobs for their relatives. Where the nuclear family is the basic social unit, notions of such obligations extend

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only to siblings, children, or close cousins. By contrast, in many unilineal descent systems, the whole community, not just immediate family members, may be claimants.

There is some evidence that under the stress of deep economic problems, steps are being taken to limit the claims of relatives on earnings and assets, redefining the family unit and kinship obligations in the process. However, there is evidence in the opposite direction as well. Uncertain about future economic prospects, extended households try to insure themselves against risk by diversifying—sending one member to work in a foreign country; another to farm in the north; another to plant in the south; another into private business. Which of these tendencies will prevail remains to be seen.

Parallel Political Authorities

By contrast with their industrialized counterparts, many African states face considerable competition in their roles as arbiters of order. Kingships rooted in particular communities and religious organizations resolve conflict among their members, provide services, set local rules about land use, collect taxes, and sometimes maintain their own police forces. Governments that have tried to suppress these alternative sources of power have usually met with trouble and have attracted outside intervention or disapprobation. Unlike many of the early modern European states, African governments today must negotiate with these groups and work with them to determine a mutually acceptable division of responsibility.

Weapons Technology and State-Formation

Max Weber associated the formation of the modern state with the acquisition of a monopoly over the instruments of violence. If historically, in Europe, it was possible for a few to seize control of specialized weaponry to intimidate and control populations, and to constitute states on that basis, that is less true in Africa today. There are several dimensions to this problem. First, many people have access to weapons, and at very low prices: in 1992, an AK-47 cost about $14 outside of Abidjan, the capital of Côte d'Ivoire; grenades were so common in Rwanda in the years before 1994 that even small gangs of thieves used them to threaten rural households into surrendering their property. A grenade tossed into a hut

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or bar just after a robbery became known in the region as the Rwandan style of crime.

With the end of the Cold War, conventional arms flows to Africa have not stopped. Indeed, there are new purveyors of arms and a booming clandestine trade in conventional weaponry. The backwash of arms into countries that border conflict areas has made the task of state-building more difficult: there has been a leakage of weapons from the Sudan, where North African and Persian Gulf countries compete to arm various factions in a bid to shape the form of Islam that becomes dominant.

Yet another weapons related challenge to state-building is military demobilization. At issue is the dispersion of control over the means of violence. Often it is difficult to seize the weapons of soldiers who are leaving the armed services. Gun buy-back plans are notoriously expensive and are often ineffective. And since there are no central registries of arms, returns are hard to monitor.

Factor Mobility and Sovereignty

Where capital and labor can flow across national boundaries with relative ease, governments have little discretion over many kinds of policy. Factor mobility forces convergence with respect to many types of economic policy. Governments that do not comply risk capital flight, migration of skilled labor, and the loss of other resources without which it becomes difficult to support institutional effectiveness and economic growth. Moreover, the "exit" of many of the most educated citizens to work abroad decreases domestic pressure for improved government performance. The state-builders of early modern Europe lived in a world where transportation, communications, and systems of economic organization facilitated factor mobility to a far lesser degree.

Aid, International Nongovernmental Organizations, and Government Legitimacy

Where governments are heavily dependent on outside aid, the form in which assistance is delivered may also complicate the task of state formation. Economist Paul Collier has offered a provocative argument in this regard. For the past two decades, donors have favored program lending, in which monies are provided for some general purpose or balance of payments support on the

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condition that the government meet certain targets laid out at the time of agreement. During the late 1980s, discouraged by low levels of government performance, foreign governments looked more closely at the delivery of assistance through nongovernmental organizations.

As political liberalization occurs and new multiparty systems develop, the situation will change further. Moreover, political liberalization often entails decentralization, and holding many local jurisdictions to the terms of loans is likely to prove impracticable. New parliaments are not as likely to accept the imposition of external standards. Donors will increasingly be forced to shift away from conditional lending to project lending, and to assistance via nongovernmental organizations. Under project lending, foreign donors or nongovernmental organizations provide grants and loans for community development, infrastructure, and clinics, etc.

As Collier argues, this shift in the character of aid, already partly underway, means that foreigners will finance the development budgets of African countries while the state governments will have to pay for the army and the public payroll. This means that the donors will capture the goodwill that projects bring, and the governments will be left with little for which they can take credit.[11]

Limited Cross-Border Wars

Another reason why many African states are ineffective may rest with the general absence of experience with cross-border wars. With the exception of Lusophone Africa, most countries south of the Sahara won independence with relatively little bloodshed. The norms of the international community shifted to produce a consensus favoring the withdrawal of the European powers from the continent. Although there were some military skirmishes and long-term hidden resistance, there were few instances of nationalists raising armies to wage war against colonial powers. More importantly, since 1960 almost all of Africa's conflicts have been civil wars. There has been little need to raise taxes to support the defense of territory against a foreign invader, despite the fact that neighboring countries have often served as bases for rebel insurgents. Thus, the demands that prompted greater efficiency—and in some cases recourse to parliaments—in European countries have

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arisen less often in the African context. (The main exception in this regard is Botswana, which long faced the possibility of menace from South Africa.)

Although there is no reason to believe that cross-border wars will become more common in Africa, requiring greater resource extraction and raising demands for efficiency, there are equivalent pressures. It is quite possible that foreign aid to Africa will simply dry up, instead of taking the form of project lending. The availability of outside help is diminishing rapidly, as donors question the effectiveness of spending in Africa. Under these conditions, there is little choice but to broaden the tax base, to restructure the tax system so that producers operate under less of a disadvantage than they did before, and to improve the efficiency of revenue collection. Fiscal imperatives of this type could produce higher levels of institutional performance, more government decentralization (on the theory that people are more willing to pay for services when they can see them and use them), and a greater measure of popular participation as leaders trade voice for resources.

SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION

State failure does not necessarily lead to state collapse, and comparatively better state performance in Africa appears to be no protection against disintegration. State collapse and state failure may have related origins, but they are not the same.

Not all failed states in Africa collapse. Professionals in Côte d'Ivoire talk in hushed and worried tones about the cases of social disintegration where governments have given way to struggles between warlords. For them, Liberia, Chad, Zaire, Angola, Togo, the Sudan, Rwanda, and Somalia are in a category unto themselves. Cameroon and Nigeria hover on the brink. But the earlier "success stories," such as Côte d'Ivoire, could disintegrate, too, in their view, if leaders fail to provide a basis for hope—information about and a rationale for supporting short-term sacrifices—and to recreate ties between generations.

The conditions that prevail in the countries that have disintegrated do not constitute a Hobbesian war of all against all. The ferocity of conflict is apt to be much lower where people act as individuals and make no effort to cooperate. As sociologist Mark

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Granovetter has pointed out, where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" it is difficult to organize the bands and militias that bring such devastation.[12] Hobbes's war of all against all in the context of extreme individualism is a mild form of conflict compared to what can ensue from clashes between several social groups, each of whose members display high levels of social trust, internally, and no trust or active distrust towards outsiders. Conflict becomes more devastating when the possibility for coordinated action exists. The kind of social trust produced in lineages, patron-client relationships, hierarchically ordered religious groups, and other vertical associations, or in networks whose memberships do not cross-cut classes and ethnic groups, is potentially extremely dangerous. The collapse of states in Africa occurs when people still feel some social obligations to one another but where the boundaries of the moral community parallel ethnic divisions.

A second observation is that social disintegration may have much more complicated origins than simply low levels of trust or networks of civic engagement—"social capital," in James Coleman's terms. Social disintegration such as we find today in Somalia and Rwanda bears a strong resemblance to the behavior of hostile and expressive crowds: "A group engages in an action together that no member would have engaged in alone. . . .It is described as behavior that violates the norms, or behavior that ignores established authority."[13]

These incidents have several features that appear to be causally related. First, the essence of the action is the "withdrawal by crowd members of rights of control over their action by authorities." It begins with individuals deciding to deny the legitimacy of the established system. Only when many have done this is it safe for any one individual to disobey agents of the state. The best point at which to participate is contingent on the actions of others. The milling about that one observes in crowds just before hostilities break out reflects efforts to try to determine whether there is sentiment for a collective denial of the rights of civil authorities—a condition under which the risk of punishment for being "the only one" or "the first" to break the rules disappears.[14]

Second, the likelihood or expression of hostility increases with the numbers of people involved. This is partly because the larger numbers of like-minded crowd members heighten perceptions that

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new norms of behavior govern the situation. It is also because "each additional person who coordinately engages in action. . .reduces the potential cost [to any one person], since punishment by the authorities becomes less likely."[15]

Third, the more varied the thresholds for participation among members of the crowd, the more likely it is that the crowd will act. The participation of those who are drawn in early will trigger the slightly more cautious, and so on.

Finally, to ensure that many people become involved, and to diminish the prospect of punishment, participants may incite each other to join in.

It is not necessarily the case that there must be a new norm everyone shares in order to trigger this kind of reaction. All that must take place is the withdrawal of rights of control from established authority. Thus, it is possible for this kind of collective action to take place with no evident vision of a goal or a better way to run the government.

This model captures the kind of social disintegration that has taken place in Rwanda, for example. For years, members of the Hutu exclusivist groups complained to one another about the barriers the better-off Tutsi and the Hutu intelligentsia posed to their advancement. They broadcasted their views on this subject over the radio in the year before the massacres broke out, in some cases using the same radio announcer who had provoked similar massacres in the early 1960s. Because of their perceived solidarity, they were much more predisposed to break social norms about appropriate behavior toward others. This form of ethnic antagonism and the use of the broadcast media to stir up trouble are quite rare in most parts of Africa.

The interaction between the militias and the populace was also distinctive. The exclusivist militias and some of the Hutu governors were distributed throughout the country. This decentralization facilitated "milling" and their ability to gather information about whether others were prepared to overthrow existing norms. The fact that those who most deeply believed that the Tutsi and Hutu moderates were evil were also those with weapons, and the fact that they were spread throughout the country facilitated the violent outbreaks. Once a few killings had taken place, there was great incentive to encourage others to join in so as to lessen the

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likelihood of individual punishment. Those who were first to participate threatened to kill family members of others in the group unless the household head did as they ordered. For that reason, the violence, once started, was hard to contain.

POLICIES

Consultants have grown rich offering studies of ways to improve state effectiveness in Africa. Unfortunately, we have learned relatively little from the many studies of particular cases that governments and donors have supported. Part of the reason may be that the challenges to state-building are not purely those of developing the skills of public sector employees or offering better pay. There are elements of the international context that complicate the task and require accommodation. On the basis of this analysis, it is possible to offer a few proposals.

Limiting the domain of government is a sensible step from a variety of vantage points. Given resource constraints, it is possible to exercise supervision more effectively over a smaller number of tasks than over a welter of public services and public corporations. Moreover, letting private actors rather than public corporations take responsibility for deciding what to produce and how alleviates the state's obligation to shoulder losses and spreads the risk across society. Thus, limiting the domain of government may actually contribute to the legitimacy of states. As Paul Collier has remarked, the lower revenues required to sustain limited government may reduce predatory behavior by tax collectors and public servants who decide to collect their salaries directly from the citizenry instead of from the public treasury.

Investing in the political institutions central to economic growth is also imperative. Because state legitimacy is linked to overall economic conditions, increasing the capacity of the institutions that affect private investment and trade is especially important. It is hard to call malevolent civil servants to account or to commit to investment in fixed assets without impartial and effective courts. Similarly, improving central bank capacity and the health of the banking system in general should have high priority. Although foreign governments are not fond of providing support for police

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training, the creation of impartial, responsive, and efficient police forces and customs units requires immediate attention as well.

Creating a stronger sense of professionalism among civil servants and legislators is another step that African governments can pursue together. Performance-linked promotions appear to be helpful in this regard, although they are difficult to implement in many places. An alternative would be to create a regional pool of highly trained staff, from many countries, who are promoted and maintained on the basis of performance and who rotate among the middle and senior ranks of governments. This innovation would increase the sharing of information, allow governments and donors to target skill development, help foster an esprit de corps, and limit the capacity of these public servants to develop the kinds of networks that would allow them to use their offices for private ends.

Efforts to improve the knowledge bases and reporting skills of journalists, coupled with greater toleration for data collection and analysis by university researchers and independent associations, is an important step in improving public monitoring of state activity. Without access to this information, it is hard for the associations that make up "civil society" to develop demands for "good government" that extend beyond the anticorruption platforms we have seen in the recent multiparty elections in Africa.

Curbing the flow of cheap conventional weapons is difficult and unpopular in the international arena. Nonetheless, it is necessary for building a greater sense of personal security within societies and limiting the share of government expenditures that must go to policing crime and keeping emerging warlords under control. Drawing public attention to government arms deals and the foreign banks and countries that participate in them as well as to international arms conventions may prove helpful in limiting the flow of weapons and the production of some types of arms.

African decisionmakers need to think very carefully about how to handle the challenges of "mixed government," or working alongside parallel political authorities. The international community could help by distilling lessons about how to manage relationships with kingships and religious groups in the realm of tax collection, for example, or by developing conventions for the

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participation of such groups in administration and conduct of multiparty elections.

There have been few systematic efforts to think together about these issues, so far. Decisionmakers could benefit from serious efforts to think comparatively about these issues. To do so, they need data, collected carefully and systematically. Too often they have to rely on a few case studies or flawed statistics. They need ideas, from within their countries, from neighbors, and from people who have had a chance to learn about experiments to solve similar problems in other parts of the world. Most important, they need elites in their countries and abroad who appreciate the difficulties they face but who also hold them to results.

ENDNOTES

[1]Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly* 273 (2) (February 1994).

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The shortage of skilled manpower with its uneven distribution is another severe disadvantage. Although temporary in nature, this shortage is serious because it slows down the making and the implementation of decisions at this most formative period in the existence of the African states. The advantage of multiple African representation at the United Nations has been mentioned; we must mention also that tying down so many of our skilled Africans at innumerable international or interterritorial conferences several times a year removes them from the effective internal development and administration of their territories. In any one territory the few technically proficient and professional Africans may be away for many months voting on important but occasionally vague resolutions. Then, when they return home, routine administrative duties keep them tied down to their desks; or, if they are involved in politics, they may have to start campaigning for the next election. It can thus happen that most of the important developmental operations and decisions in a country are directed by foreign personnel or by international civil servants while the country's leading citizens are away or busy with other things. At the present time, it is necessary to have expert foreign personnel; it is wrong, however, for them to replace local leadership in all projects. The development of local leadership must be part of the national goal. Local schemes can sometimes be robbed of their correct orientation by frequent absences abroad of national representatives, sowing seeds of misunderstanding and future allegations of neocolonialism, when leadership is left to foreigners.

Davidson Nicol

From "Toward a World Order: An African Viewpoint"
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David E. Apter

Democracy for Uganda: A Case for Comparison[1]

INTRODUCTION

UGANDA IS A SMALL, LANDLOCKED former British East African colony of close to fourteen million people. At Independence in 1962 it was relatively prosperous, its revenue deriving mainly from coffee, cotton, tea, and other agricultural products. Like most other African countries it was highly differentiated internally and the political problem was, from the start and in common with other African countries, to find an appropriate political framework that could contain and make use of this differentiation in a positive way. My own association with Uganda goes back forty years; the study I did of Uganda politics, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda*,[2] was written at a time (prior to Independence) when the central constitutional issue was the relation between Buganda, the dominant "kingdom-state," and the rest of the country. In that book I recommended a consociational solution. What was put in place was a conventional parliamentary system modeled after the British system, which, as in many other cases in British Africa, became the vehicle for a peaceful transition to Independence. However, Uganda was then, as now, heir to virtually every form of intense separatism and cleavage politics. So much so that, as in other African countries, the constitutional framework soon broke apart.

By now, such separatist conflicts have become an old story in a variety of contexts, not all of them African countries. Uganda is a

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prototypical case, with big divides crosscut by smaller ones. One major one, which predates British hegemony, is between the so-called Nilotics in the north (some of whom are similar to the Southern Sudanese) and the Bantu in the south, with many of the former working as tenant farmers for the latter. Other big divides include religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics. Within these larger binaries are others, such as ethnic tension not only between north and south but within the north, for example, between Acholi and Lango. Economic and social disparities are also very great. While it is generally the case that the Bantu South, and particularly Buganda, is the most prosperous, the most political, and the best educated, it was nevertheless from the North that such figures as Idi Amin (Nubi), the Okello brothers, and Milton Obote, all of whom ruled Uganda, came. It was Obote who inherited power at Independence, much to the disgust of the Baganda, and it was Idi Amin Dada who became familiar throughout the world as Africa's terrifying buffoon after coming to power in a coup against Obote. Subsequently, the Okellos, the least known, seized power after the "second coming" of Obote. They lasted only a short time before succumbing to the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Yoweri Museveni. The latter, the current president of the country, has tried to repair the legacy left by these predecessors, whose activities included episodes of mass killing, rape, ethnic pollution and cleansing, prolonged infrastructure destruction, and an inheritance of refugees, displacements, depatrimonializations, and inflamed class, clan, religious (among Catholics and Protestants, and Muslims), linguistic, and other divisions, which, with each succeeding round of violence, became more deeply intertwined with other affiliational affinities.

It was in deference to the Baganda that, within the framework of the first constitution put in place prior to Independence, the Prime Minister, Milton Obote, a Langi, agreed to make the *Kabaka* of Buganda president. Since it was a largely figurehead position the arrangement was doomed from the start. The Baganda were not willing to settle for less than a dominant place in the political system. Buganda, a ministate within Uganda, was home to most of the country's elites. It was economically the most prosperous part of the country, the most educated, with the best university in

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Africa, the capital (Kampala), and its own parliament. It considered the constitutional situation as essentially temporary.

Indeed, at Independence, Buganda had retained its privileged political status originally derived from the terms of the Uganda Agreement of 1900, which the British signed with the *Kabaka,* the king of Buganda, and which provided for, among other things, freehold land tenure within Buganda, a hierarchical system of civil service chiefs (who themselves were appointed according to a fixed proportion of Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims), a prime minister (*katikiro*), a chief justice (*Omulamuzi*), and a finance minister (*Omwanika*). The other kingdom-states, Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro, and in a curious way Busoga, also had their own kings and councils. However, they lacked the same degree of political power and civil status as Buganda. Some, like Ankole (bordering Rwanda), were divided by ethnicity/class distinctions similar to those of the Hutu and the Tutsi. Others, for example, in certain northern districts bordering the Sudan, were ethnically similar to the Southern Sudanese.

However, within a short time after Independence, under the leadership of Prime Minister Milton Obote and his National People's Congress, conflict between the Baganda and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) became more intense and political parties became more parochial in ethnic and religious terms. A move to the "Left" by Obote, in part aimed at cutting the Baganda down to size and in part to establish a developmental socialism like that evolving in Nkrumah's Ghana, resulted in the overthrow of the *Kabaka.* This was followed by the establishment of a one party authoritarian regime, which paved the way to years of civil war and anarchy, leaving little prospect for a peaceful evolution of democratic politics. Remarkably, however, the picture is today quite different. Despite intervention by Tanzanian military forces, and a succession of disastrous governments that followed, the country is limping back to life. Under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni, a guerrilla commander turned president, a major effort is being made to find a constitutional solution. It is in the context of this "return to democracy" that we can consider Uganda a case for comparison.

I returned to Uganda for the first time after a twenty-six year absence in March 1995. The comments herein explore some of the

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differences I observed. Of course, one cannot return to a country for such a short visit, even if one was familiar with it in the past, and hope to render a verdict on how well it is doing or how much is being accomplished, economically, socially, or politically. (Indeed, I find breathtaking the ease and confidence with which pronouncements about "prospects" for democracy are made by political scientists with reference to countries about which they have not the foggiest notion of the complexities faced by people on the ground.) These comments are therefore very tentative, preliminary, small offerings. For more detailed analysis one should rely on the more focused research being done by such Ugandan scholars as Apolo Nsibambi, Director of the Makerere Institute of Social Research, and Professor Semakula Kiwanuka, as well as by such outsiders as Martin Doornbos, Michael Twaddle, and Hölger Bernt Hansen.

The present moment is particularly propitious for some kind of assessment because quite soon Uganda will go into a new constitutional phase and the institutions put in place will need to take effect both quickly and efficaciously. It is a moment, too, when the visible signs of the government of Yoweri Museveni, president for the past nine years, can be read "in the streets" and government efforts to reverse economic decline are becoming visible. The country is slowly repairing many of the negative consequences of so many years of social disruption, dislocation, political instability, and violence. Today, indeed, Uganda (and Ghana) is the African country with the best prospects for a return to democracy. Whether these prospects will be realized depends on how well long-standing conflicts can be resolved peacefully. Today, in Uganda a good deal of the unfinished business of the past is being fought out within the confines of the Constituent Assembly and the National Resistance Council (the parliament) rather than the battlefield. The government has dedicated itself to these constitutional discussions and has expended much energy, time, and resources to ensure their success. It has tried to engage people from all levels and groups in society in these discussions. The consultative process has become an integral part of constitution-making. What is particularly interesting is the form it is taking, what might be called a "model" of a "consultative democracy." This model favors certain structures and institutions and embodies a discourse, the use of which can

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enable people to share and understand common civic principles—an obligation that the report of the recent constitutional commission, under its chairman, Justice Benjamin Odoki, takes pains to point out.

Superficially, at least (indeed very superficially), the situation is reminiscent of the period just before Independence in 1961. At that time, too, there was constitutional debate. The framework in which it took place then has been called "tutelary democracy," or "tutelary colonialism." Then, as now, legislative and executive bodies and institutions were established and given greater and greater responsibility. Local authorities gained in scope and discretion. Political parties became the dynamic factor in politics. Then, as now, the question of how to deal with Buganda in the larger constitutional picture was troublesome. Beyond this, however, the resemblance falters. While the Museveni government has made commitments to the electorate, assuring them that a parliamentary framework is a realizable objective, political parties are of conspicuously small consequence in the current scheme of things.

Despite the absence of political party activity, not only do today's constitution-institution builders confront some of the same issues as those of the past, they also confront very new and different problems brought on by many years of conflict and violence. A brief assessment of similarities and differences might be helpful in enlarging our understanding of the problems of constitution-making in a contemporary political context.[3]

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

One does not, of course, want to make too much of a case for Uganda's exceptionalism. As already suggested, many other African countries suffer from ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other rivalries. In many there is a dominant kingdom or ethnic group seeking to preserve its power. In many, also, ethnic and sectarian concerns became intertwined with ideological preferences. And, as in Ghana and several other African nations, the return to democracy is accompanied by efforts to reevaluate conventional ideas about politics, including how to rework political institutions to make them more appropriate to local conditions. In Uganda, an overhaul and renegotiation of the entire political system thus ac-

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companies the current tendency toward a consultative democracy and the rebuilding of what had become a sadly deteriorated infrastructure. Given the magnitude of the task, it might perhaps be useful to review the events leading up to the present situation and the circumstances in which the present efforts are being made.

Like most other British territories in Africa, Uganda went through a relatively painless transition to Independence. During the period of tutelary democracy, the most critical event was the attempt by a liberal colonial governor to get rid of the *Kabaka* rather than dismantle the special position of Buganda as provided for in the Uganda Agreement of 1900. The effort backfired. Not only was the *Kabaka* brought back but the conflict left a legacy of heightened Kiganda nationalism that would plague succeeding governments. Otherwise, the devolution of authority and Uganda's move toward Independence occurred smoothly enough, and simultaneously with the evolution of legislative and parliamentary institutions, "first past the pump" electoral procedures, and growing accountability at the center. It occurred so smoothly that a ramified system of local authorities was already in place by Independence, as was a conciliar structure functioning at two modal points, district and provincial councils together with a national parliament, the whole embodied within the 1962 federal constitution. Once a provision was agreed on for the special constitutional status of Buganda (and to a lesser extent the other "kingdom-states," Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and Busoga), Independence was realized far more quickly than anticipated.

Also prevailing at the time of Independence were a lively and free press (soon eliminated), a good university (which became embattled), and an excellent civil service cum political administration (slowly undermined), which linked the central government with provincial, district, county, and other more local jurisdictions. In contrast to most other African countries, and because of the variety of social and political particularisms and ethnic rivalries and conflicts, mass nationalist political parties never fully developed. The Uganda National Congress was never a real equivalent for a Convention People's Party (CPP), a Tanu, or Kanu, although the UPC, which succeeded it, came closer. Nevertheless, Obote's attempt to establish a UPC-based movement/party-state along Ghanaian lines not only failed, it intensified the ethnic,

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religious, and other cleavages in Uganda society. Not only did the UPC remain insufficiently ecumenical to override such differences, but it soon collided with Buganda, which had become a virtual ministate. Attempting a rapprochement, the first Obote government (Obote I) was made up of a UPC-*Kabaka Yekka* (a "*Kabaka* only" party) coalition. The *Kabaka* was made Uganda's first president. But Buganda remained genuinely separatist. What had held the unlikely coalition government together was the common concern of both the UPC and *Kabaka Yekka* over rapidly growing support for a largely Catholic Democratic Party, which, although primarily sectarian in nature, had good prospects for becoming a formidable opposition.[4] When the Democratic Party fragmented, so did the coalition.

In 1966, Obote suspended the constitution, abrogated federal and semi-federal institutions, and declared a state of emergency in Buganda. The latter and the other kingdom-states were abolished as legal and jurisdictional entities. The army, under Colonel Idi Amin, was directed to attack the *Lubiri,* the *Kabaka*'s palace. The *Kabaka* himself barely escaped to London where he subsequently died.[5] Obote's next step was to try to undermine the economic power of the still powerful Buganda oligarchy, challenging the *mailo* land system and the civil service chieftaincy, closely associated with land and property according to rules set down in the Uganda Agreement of 1900. It was in this specific context that the Obote government decided on a "move to the Left," which, described as a "common man's charter," exacerbated the already existing conflicts.

It was not until 1972, after having been thrust into the political picture during the *Kabaka* affair as well as others, that Amin seized the opportunity to overthrow Obote (while the latter was out of the country attending a Commonwealth conference). The regime he established quickly became famous for its mixture of buffoonery, capriciousness, vindictiveness, and brutality, and infamous for its murders.[6] Amin found the civil service too constraining and patronizing and continued undermining and politicizing that which had already begun during Obote I. He also expelled the Asian community, a move that, although popular at first, turned out to have disastrous consequences on the distributive and commercial system. In trying to establish his own land-owning oligar-

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chy in Buganda, he alienated Baganda support. The result of these and similar policies was virtual total economic disruption, which drove ethnic and sectarian opposition underground, the revival and intensification of clanship, and a flight of talent from the country. In response, the regime increasingly relied on terror to maintain its power. It became parodic of the arbitrary displays of power occasionally indulged in by certain previous *Kabakas.*[7] Amin was overthrown in 1979 after the successful intervention of Tanzanian troops and Uganda exiles.

Once again, ethnic infighting and sectarianism prevailed. The overthrow of Amin failed to produce a political solution, and a series of unsuccessful regimes, in which both the army and Tanzanian forces, represented by a Military Commission, continued to play a significant role, followed in rapid succession. In spite of the fact that the Commission favored a return of Obote (who continued to play his role behind the scenes from Dar es Salaam), the new government formed under Y. K. Lule, a Muslim former vice chancellor of Makerere University (a non-royal Muganda) and leader of the Uganda National Liberation Front, was anti-Obote. Lule not only became president but also minister of defense.[8] The newly constituted Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), however, remained largely pro-Obote. After only about six months, Lule was overthrown in an overnight coup by Godfrey Benaisa, a Muganda who favored the UPC, Obote's party. Benaisa made several critical errors. First, under pressure from the UNLA, he dismissed his anti-Obote minister of defense, Yoweri Museveni (now president). This triggered a purge of remaining Museveni supporters in the army by the army leadership. When, in reaction to this purge, Benaisa removed his pro-Obote chief of staff, the Military Commission removed him and installed Obote's longtime political associate, Paulo Mwanga. The latter promptly paved the way for Obote's return. In the 1980 elections (the first since Independence) the UPC won against the Democratic Party amid charges that the election was rigged, and in which Museveni's own party received little more than a token vote.[9] Obote came to power for the second time (Obote II).

As Low points out, Obote II was never really accepted. Though he was for a time able to rely on support from Tanzanian and army forces, there were too many other problems he had to con-

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front, not least of all conflict between pro-Obote Lango and pro-Okello Acholi elements in the army. At this point, Museveni, who had formed a National Resistance Army (NRA) in the west, launched his guerrilla campaign against Obote's undisciplined UNLA forces, which were mainly from the north (*Abaluulu*).[10] The UNLA terrorized the local population, most notably in the Luwero Triangle where they killed an estimated 50 percent of the population.[11] Museveni gained support from the Baganda. As his forces gained ground, they established Resistance Councils in each area coming under NRA control, establishing what would subsequently evolve into the structure of local government. The Museveni campaign so undermined the Obote regime that it was overthrown by (Acholi) generals Bazilio and Tito Okello. The latter were decisively defeated by Museveni when the NRA captured Kampala,[12] Museveni himself coming to power as Uganda's eighth president in 1985.

In the years following, much has been accomplished. First, what at Independence had been a small but prosperous and well-administered country of peasant cultivators linked to domestic outlets for foodstuffs and international markets for coffee and cotton was now in ruins, its economy disrupted. Cotton had virtually disappeared as a major cash crop. Coffee was subject to smuggling. There was starvation in some parts of the country and rural poverty virtually everywhere. Urban enterprise was at a standstill, housing badly damaged or in a deteriorating condition. However, once the violence ended, the economy began to recover more rapidly than anticipated, especially at "ground level" and was primarily a result of individual initiative and local improvisation; small markets sprung up. However, poverty remains a major problem. To make ends meet, many, especially those living in urban areas, take on several jobs. The professional part of the work force is not insulated from economic hardship. An estimated 20 percent engage in small-scale family related enterprise (for example, a civil servant's wife may do vending).

Second, virtually the entire intermediate commercial sector, comprising tea estates and other enterprises owned by Asians, was wiped out when Amin expelled the Asians from Uganda. Today this sector is reviving; Asians are returning and restoring their properties. However, due to unrest in many parts of the country, the once ubiquitous small Indian traders have not been replaced.

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In some areas and for certain activities communal labor and barter now prevail. This leaves open opportunities in enterprises previously dominated by Asians, particularly if concerted local developmental plans are put in place.[13]

Third, some important administrative jurisdictions were modified, at the provincial level abolished. Buganda was divided into three districts and local government was virtually destroyed. Districts whose original boundaries were in some rough accord with the distribution of dominant ethnic groups have also altered. Today ethnic groups are less neatly contained within territorial boundaries. There is considerable ambiguity about the units as well as the functions of local government. In certain areas, considerable dislocation, displacement, and population movement have contributed to a more fluid and mixed population, but without resulting in integration. There are still refugees. In Buganda, as the old landlord system was undermined, opportunities opened up for outsiders to buy land, sometimes by groups previously discriminated against. This remains a contentious issue in Buganda. The newcomers are disliked and discriminated against. (Buganda has a policy of discouraging sales of freehold land to "outsiders.") While "ethnic scrambling" has to some extent muted ethnic nationalism even in Buganda, ethnic prejudices remain strong.

Fourth, the very intense religious conflicts of the past seem to have burned themselves out. In this respect the negative sectarianism of some political parties is less significant than it was. Denominational schools, once very strict in their recruitment, now have mixed, if not open, entry. In Buganda, the current *Katikiro* is a Catholic, something previously quite unthinkable. However, Islam has become more important as a political factor, with Muslim nationalism making its formal debut within its own political party.

Fifth, if ethnic nationalism has declined, at least in its most overt manifestations, clan affiliations have grown in importance. Because of clan connections and obligations, such affiliations have been useful in facilitating money lending, reinforcing family support, and assisting in the organization of collective self help. Indeed, clan revivalism may account for some economic resiliency in rural areas.[14] In Buganda, the clan system became politically reinvigorated after the Buganda government and administrative system were abolished. Loyalties to the *Sabataka* (head of all the

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clans) sustained national identity and support for the kingship after it no longer legally existed. Clanship, representing the "original" side of the dual system of Kiganda authority, sustained rules of obligation, property, law, and rights—all factors that gained momentum and produced agitation for the restoration of the *Kabaka*-ship. By accepting these demands Museveni avoided a replay of 1956, although he may get more than he bargained for if pressures grow to transform a "cultural" *Kabaka* into a de jure, as well as de facto, political one. While the virulent and intense nationalism manifested by Buganda at Independence no longer prevails (there are no demands for a separate state based on the Uganda Agreement, for example), there is widespread support for a federal constitution. Meanwhile, the jurisdictional status of Buganda in Uganda remains ambiguous at a time when it is more than ever the most important political entity in the country in terms of economic, social, educational, and political factors.[15] Moreover, the present leadership is far more sophisticated and better educated than that which prevailed at the time of Independence, although clan/political conflicts have become manifest in the *Lukiiko* (whose members are now elected).

Sixth, there remains considerable, some say growing, violence, political unrest, and criminality. The situation has been complicated by syncretistic religious movements, like the Holy Spirit Movement, which pose security problems, especially in the North and Northeast. Furthermore, demobilized soldiers, remnants of former governments and armies, former supporters of Amin, Obote, and the Okellos, continue to engage in acts of violence. There is little control over guns. Arms and grenades are readily available, and not a few former soldiers have become bandits. Correspondingly, self-defense units have formed within some local communities.

Seventh, the farther one goes from Kampala the more deteriorated are the schools. Where there are schools many families are unable to pay school fees. Indeed, in some areas more than 40 percent of school age children are not in school.[16] Standards have been maintained only in a few exceptional places like King's College, Budo. A large proportion of teachers have, at best, very poor training.

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Eighth, there are major defects in the senior civil service. During both the Amin and Obote periods, permanent secretaries were often made ministers and so politicized. They were also vulnerable to dismissal and disgrace, if not worse. The result has been massive disarray in the system as a whole, poor coordination between the President and his senior ministers and between ministers and permanent secretaries, as well as great unevenness in the quality of leadership. Apart from Museveni himself, who, all agree, is quite a remarkable figure, the most crucial person is the minister of finance. Increasingly subject to intrigue at the top, the civil service is hardly the "steel frame" needed to hold the political system together, a condition made worse in the absence of political parties. Furthermore, what talent exists is poorly distributed. Talent tends to be leeched out from local areas to the center, from other urban centers to Kampala, and from the public sector to the private. At the same time, many educated and professional Ugandans who either left the country during the period of violence or went abroad for education have not returned (there are perhaps thirty thousand Ugandans in Canada, the United States, and Australia).

Ninth, National Resistance Councils have replaced local governments. Such councils are ranked from one to five, replacing but paralleling the previous village, *miruka, gombolola, saza,* and district council levels. These councils are very unevenly developed. There are large discrepancies between how they function on the ground and their terms of reference.[17] Moreover, despite ordinances to the contrary, it is not clear whether they can carry on the responsibilities awarded to them. For the moment, at least, Resistance Councils have made possible "a political truce by embracing fragmented elites who subscribe to conflicting ideologies."[18] The same can be said of the National Resistance Council, the Constituent Assembly, and the constitutional process overall.[19] Nevertheless, the truce is becoming more and more frayed as the constitutional denouement has been postponed.

Tenth, although political parties had fallen out of favor, interest in them is now reviving in very diverse quarters, not least of all from the dynamic and eloquent woman who is the de facto leader of the UPC but appears to remain loyal to Obote. The Museveni government tolerates them (that is, they are not banned) but has

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prevented them from playing an active role in the political process. All the main parties publish their own newspapers: *The Citizen* by the Democratic Party, *The People* by the UPC, *Shariat* by the Muslim parties, and *New Vision* by the government, although ostensibly it is independent.

Finally, recruitment to and composition of the army has been profoundly altered. In colonial times recruiting was mainly from Northerners, including Nubi remnants of colonial armies who settled in West Nile, whence came Amin's family. The NRA, in contrast, consisted mainly of Southerners. It was, on the whole, disciplined. (Soldiers were admonished to conduct themselves with discipline something like the Eighth Route Army under Mao Zedong in China.) It presently includes elements that served under both Obote and the Okellos. Now less homogeneous, it faces growing problems of discipline and control. Recruitment of Baganda soldiers in the NRA has led to a sense of Buganda entitlement—based on the notion that Museveni owes much to Buganda for his success.[20]

These are only a few of the more obvious aspects of the legacy left over from the years of conflict that need to be confronted by today's political leaders. Clearly, few of the old conflicts, ethnic, religious, jurisdictional, civil-military, have been resolved. Nor is the role that political parties might play at all clear. Modest economic recovery has occurred. There is more than a semblance of authority at the center. Museveni has maintained considerable public support, although perhaps this has most recently become somewhat more tentative as the long constitutional process initiated by him has led to what might be called a period of watchful waiting. There is a mood of growing uncertainty about the future that will no doubt continue at least until the constitutional process ends, at which point the future role of political parties will also have to be decided. Overall, there seems to be a greater willingness today to face reality and less inclination to blame colonialism for present conditions.

What is clear is that Museveni has made remarkable progress in the nine years of his administration, the first part of which may be said to represent a period of *consolidation* of power. In this period, the emphasis has been on eliminating remaining elements of the personal armies of his predecessors, reestablishing order, and

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controlling inflation (including currency reform), reestablishing links between the center and the districts, creating a more hospitable economic and social climate for foreign investment and the return of Asians, and improving medical services. A banking and commercial infrastructure has been restored in Kampala. Makerere University is functioning despite severe economic problems, and new research institutes have been established.

The second and present phase, now drawing to a close, can be described as *anticipatory*. It includes the four and a half year consultative period in which the Constituent Assembly was set up and during which time hearings under the Odoki Commission were held. The process was, in and of itself, a deliberate effort to get people to look forward rather than back and to build a common constitutional language, if not a framework. It is also the period in which the consultative model of democracy is being sketched out, pragmatically and on a day-to-day basis. Central to this period has been the focus on constitutional principles. By sponsoring such a lengthy, complex, and expensive constitutional exercise, Museveni has tried to build civic consciousness and win support for the principles of what will be called a consultative democracy model.

However, the brief review of changes that have occurred since Museveni took office suggests three critical areas that need to be dealt with if such a model is to work. Most of those interviewed agreed that the senior civil service had been totally undermined with appointments, as one senior official put it, "on the basis of political connections rather than competence." They also agreed that local government hardly exists in most areas, the old system long ago having become a shambles, and most Resistance Councils barely function. Hence, particular attention needs to be paid to both ends of the spectrum: to improve the civil service and to reconstruct local institutions. Indeed, if Museveni's constitutional reforms go through, enormous burdens will be placed on local authorities. They will need to assume greater responsibilities than in the past, even though the efficacy of Resistance Councils is at best uneven. They will be expected to serve as local consultative bodies. At the district level they will need to be closely linked to both the central government ministries and to subordinate jurisdictions. Counties are designated to serve as constituencies for

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parliamentary elections, while county councils are also electoral colleges for the district councils. However these arrangements in the end work out, it is clear enough that their real potential will be in connection to development. In effect, local authorities need to sponsor development communities. Much, too, will depend on the future of Buganda. In this regard, Museveni has taken a number of conciliatory steps. Not only has he restored the *Kabaka*-ship, he has countenanced, albeit with some reluctance, the transition from a "cultural" to a "political" *Kabaka* whose exact role remains to be decided.

In this and in other ways Museveni has shown considerable flexibility. In his nine years in office he has substantially changed his political views, moving away from a once-fashionable "Dar-es-Salaam leftism" to a more pragmatic and market oriented perspective. Not a few observers have commented on his capacity to "rise to the occasion" and to "learn on the job."[21] The policies he has followed have revived local economic activity. Restored and flourishing local markets are among the visible signs of improvement, other evidence of which can be found in the increasing proportion of tin roofs on houses and the growth of small commercial enterprises like video shops.[22]

The formal sector, previously at a virtual standstill, today represents 30 to 40 percent of the economic activity, including multinationals, Asian commercial and industrial enterprises, a large import sector, and considerable local production such as cement. This sector is more integrated than in the past, responding well to exchange rate policies, interest, and taxation. Economic growth is estimated at about 6 to 7 percent although there is beginning to be a population problem. About 80 percent of the population lives and works in the agricultural sector. Of this, the approximately 60 to 70 percent of the economy in the informal sector involves local exchange, that is operates as a cash economy. In the rural areas there is virtually no banking system. Local branches of commercial banks are closing rather than opening. Credit is very local and interest rates are high, as are risks. Avoidance of taxes is commonplace. Some middleman activity is evident. However, poverty is more widespread than in the colonial period—even in Buganda. (Indeed, in an interview the *Kabaka* suggested that the most important feature of his political, as distinct from cultural, role

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would be to pay attention to the problem of rural poverty in Buganda.)

Among the problems mentioned by the people interviewed, several stand out. Heavy reliance on the state has not, on the whole, been accompanied by the recruitment of highly qualified and talented leadership. Museveni, it has been said, stands alone, keeping something of a barrier between himself and his cabinet and staff. His qualities are appreciated, especially his articulate and intelligent understanding and his willingness to discuss major problems with people at all levels. Some indicate that he is a much better talker than listener. Several also were concerned about his reliance on the army, especially now that it has included elements not disciplined in the manner of the NRA during its campaign. Discussions and meetings are frequent but not particularly productive. The ensemble of advisors and councilors on whom Museveni can rely is not of an exceptional caliber. Chosen in part because they represent different sectarian and other affiliations, it was said that the result is not so much reconciliation as the rise of mutual antagonisms, intrigue, and clienteleism. This situation is aggravated by the lack of accountability. In neither the ministries or their instrumentalities, nor in enterprises run by the state, is the most basic accountability forthcoming. Corruption is rampant.[23] The leeching out of external funding provided by donors that began under Obote II has continued. As a result, programs that might seem well conceived and necessary are less than successful, a source of growing frustration among the most talented people, particularly those with a genuine civic sense, a desire to serve the worthier purposes of state and society and simply to get their jobs done. Not surprisingly, attempting to accomplish even the most basic objectives makes them susceptible to intrigue, manipulation, and corruption. Nothing is surprising about this, and it is hardly unique to Uganda. Indeed, compared with certain other African countries, the problem is minuscule. Nevertheless, it needs to be dealt with before it grows to larger proportions and engulfs the state just at the point of transition to a genuine democracy, which suggests the need for what is perhaps one of the most essential and most difficult tasks any country can confront, redefining the political sphere.

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REDEFINING THE POLITICAL SPHERE

As has already been suggested, the centerpiece of the anticipatory phase has been the quite remarkable consultative process initiated under the auspices of the Odoki Commission. Rarely has so thorough a review of history, political philosophy, constitutional principles, and institutions been undertaken, and so thoroughly discussed by so many people. Moreover, the draft report contains a wealth of facts about geography, peoples, cultures, gender, class, institutions, attitudes, and beliefs. It reviews the circumstances, conditions, and events of the past and those currently prevailing in the country.[24] Using both oral and written materials and statistical and analytical methods, the Odoki Commission Report makes it clear from the beginning that the information so gathered was to be the foundation for future deliberations over appropriate institutional instruments. Moreover, the process itself was to become an integral part of nation-building and a means of establishing common values.[25] Thus, the centerpiece of the anticipatory period is the constitutional process itself, which will lead not only to decisions about the most suitable and acceptable institutional framework for Uganda, but, by means of a national discourse, will contribute to the formation of a genuine national and civil society.

Of course, all this is more easily said than done. Despite (and perhaps because of) the long and arduous constitutional consultative process that has been undertaken in this anticipatory phase, many hopes have been built up that will not be realized. Anticipation also leads to disappointment, which is a danger to a new constitution. Moreover, behind many of the arguments in the Constituent Assembly (CA) over principles, as well as preferred political arrangements, are attempts to settle old scores. So far, positions have clustered between the two apparently opposite constitutional poles of federalism and unitarism, the latter with some considerable but undecided degree of decentralization. Nevertheless, these alternatives are more rhetorical than real.

And, as in 1962, not a few of the issues involve the role and position of Buganda. Despite all that has occurred and the considerable erosion in significance and status in the country that it has suffered, Buganda remains in essence what it was—a ministate. In these regards, what Buganda anticipates may be different from

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what the national government anticipates. If Buganda remains a relatively strong ministate, Uganda will remain a relatively weak national state—a state waiting to be built. Moreover, Buganda is all the more a coherent cultural entity as a result of the intensification of clan affiliations, sustaining its integrity even though the Obote regime dismantled its government and hierarchy. The return of the *Kabaka* has rekindled Kiganda cultural and political nationalism. The *Kabaka* and his *Katikiro* are engaged in a process of redefining the political role of kingship and of managing the internal politics of the *Lukiiko*, in a context of broader political and constitutional issues. Towards this end it has already built up an internal momentum that will not be denied without the danger of violence. And because Buganda continues to dominate Uganda's economic and educational life and contains the capital of the country, there is a sense in which Buganda holds Uganda's future hostage.

At the center of the anticipatory period, then, is the question of how to deal with Buganda. Buganda today, as in 1900 and 1961, is a uniquely difficult political problem that must be resolved if a stable national government is to become possible.[26] In Buganda territoriality, language, culture, history, political institutions, and the economy have been and remain, on the whole, mutually reinforcing. It constitutes its own civil society. Nowhere else in Uganda, not at the national level nor at any level of local government and administration, is there such unity. The question is how to deal with it. If Kiganda nationalism is accommodated will Buganda become more or less politically challenging to the state? No one knows. Buganda's preeminence remains a source of irritation even though it is far less the whole story than it was just before Independence in 1961. The solution is to assist in the development of Buganda without becoming hostage to it.[27] But this can only occur if the national government is itself vastly improved, able to attract investment and resources and provide types of support that Buganda alone could not command. Buganda nationalism can be blunted, and its political claims and demands can be reduced from the level of constitutional principles to the level of political interests, if it becomes clear that its participation in the national state will provide clear gains. In this sense, and perhaps in the longer run,

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

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

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Buganda, like Scotland, will be allowed to retain a considerable degree of home rule.

It is not only Buganda particularism that will require less formulaic constitutional solutions. As already indicated, the old districts were drastically altered by Obote I. Today's Resistance Councils 5 no longer delimit the same jurisdictions as in the past. Provincial administration no longer exists. It would be an error to consider the Buganda problem, important though it is, outside of the more general problem of revamping the boundaries of local government, not least because the counties are likely to become constituencies for members of parliament. Thus, the local areas will become far more important than they were even when they functioned well, and especially in terms of new political, economic, and social responsibilities, crucial and directly germane to the restoration of the rural economy and infrastructure, not least in areas devastated by years of conflict. The general problem is how to assist the Uganda government in improving the fit between central government and local authorities, and to improve the capacity to both make and effectuate policy. Unfortunately, while these are matters that are in the forefront of the constitutional debates, the rhetoric of today inhibits rather than facilitates their resolution.

The point is that too many of these problems cannot be decided by constitutional instruments. What will be important is how well constituency boundaries are redrawn, the future role of political parties, the establishment of effective local government institutions that are able to make provision for local needs, and the establishment of some reasonable degree of genuine democracy on both national and local levels, with information flowing up as well as down.[28]

It seems that a national consensus has today greater possibilities than before. Parochial identities have become blurred. Ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian affiliations are less binding, even though in some regions while ethnicity and sectarianism have become less important, clanship and kinship have become more important. Of course, this does not ensure that even with considerable mixing up of populations people will become more politically tolerant. It will be a long time before the peoples of Uganda accept their perceived differences in terms of a positive pluralism.[29] But certain steps can be taken, especially by outsider donors, toward such an outcome.

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The problem is fivefold: restoring infrastructure, developing the economy, redefining political/administrative institutions, rectifying imbalances between the civil society and the state, and building a national society.

MUSEVENI'S CONSULTATIVE DEMOCRACY AS A MODEL

Politically, economically, and administratively, what has been put in place, prior to any final constitution and within the framework of the constitutional process, are the outlines of a "consultative democracy." Some of the ideas were embodied in the ten point program that was "thrashed" out in the "Ugandan bush" by the NRA guerrillas.[30] What it represents is a nonparty alternative to the models that preceded it, the British tutelary democracy, Obote I's version of the one party "mobilization state" that accompanied the movement to the Left (and was much influenced by Nkrumah's Ghana and the general wave of socialist developmentalism prevalent in Africa at the time), and the rash of military regimes that resulted from coups.[31] If Museveni does not want to rely on the army or a political party, then he must build his "movement" very quickly if a political vacuum is not to develop.

Signs of such a vacuum may already exist. The constitutional process appears to have been extended too long. People not only "anticipate" less and less, but their expectations have changed. What started as a transparent process is becoming more and more a manipulated one. Indeed, some might argue that the consultative process was basically a shadow play. If such a political climate should prevail (at the moment the situation does not seem serious) or is allowed to continue, it could generate fresh opportunities for the reappearance of old conflicts.[32] Hence, if Museveni does not rely, even residually, on the military, he will need to establish not only a broadly based political consensus and electoral processes, but also a new government, and sooner rather than later.[33]

If these remarks are correct, and because he came to power by force of arms, his own party losing the only election in which it participated, Museveni's position can be described as more recognized than legitimate.[34] He needed the consultative process as a way of giving birth to a constitution. Now he needs to ensure that he gets the kind of constitution he wants. Then he will need to win

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the election without a political party to help organize the vote. Otherwise neither his role, nor the actual institutional structures and processes envisaged for the constitution, whatever they might be, or the process of validating authority, can be fully realized. This despite the fact that Resistance Councils were used to elect the members of the CA and the National Resistance Council.

Of course, it is far easier to use the consultative process as prima facie evidence of the desire to build a democracy from above than actually authenticate it by input from below. It remains to be seen whether the elaborate system of Resistance Councils, now established in both rural and urban areas and such bodies as Makerere University, will work and whether, as district, county, sub-county, and village bodies, they can be used by the government as the primary means of reaching down into society. Nor is it clear how much attention will be paid to responses from below by a parliament that is yet to be promulgated.

One way to interpret Museveni's model is to consider it in the context not of a single party but of a single, national political movement, a kind of nonparty party, differentiated on the basis of region/locale/constituency. Multiple electoral colleges would elect single members from county constituencies to a national and sovereign parliament. The model would, in effect, move the source of power away from the NRA (which would become only the power of last resort), increasing the power of the National Resistance Council (parliament) and, via the consultative process and the CA, of the parliament that will come into being. There is, to be sure, a certain sleight of hand in this that becomes visible, despite the illusion of transparency, when one turns to the draft constitution itself.

However, the process has not yet gone through its full cycle. The longer it goes on, the more the here and now predominates over the future. As we have seen, during the consolidation period Museveni's policies were, on the whole, popular and successful. In this final phase of the anticipatory period a certain querulousness has crept into public life. There is still a die-hard faction in the *Lukiiko* that wants maximum autonomy for Buganda in a federal system. For the moment, at any rate, odds favor the adoption of the unitary constitution called for in the draft. Indeed, a decision to this effect (which Museveni has called final) has been passed by

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the delegates to the Assembly (CADS). Today time seems against *federo* (the federal system) where in 1961 it favored it.

All the more reason, then, to look seriously at the consultative model Museveni favors, as embodied in the draft constitution. It calls for a unitary but decentralized state, a single-chambered parliament elected mainly on the basis of single member county constituencies.[35] The purpose and spirit of the constitution are defined in two parallel sets of clauses. The first set consists of thirty-two somewhat overlapping and lengthy "objectives," political, economic, social, and cultural, including rather hortatory moral qualifications and characteristics for citizenship, and some twenty-five rights. It also calls for a human rights commission with investigatory powers.[36] Majority vote and universal adult suffrage would directly elect the president, his cabinet being selected from among members of parliament, subject to approval by a second representative body that is to serve as a "liaison" between the executive and parliament. This body, although somewhat ambiguously defined, is less than an upper house and more than a "reconciliation" committee. Its members would be mainly elected by district councils from among the members of parliament from each district. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this rather unusual document is the fact that not only is the public service built into the constitution but the system of local government as well, with districts at the top of a pyramid of local authorities.

Four features of the draft constitution stand out: First, no provision is made for Buganda as an entity. There is no province level jurisdiction. In this sense, constitutionally, Buganda does not exist except as three districts. Second, there is a prohibition of sectarian and ethnic political parties or parties that are not represented in at least two-thirds of the districts. Third, the promulgation of a one party state is prohibited. And fourth, a "movement," which predates and would continue beyond the constitution, would prevent political parties from in any way figuring in elections.[37]

If the draft constitution, as it now stands, becomes law, it is likely that both the political situation of Buganda and the future role of political parties will be lightning rods for continued unrest. The model that the constitution represents is of a consultative democracy that is based on a movement that tolerates the existence of political parties while preventing them from engaging in

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their primary activity. This means that there is no clear opposition. Indeed, by bringing opposition into the government, the likelihood of intrigue, manipulation, and deceit is likely to be very great.

In effect, rather than a one party state, Museveni has tried to establish a consultative democracy with democratic guarantees. Its principle is that of a "movement-state," with "the movement" specifically provided for constitutionally, intertwining in rather obscure ways with the provisions of the constitution itself. This accounts for the emphasis on consultation with lower authorities. By drawing its sustenance from below, the "movement-state" validates both the deflection of political parties and the negation of Buganda as a political entity.

Can such a system work? Perhaps, but it runs the risk of polarizing two forces, the movement-state and the nascent power of a Kiganda nationalism, which seeks to reaffirm its old jurisdictional boundaries, its autonomy, while rallying around the as yet undefined political role of the *Kabaka*. Buganda as a political force remains a potentially subverting element threatening the balanced relationship between national and local authorities as spelled out in the draft constitution. Just as it was the unfinished business that unraveled the 1962 constitution, it is likely to do so again today.

In this sense, the political stability that a new constitution should usher in, especially after such a long consultative process, may turn out to be fugitive. Nor are the sources of state power unambiguous. Tutelary democracies could rely on the external metropolitan power, a mobilized mass movement/party in control of all resources, with a military oligarchy in control of the armed forces. A consultative democracy based on a "movement-state," without effective political parties, and reluctant to use the military, would be so heavily dependent on local support that it could easily become the prisoner of competing and urgent demands, especially if, as laid out in the draft constitution, counties within the districts constitute single-membered constituencies. Envisaging how such a complex political process would work is difficult. For example, the electoral system, the dynamics of candidate recruitment and selection, and the determination of preferences within constituencies would involve two tiers of local government, i.e., the county, which is the subordinate jurisdiction but also the constituency that elects and is represented by a member of parliament, and the

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district, the superordinate jurisdiction, which would have primary responsibility for administering central government policy. This confuses the lines of power and responsibility. The two jurisdictions could easily work at cross purposes if parliamentarians representing county interests pit their authority against district officials representing central government policy.

Although the Museveni model lacks the mediating force that independently drawn constituencies might provide, as well as the mobilizing effects of political parties, it could be argued that this will keep the national government accountable to district and local councils, sensitive to their needs, and therefore more democratic than alternative forms. That, indeed, is the model's promise. It might also risk becoming hostage to "provincialization" and the elevation of local over national interests. To avoid this would require local authorities working closely with those at the center, which means a decisive role for the Central Government Representative, the de facto replacement of the old district officer. Without a good administrative fit between the center and the local governments a power vacuum could easily develop.

Much would depend on the quality and training of both local and central government cadres. Although Uganda is blessed with a substantial proportion of highly educated and well-trained people (some of them still overseas), many of them are underemployed. Moreover, and despite efforts at reform, the civil service remains bloated, inefficient, underpaid, and manifestly unable to perform the role outlined in the draft constitution, or any other for that matter. It is very much at the stage of "you pretend to pay me; I pretend to work." It is, of course, a situation that, among other things, invites nepotism and other forms of corruption.[38] Efforts are currently under way to reduce the government payroll of more than 300,000 (about half of which consists of teachers and the army) to about 170,000, to slim down and "monetize" perks, eliminate housing, and reduce access to vehicle pools. The object, laudable in itself, is to give civil servants a living wage that will enable them to choose how they spend their personal income. But this will not deal with the problem of basic civil service reform, i.e., how to restore the senior administrative service, those small elite cadres needed to staff the ministries and the political administration. A fundamental overhaul seems to be required to restore

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the quality and service standards of what was once an excellent civil service in the British tradition, before it was undermined, politicized, and savaged under both Obote and Amin. The senior service not only needs virtually total rehabilitation, but as one interviewee put it, it needs to be started all over again with new and younger people. In any case, the underutilization and misuse of talent in the public sector, combined with an overreliance on the state as the primary instrument of developmental and constitutional change, is an invitation to financial abuse. Not surprisingly, there are serious problems of coordination and implementation.

This condition at senior governmental levels has already led to a situation in which high-ranking officials, those actually running the country, become more wary of sharing power and responsibility at the local level (because consultative democracy involves decentralization) when they are supposed to be decentralizing. This only exacerbates the flight of talent from the local areas. A tripartite set of reforms is needed, more or less simultaneously: the recruitment and total rebuilding of the senior civil service from the first ranks of a clearly defined administrative class; the formation of qualified local cadres; and the creation of effective development teams at the district and county levels. Both the newly formed local cadres and the development teams would in effect become the local counterparts to those with similar responsibilities in the ministries. Unless these three targets are aimed at simultaneously, the likelihood is that even a revamped administrative civil service will only give lip service to the idea of decentralization—and do its best to make it inconsequential.

In short, without an effective working relationship between central and local government, with effective cadres at all levels, a struggle between countervailing pulls of power will ensue, especially given the likely dynamics described above. The center will try to prevent any real decentralization of decision-making or anything that will dilute its power, while increasing accountability will stimulate local governments to impose (unwanted) restrictions on the policy-making process at a time when some of the most important decisions that have to be made at the center are likely to be extremely unpopular at the local level.[39]

To restate the problem in more general terms, in the past Uganda was a textbook example of the negative side of pluralism.[40] Any

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democratic constitution, to be viable, will need to ensure that diversity makes for pluralism and compromise, and promotes national and civic integrity. Most particularly, a consultative democracy will need to avoid too much manipulation at the center, i.e., favoritism as a way of cultivating clienteles and support, especially in the absence of effective electoral party competition.

This raises the question, what kind of support and assistance would be needed to make the system work, and, whatever the final contours of the constitution, to minimize conflict and maximize developmental growth?

CAPACITY BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY—HOW TO IMPROVE CAPABILITIES

The problems discussed in this essay are unique to Uganda only in their particulars. Many African countries share them. Indeed, they are not even unique to Africa. In the European Community, arguments about the relations between the center and the parts, the role of a European parliament, the degree of sovereignty left to the members, and, indeed, the question of more local jurisdictions have given rise to extremely interesting debates. One of the most important concepts to come out of those discussions has been called the principle of *subsidiarity*. This principle argues that, wherever possible, problems of the economy, social life, effective participation, etc. should be dealt with by the lowest jurisdictions rather than the highest. The assumption in the European Community is that the basis of decentralization is not each of the states of the community, but communities within the several states. There is much merit to this proposal, which both maximizes local knowledge and brings expertise to the level where it is most needed. But to do that requires a highly sensitive and sophisticated administration at the center, able to make appropriate connections to the locale.

Subsidiarity can be applied to Uganda as well. Even if the term is not used, it is very much in the spirit of the draft constitution. The proposals to be put forward place emphasis on both the center and the locale and are framed not as concrete programs but rather as ideas for discussion. They also reflect some of the specific

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problems faced by a country entering a new constitutional and democratic phase.

In the present view, the principle of subsidiarity is one that might be applied elsewhere in Africa as well. From the standpoint of the subsidiarity principle, there has been, from the colonial period on, far too much emphasis on the state as the instrument of transformation of society. Development from above was inherent in the tutelary colonial role. In the post-Independence period, virtually all former colonial territories relied on the state as an instrument for the realization of economic and social change by political means. Indeed, this emphasis on the state coincided with an increase in state responsibilities in the West and the use of the party-state as the primary instrument of forced draft development in socialist countries. In the African case, a "lineage" has evolved rapidly, leading to what might be called the regime-state, going through phases that include the organization of ecumenical nationalism in the form of mass nationalist movements that are populist and unifying, overriding ethnic, religious, class, and other differences. Effective party organization leads to Independence and the overthrowing of colonialism. The resultant regime-states, whatever their original sources of support, quickly became the instrument of a movement, a party, a military clique, a class, an ethnic group, relying more and more on coercion to maintain power. Hence, the main characteristic of the regime-state is the politicization of all aspects of social life. By penetrating the private sphere, however, the state takes on nearly all the responsibilities handled in the past by individuals, families, clans, or other groups and assumes burdens far beyond its capacities. The consequences are virtually the same everywhere. The more responsibility the state takes on the less effective it is, the more coercive it becomes, the more resistance it encounters from below, and the more corruption occurs (political leaders cannot live by coercion alone and must establish supportive clienteles by paying off supporters). These circumstances have led to a polarization of African politics between two extremes. One is where the regime-state defines the goals. The other is opposition to the state in the form of localized movements, parochial nationalisms, and the rejection of state defined goals, resistance to dominant party interests, and a variety of defense mechanisms against the regime-state. In this process, virtu-

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ally every form of affiliation, class, ethnic, racial, linguistic, ideological, religious, takes on new relevance and fresh power, which makes political solutions all the more difficult to realize.

Whatever form of constitution is adopted, and especially if the Museveni model of a consultative democracy is followed, some kind of subsidiarity will be essential, whether as decentralization or in some other form. This brings us to the specific suggestions I make in this essay. These deal first with the center, particularly the senior administrative service, second with the reinforcement of professionality, and third with subsidiarity, in terms of building district and lower level development communities.

Most of those we interviewed, both in government and out, agreed that reforming the present system is not possible. At the very least what is required is, first, the rebuilding of the senior administrative service, the reconstruction of the service itself with a strong emphasis on professionality, education, and expertise. A country otherwise so divided requires a "steel frame" in the form of a well educated, competitively recruited corps whose officers possess a high sense of duty and commitment. The formation of such a corps depends on a clearly defined career service, regular promotions based on merit, and a suitable retirement program. The ideal is an apolitical civil service, committed to serve the policies and government of the day, and capable not only of reinforcing its expertise but of learning from experience, so as to provide ministers and political leaders with sound advice based on independent judgment. To put it bluntly, what is needed is a senior civil service that is immune to sycophancy and resistant to corruption. This, in turn, will require the continuous reinforcement of professionality, integrity, and expertise by means of support networks designed to sustain the role of civil servants and improve performance within the role.

This brings us back to the question of subsidiarity in the context of local development and administration in Uganda, and specifically in terms of the relationship between the national and local government. Involved in subsidiarity are local administration employees, private and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) enterprise and projects, and central government representatives. In keeping with the Museveni model of a consultative democracy, the

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problem is how to develop from below while strengthening, not weakening or bypassing, the center.[41]

This is very much in accord with the direction already taken by the central government. President Museveni himself said in this regard, referring to local development,

> Our actions were based on our conviction that decentralization comprehensively facilitates the realization of our development and political objectives. First, decentralization will give power to the people to move steadily on the path of democratization. Second, decentralization will meet our goal to attain an equitable distribution of resources between and within districts, thereby spreading the benefits of economic growth. Third, we have committed ourselves to improving public sector performance and eventually to reduce public sector spending. This will be achieved by eliminating expenses caused by excessive centralization of decision making in Kampala, by increasing the generation of Local Authorities' revenue through improved local tax collection and by making political leaders and employees of local authorities more responsible in the expenditure of public resources.[42]

Given the likelihood that some version of the Museveni model will be adopted, and the importance Museveni himself attaches to both decentralization and the stimulation of rural and local development, more attention to efforts along these lines elsewhere might be useful. This is in part because the most improvisation and initiative have come from these areas. However, inducements will be required to prevent capable local leaders from leaving for higher levels of government or business. County level and even lower jurisdictions need to take on more developmental functions, encourage self help programs, and work in conjunction with, rather than at cross-purposes to, the national government.

In the past, during the period of tutelary democracy, a combination of community development plus a district team approach worked fairly successfully. The team, consisting of rural development, medical, educational, and other officers, under the general direction of the district officer, was responsible for drawing up local development plans and had the financing, staffing, and coordination required to realize them. This principle has been incorporated in both the present local government ordinance and the draft constitution in the form of district development committees (the

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term "district team" is no longer used). There is a strong emphasis on taxation *with* representation. As outlined in both these documents, some of its main objects are promotional, aimed at improving the capabilities of local rural and urban groups, their markets, roads, communications, schools, water supplies, food supplies, and other basic activities at the level where, especially in the countryside, starvation and poverty are endemic. Since there has been considerable recovery, more effective local development would have to facilitate local initiatives that are beyond the immediate means of those most involved—initiatives that would stimulate rather than stifle local improvisation.

Such worthy objects are singularly difficult to realize and even more difficult to sustain. Indeed, the history of community development programs in Africa generally and Uganda specifically has shown very uneven results. There have been all kinds of alternatives tried, and transplants drawn from elsewhere—the Panchyat program in India, cooperatives following Rochdale and/or Fabian principles, more radical experiments such as Ujaama villages, communes, cooperative farms, etc. Not that there have been no successes; one can cite the Chagga Coffee Cooperative in Tanzania, or the Harambee experiments in Kenya, for examples. But on the whole the results have been disappointing.

Perhaps the most singular failure of past efforts has been the failure to bring people more directly into economic, social, and political activities in ways whereby they might simultaneously pursue their own as well as more collective interests. Hence, even in those rural sectors where recovery and growth have occurred and the commercial sector has revived, the opportunities for corruption, manipulation, and the misuse of government facilities and agencies have become more widespread.

Despite this, there are certain clear advantages of localism. Information flows freely, and flexibility, innovation, and adaptability are more possible. Localism allows for the quick transfer and shift of resources and money, and, in the informal sector, a very high degree of participation, including women.

In Uganda a great deal will depend on how all this is organized. If the pattern of administration is uneven, with too much variation in the way local governments operate (especially if they continue to take the form of "Resistance Councils"), then the efforts by

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central governments to realize policies at the local level will provide innumerable opportunities for the inappropriate use of public funds. At the local level the problems range from access to pure drinking water to the availability of areas for children to play, public bath houses, public laundry facilities, training courses, conventions, demonstrations, exhibitions, film shows, classes, and the creation of pilot villages where others could observe how to do things.

The appropriate ministries will need to establish local counterpart programs. The Ministry of Education can provide for community education, placing particular emphasis on leadership training, the development of individual leaders capable of taking strong initiatives, and the institutionalization of such leadership. Experience elsewhere cannot be easily duplicated but suggests some of the conditions and requirements that might help realize the principles put forward by Museveni and others. One would need first to locate such a village development program in an appropriate ministry and establish a few pilot villages, working under the direction of a development officer and a district team coordinator. To facilitate the process it would be extremely valuable to invite the participation of nongovernmental agencies from interested countries, such as Denmark. Reestablishing the district team might also be useful. Certainly it would be necessary to establish and make available effective procedures and to institutionalize consultations with local bodies.

There are many possible ways to redeploy administrative officers within the district administration who are already in place as senior civil servants assigned to work in the "field" and who represent their respective ministries. If something like the Korean example could be adapted to Uganda, and ways could be devised so that together with their local counterparts, and under the overall direction of the Central Government Representative, who would be ultimately responsible for them, they could be responsible for drawing up local development programs, then both the work of district committees and their officers could be improved. The point would be to make it possible for local officials and elected councilors to be more responsive to public needs, and to enable them to more effectively discharge their responsibilities by ensur-

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ing that plans remain close to home, facilitating rather than inhibiting local initiatives.

In these regards, the role of a coordinator would be crucial, perhaps a senior administrative officer assigned to the district level (including municipalities) who would be required to be a "touring officer," to be in continuous and direct contact with the subordinate county, subcounty, and village councils and officials. Thus, development from below would be more highly integrated with development from above, with agenda setting and policy formation no longer done by the state, but in a more mutually interactive fashion in keeping with the model of consultative democracy itself. Denmark has not only been interested in local government and development in Uganda but has become involved through conferences and assistance in drafting local government programs. Joint coordination might be possible under the sponsorship of the World Bank and appropriate Danish agencies.

Subsidiarity, of course, brings us back to the "Buganda problem." It might be necessary to accept as a fact Buganda "exceptionalism" and to treat Buganda as a province (or an "R-6 Resistance Council"). While this would have the effect of making Buganda a "province" in a country organized around districts, the history, size, complexity, social structure, culture, and current politics of Buganda suggest that the *Kabaka*'s government and the *Lukiiko* constitute a natural venue for development from below. This might help to direct the energy and vitality of Buganda inward, to self help and development, rather than outward in a struggle with the center.

ENDNOTES

[1]These comments are based on research conducted under the auspices of the World Bank, which is in no way responsible for them.

[2]David E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, rev. ed. 1967).

[3]Use has been made of published and unpublished materials including proposals for reform and interviews with a variety of leaders, officials, and academics. Among those interviewed were members of the government, the Prime Minister, the First Deputy Prime Minister, the Governor and staff of the Bank of Uganda, the Director of the Uganda Development Corporation, His Highness the

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Kabaka of Buganda, the *Katikiro,* representatives of political parties, an editor of *New Vision,* the Uganda representative of the World Bank, the American Ambassador, various members of the social science faculties of Makerere University and the Makerere Institute of Social Research, as well as members of the Constituent Assembly. While those interviewed hardly agreed on the matters under consideration, it was not difficult to identify significant areas of common concern.

[4]At its inception the Democratic Party was mainly Catholic.

[5]See Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda.*

[6]Many Baganda were so offended by Obote that they supported Amin—to their subsequent regret.

[7]See Aidan Southall, "General Amin and the Coup: Great Man or Historical Inevitability," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 13 (1) (March 1975).

[8]Founded in Moshi, Tanzania.

[9]The official returns showed the UPC with seventy-two seats, the DP with fifty-one seats, and the UPM (Museveni's Uganda Patriotic Party) with one seat. A Conservative Party also contested the election but failed to win a seat.

[10]See Anthony Low, "The Dislocated Polity," in Hölger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle, *Uganda Now* (London: James Currey, 1991).

[11]Per Tidemand, "The Guerrilla War in Luwero Triangle, Uganda 1981–85," unpublished paper presented to the Agrarian Studies Program, Yale University, April 1994.

[12]See Dan Mudoola, "Political Transitions since Idi Amin: A Study in Political Pathology," in Hansen and Twaddle, *Uganda Now.*

[13]A major inhibiting factor is the disproportionate growth in the number of female heads of households, not least because of the AIDS epidemic.

[14]Moreover, today, this inheritance of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional affiliation and loyalty spills over the borders of Uganda into neighboring Rwanda.

[15]See, for example, the Memorandum on the Termination of British Protection, a resolution of the *Lukiiko* passed in 1960 that outlines a plan for an independent Buganda. Cited in Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda,* Appendix.

[16]See William Senteza Kajubi, "Educational Reform During Socio-economic Crisis," in Hölger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle, eds., *Changing Uganda* (London: James Currey, 1991).

[17]As laid down in the Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Bill, 1993. In February 1989 elections were held at the R1 level, and indirect elections from 2 to 5, at the same time that a Constitutional Commission was established at the center. Local elections were held again in February 1992.

[18]Apolo R. Nsibambi, "Resistance Councils and Committees," in Hansen and Twaddle, eds., *Changing Uganda.*

[19]See Ibid., 295.

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[20]See E. A. Brett, "The Military and Democratic Transition in Uganda," in Hölger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle, *From Chaos to Order* (London: James Currey, 1995).

[21]Despite the lack of legitimacy, there seems to be general agreement that Museveni is a person of considerable stature even though he is inclined to be personally autocratic. There is agreement too that he knows how to exercise power with discretion, no mean accomplishment for someone who has been described as a "bush commander," who has had to learn on the job.

[22]Not least because of the clan factor as noted above.

[23]One of the most common themes raised in the interviews is the lack of good reporting and accountability. Indeed, the idea of accountability, which was one of the chief virtues of the colonial administration and at virtually all levels of government, is conspicuous by its absence. Even if the idea of accountability were more clearly accepted, there are no instrumentalities whereby it can operate. There are very few accountants or people with sufficient financial and fiscal expertise. Indeed, the system produces inducements for self-enrichment that are likely to grow as the economy recovers.

[24]The South African government has gone through a similarly thorough constitutional exercise and produced a monumental three volume set of proceedings. But these have not relied on such an extensive consultative process.

[25]See the Odoki Commission, *The Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission, Analysis and Recommendations* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1992), 75.

[26]Buganda was, in effect, used by the British to further the interests of the colonial government, and both its privileged constitutional position, as outlined in the 1900 Agreement, and many of its economic and social advantages followed from that. Furthermore, Buganda nationalism was intensified in the 1950s when the *Kabaka* was exiled and then brought back. The idea of a "cultural *Kabaka*" is clearly untenable. Moreover, because the old system of hierarchical and appointive chiefs was dismantled (Buganda was divided into three districts rather than remaining as an entity in itself), clanship increased in significance as a kind of cultural "cement," holding it together as its political structure declined. In this respect the question of Buganda particularism includes whether or not Buganda will be a province, in a country in which all the other units are districts, and if so, what political role will be assigned to the *Kabaka*. Nevertheless, some things have indeed changed, not least of all the about face of the Baganda on the issue of federalism itself. Where once they were opposed to it, today they favor it.

[27]In this regard, considerable home rule for Buganda is essential, whether the constitution eventually decided on is "federal" or "unitary."

[28]For an extremely thoughtful discussion of these matters see Apolo Nsibambi, *Managing the Transition to Democracy in Uganda Under the National Resistance* (Kampala: Makerere Institute of Social Research, Report of the Uganda Democratization Study for the Global Coalition for Africa and the African Leadership Forum, 1994).

[29]Museveni's willingness to accept the return of the *Kabaka* as a "cultural" figure implies that elevating cultural factors will help minimize other differences, reducing them to negotiable interests. One should add in this context that when

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religious, linguistic, clan, ethnic, subethnic or other affiliations coincide, conflict is inevitable and is likely to be intense, leading to what might be called a predisposition to genocide, as in Rwanda and Burundi, or Southern Sudan—all immediate neighbors of Uganda.

[30]Hansen and Twaddle, *From Chaos to Order.*

[31]The main points of the program read like a wish list of democracy and include: democracy, national unity, the elimination of sectarianism, national independence, integration, a self-sustaining national economy, restoration of social services, rehabilitation of war-ravaged areas, elimination of corruption and the misuse of power, correction of population dislocation and improvement, and cooperation with other African countries.

[32]Of course, although he is trying to generate support from the public at large, Museveni is still backed up by the National Resistance Army.

[33]Nor is it so surprising that Museveni remains hostile to the idea of reviving political parties. His own past effort to build a political party was unsuccessful.

[34]Indeed, there are those who throw doubt on his qualifications by saying that he is a Tutsi (that is, an Ankoli Hima).

[35]Provision is also made for a certain number of ex offico members on the basis of prescribed categories.

[36]See the Uganda Constitutional Commission, *The Draft Constitution of the Republic of Uganda* (Kampala: Uganda Constitutional Commission, 1993).

[37]This suggests that no matter what form the constitution takes, conditions in Uganda, both past and present, militate against classic principles of liberal democracy, with its strong emphasis on individualism and its assumption that the fundamental similarities between people will outweigh their differences. In the politics of Uganda differences have prevailed over similarities and this is likely to continue, particularly if the model of a consultative democracy should in fact come to prevail.

[38]There is no real accountability. Virtually everyone interviewed mentioned the lack of accountability. Records are improperly kept; review processes are not what they are supposed to be, etc.

[39]Among the criticisms of the present situation several may be noted: too many meetings with inconclusive results, overlapping lines of jurisdiction that blur responsibility, etc. Among the saving graces of the situation mentioned by the people we interviewed are Museveni himself, who is not only highly regarded but "stands above his cabinet (with his army at his side)," the minister of finance, who seems to be universally highly regarded and respected, as well as several of the more exceptional senior civil servants.

[40]Negative pluralism refers to any totalizing affiliation that results in the transformation of interests into principles, cleavage politics, and increasingly differentiated societies. An example of such totalizing affiliations is race. Another is religion. For discussions of pluralism in terms of India, Burma, and elsewhere in Asia see the contributions of J. S. Furnival and Edmund Leach.

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[41]This puts the subsidiarity question in terms of specific units of jurisdiction, including Buganda, more so because the *Kabaka* has made eliminating poverty the rationale for an expanded *political* role. Local development programs in Buganda are not likely to prosper without the support of the *Kabaka*'s government, but its constitutional status remains unclear.

[42]See Yoweri Museveni, "Address," in Decentralization Secretariat, *Decentralization in Uganda* (Kampala: Decentralization Secretariat, 1992), 3–4.

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Bogumil Jewsiewicki and V. Y. Mudimbe

Meeting the Challenge of Legitimacy: Post-Independence Black African and Post-Soviet European States

Only history can save us from history.[1]

—Pierre Bourdieu

INTRODUCTION

ERIC HOBSBAWM USES THE METAPHOR of the intergalactic scholar, who, when examining the documents of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, will fix on a mysterious key word: nation.[2] Hobsbawm emphasizes that the theoretical discourse of both intellectuals and the liberal bourgeoisie of the West resides above all in the equation "state equals nation equals people,"[3] recognizing that for governments the state is the central element.[4] Marxists-Leninists preferred the equation "state equals class," assuming that class will eventually absorb the nation. As much in political practice as in political discourse, it is always the state that transforms the people into citizens.[5]

Hobsbawm's equation[6] is echoed in one of the most influential of twentieth-century definitions of nation, that of Joseph Stalin, who wrote: "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community. . . ."[7] Who makes nations stable? Who is the agent of such continuity? There is not but one twentieth-century answer, the state.

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WHAT DO WE MEAN BY STATE?

The word state is so polysemous that its usage constantly leads to confusion. To clarify its meaning, Western readers in particular must be reminded that the state, an institution and a political reality that many people experienced in quite different forms during their lifetimes, implies nothing more than a claim to the monopoly of violence. Some, given their experiences, would raise questions about Max Weber's definition of the state as enjoying the right to *legitimate* violence.

The authors' parents, in their own lives, compelled to live under very different regimes, have experienced the ambiguity of state authority in the twentieth century. Mudimbe's father has known both colonial and postcolonial states, but also the secessionist Katanga state, and Mobutu's state. Jewsiewicki's father knew the czarist state, its Bolshevik successor, the independent Polish state, the fascist German state, the Polish popular democratic state, and, today, the new Polish liberal state. These two instances, like so many others, illustrate how difficult it is to speak about *the* state having a legitimate claim for the *unrestricted* use of violence. Today, in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Zaire, the former Yugoslavia, and many former Soviet republics, people act in accord with the old American "hippy" slogan, taking the state's claim to the right to unrestricted violence as a political tool to use against the state itself.

The immediate and most urgent question remains: what do we mean by the state as a political subject? The most useful answer should come from an examination of the socializing activities of the contemporary state that have an impact on all citizens and institutions, what is fashionably called "civil society." Our somewhat heretical assumption is that, more often than not, what we call civil society in a modern state is a product of the very particular circumstances attending the formation of the liberal state. This assumption inverts the common wisdom that credits the nation with state creation.[8]

Two discursive modes of thought on the genetic relationship between the state and the nation need to be distinguished. Depending on whether priority is given to the state or the nation, one speaks either about the state-nation or the nation-state. Israel and

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the United States exemplify the former; many Central and East European and black African states exemplify the latter. In the state-nation, the politics of exclusion seem historically to be more important than the politics of inclusion aimed at the assimilation of minorities.

The present Russian and Hungarian states suggest the possibility of a third category. Opting for a concept of nation that includes those who are in the diaspora, both states are potentially seeking to spread their sovereignty to wherever groups of people who claim to be part of the nation, or are claimed by the nation, happen to live. In the recent past, certain African states, such as Ghana, advanced similar claims. If one excludes annexation as a hidden purpose, it is possible to imagine a deterritorialized state, a state with undetermined and potentially unlimited borders, with citizenship defined by collective rather than individual rights.

Defining the contemporary state by its function of generalized socialization leads to a fundamental assertion: the contemporary state makes the nation. The discovery of a people, taken more as a depository than as an active agent of a specific culture, language, etc., imposes the *historical* necessity for state intervention as a socializing agent. From the nineteenth century on ethnographers and folklorists were expected to produce a political archeology for the state. In the twentieth century, the age of imperialism, the state emerged as the universal agent of internal and external colonization, legitimized by its own civilizing project.[9] Yet, like the culture of imperialism,[10] the state cannot escape the colonizing project, being itself a part of that project; the contemporary state is made by the very logic of colonization. This is the first reason why post-Independence black African and post-Soviet Central European states can be compared.

Since the beginning of this century, there has been a growing assumption that every nation coming to cultural and economic maturity deserves to be recognized as a state. It is, in fact, one of the central arguments for the independence of Quebec.[11] To create a state, an ethnic community or nationality must be discovered—as the West discovered America—and then promoted as a unique historical entity. Quebec has not been recognized by the British as a nation[12] in part because it lacks its own history; the language,

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despite being French, lacks the indigenous institutions to normalize and frame it.[13]

A people in the process of becoming a nation needs its own state to protect and promote its future. When a cultural group reaches maturity, passes from political adolescence into adulthood, its ability to secure status as a sovereign state is thought to be essential. Such a graduation into the international system is supposed to move the group from dependence into independence. The symbolic value attached not only by the newly-created state, but by the international system as well to this rite of passage is so great that the history of the group is reorganized and reformulated to take account of its new status. Even if networks are organized against a given political regime—as protection from its invading presence—the culture of politics then depends on the kind of state that is created. This was true for the successor states of former European empires such as Austria-Hungary or imperial Russia; it is equally true for the states created out of the Soviet European bloc as well as the former colonial empires in black Africa. From the nineteenth century on, a group aspiring to become a nation started with the presence of an intelligentsia able to imagine the culture, codify the language, write down its literature and history. Such an intelligentsia cannot appear without the previous presence of a contemporary, bureaucratic state, whether colonial or imperial.[14]

Not only in colonial Africa but also in Central and Eastern Europe, the intelligentsia often came from a different ethnic and cultural (national) origin than the language and culture adopted for study and promotion. For example, by the end of the nineteenth century, German intellectuals went on "culture-producing" missions to Bohemia, and, some years later, Flemish missionaries began codifying, protecting, and promoting local cultures in the Belgian Congo, dreaming about establishing ethnic states.

Since the end of World War I, in a world increasingly dominated by the United States, the international system has rested on the assumption that the nation creates the state. However, the political process reveals the opposite: new states endow nations, adjusted, adapted, and sometimes crafted to serve state interests. Not one twentieth-century Central European state escaped this process: the recrafting of Poland after World War II, moved 300

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kilometers west by the Yalta agreement, and the production of such national languages as Serbo-Croatian are well-known facts.[15] Comparable examples in black Africa are countless.

It does not matter, however, that twentieth-century nationhood, national culture, and the like are state-produced artifacts; they are hard political realities that cannot be denied. The political culture their very existence created has survived the collapse of certain states and presides over the birth of new ones. Among its most urgent tasks, the shaping of nations, cultures, and languages are primary. One cannot help but wonder what the structural logic of this political culture/state creation is.

The state sets itself up as the supreme and most rational political subject, politically self-sufficient, "inventing" both the people as its sovereign body and the nation to establish its legitimacy, claiming in the name of its nation to be the exclusive agent of history. Because the nation is thought to be the highest form of human collective existence in history, the narration of the past becomes a discourse to legitimate a relational triad: people, nation, state. The state guarantees those who have become citizens privileged, if not exclusive, access to its territory, culture, and language. Through education—in the first half of the century when political society was still overwhelmingly masculine—through the army, and today through the media (popular literature, movies, and television) the state socializes its people, disciplines them, makes them adopt codified language and a normalized culture, at the same time converting them into voters, consumers, and producers.

It is not the nation that appropriates a political institution, that endows itself with a state. Rather, it is the state, by normalizing, disciplining, and domesticating the nation and the people, that creates the illusion of continuity. What postmodernism calls the end of the great narratives is a symptom of the crises of the legitimation of the state in relation to both the nation and the people, the crises that attend individuals seeing themselves as a historical product of the triad.

None of the recent manifestations of nationalism or of ethnic irredentism, frequently absent at the moment of state creation, signify a radical refusal of the state as an institution. Rather than speaking of the crisis of the state, it may be more useful to speak of the proliferation of statism, the "statification" of identities and

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cultures. In accepting one of the latest UN peace settlements, Alija Izetbegovic affirmed that Serbian control of a portion (49 percent) of the Bosnian land is necessarily temporary because if the Bosnian state is preserved, democracy must win in the end, reunifying Bosnia-Herzegovina. The reason is simple and revealing: so long as there is a Bosnian state but not a Serbian state in Bosnia, the state cannot but seek to make it a nation.

In order to understand the formation of the contemporary state, whose principal goal is its perpetuation and reproduction, it is necessary to separate analytically three components: the institution (politics), the nation (culture), and the people (biology). The three are immersed in history, whose narrative structure is borrowed from the "first book of humanity," the Bible. Of course, contemporary states are secular, but secularization has simply universalized and democratized the Christian idea of the chosen people who deserve their own state. The international state system has made possible a universalization of the state principle, which, since the end of World War I, has increasingly dominated. If each contemporary state is presented as equal to all the others, the pressures are strong for each state to conform to the Western democratic and nationalistic model. And yet, as on Orwell's farm, some are more equal than others, and those who do not conform to the model are instantly corrected.

The first political manifestations of the contemporary nationalist state[16] occurred in the West, which has historically served as its vehicle. Nevertheless, neither the contemporary state nor nationalism is a Western property; they are simply institutions of Western origin, as are Christianity, capitalism, and modern technology. Making the West responsible for what the state is today is akin to making Jews accountable for contemporary Christianity and capitalism and, by extension, the Atlantic slave trade. With few exceptions, the configuration of contemporary states is the result of the regional restructuring of the international power structure after World Wars I and II.

Since the processes of nationalization effectively take the state as both the starting point and the destination, it may be more appropriate to speak of the "statization"[17] of people, nation, and language. In political practice, the state dresses in national clothes, which, like the fabled emperor's, exist only in the political imagi-

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nation, in the legitimizing discourse. In reality, the state is naked, except in the eyes of the nation invented by the state.

The effacement of metaphysics and the secularization of thinking accompanied the formation of the state in the West. After Kant, while the state affirmed itself as an autonomous political subject, metaphysics veered into history and indeed was mandated by history. The progressive secularization and socialization of people into citizens made history the only rational legitimation; ideology was seen as a purported scientific rationality to serve the different political and social orders. In the twentieth century, the state brings into its camp both the political and the epistemological; forging societies, reformulating peoples, inventing nations, adapting itself to a still changing field for which Michel Foucault has offered a masterful archeology.

This triumph of the state took place in the context of colonization and decolonization. Today, in the age of decolonization and de-Sovietization, globalization is replacing historicization. Both are represented as unifications of the world political field under the pressure of a force represented as the inevitable direction toward destiny, toward a better future. A genealogy of such a future is based on a tyranny of the past invented by history. By the end of the colonial period, the West did its best to endow peoples imagined as the West's own past—notably those of black Africa—with its own brand of historicity. On the foundations of the former colonial library,[18] the new political order was beginning to organize. Historicism was the organizing principle of culture in the twentieth century, the century of the worldwide spread of narration and of the nationalizing state. Is not globalization, the framework of universal decolonization in the aftermath of empires, the new epistemology?[19]

The twentieth-century state presents itself as the unique political subject, the savior of the nation, legitimizing itself through the rationalization of the past, as produced by an invented historical discourse. Today, the neoliberal reinvention of civil society[20] and of citizenship may well be an adjustment to the evolving character of the state. Nation is being replaced by civil society; the people are being replaced by the body or bodies of citizens having a contractual rather than a congenital relation to the state.

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THE INVENTION OF TIME AND STATE LEGITIMACY

> *I smell a deceit in the springtime. Intolerable machinery of the invented time.*[21]
>
> —Andrzej Stasiuk

As Ernest Renan wrote a century ago, "No doubt there is a degree of balance between social memory and history officially diffused, a certain degree of acceptance beyond which forgetfulness and historical error become counterproductive."[22] In Poland, the historical communist myth of Pilsudski as a socialist antihero has assured him the symbolic position as the nation's hero, depicted as being both anti-socialist and anti-Soviet.[23] This is a paradoxical fact, involving the quasi-sanctification by the civil society of a very controversial political personality, who was always aware that it was the state that made the modern Polish nation and not the other way around.[24] Nevertheless, it is not the simple forgetting of facts, events, and people, but the structural forgetting—the production of history sponsored by a monopolistic state—that seems to be essential for the invention of a nation; it might be better to speak of the rebirth of a nation every time it is endowed with a new state. In colonial and postcolonial Africa, as well as Soviet and post-Soviet Central Europe, new history produced a new structure of forgetting and remembering.

The postcolonial black African states and the post-Soviet Central European states can be examined in terms of the transformation of the nationalizing state, whose failure to legitimize itself led to a kind of *printemps des nations,* this century's version of the nineteenth-century *printemps des peuples.* The restructuring of states is due largely in the present decade to crises of social and ideological structures that the states did not know how to respond to, or, more frequently, did not have adequate resources to respond with. The political redefinition of nations, territories, languages, and even families and individuals common in post-Soviet Central Europe and postcolonial Africa does not signify the failure of the state as an institution, but only of individual states.

In Africa and Central Europe, state institutional forms and boundaries were arbitrarily imposed by foreign powers. The sovereignty these states enjoyed was guaranteed by the worldwide

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balance of power. For these states, internal rather than external legitimacy represented the principal challenge. Thus, as a matter of urgency, they put ahead the nationalizing process first, paradoxically conceived as an aspect of internationalization, either in the framework of pan-African or, more extensively, black identity, or in the framework of workers or an exploited class identity. Subnational identities (ethnic, regional, and the like) emerged as a powerful surrogate principle of internal competition for access to state-granted privileges, for co-optation into the state *nomenclatura.* Becoming very soon the real, if hidden and officially despised, practical principle of management of society and economy by the state, subnational identities exploded after 1989 in Central Europe.

Although Aleksander Smolar wrote about the most extreme case of subnationalism in the Polish instance, political manipulation of identity by both the state and the social forces in civil society has had very wide application. Smolar, writing about Poland, said: "How could one fight anti-Semitism when anti-Semitism had become, tragically and paradoxically, part of the protective wall raised by the nation against the pressures of the new power trying to impose on it a completely alien vision of the past, the present, and the future."[25]

It is important to keep in mind that, in the political field at least, identity cannot be a sufficient distinction if it lacks political merit, is not meaningful to significant numbers who share in the belief. In the post-World War II system, legitimate political identity seemed to be subordinated to a kind of unifying field largely structured by class and race.[26]

Black African nationalisms were expressed first as African or as black, and only then related to a specific state. In Soviet Europe, nationalisms were similarly expressed as workers'/oppressed peoples' identities. In both instances, the legitimizing discourse of history—the narration of state/party as an agency bringing about the end of history—radically reorganized social memories. Black African intellectuals and politicians simply announced that the colonial period did not matter or had never happened.[27] The case of Soviet Europe is not much different. As Tony Judt has said: "Soviet power appropriated national myths for its own ends, banned all references to uncomfortable or conflictual moments except those

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which retroactively anticipated its own arrival and enforced a new 'fraternity' upon the eastern half of Europe. But it did not just abolish the past, of course, it also reinvented it."[28]

ON STATE MONOPOLY OF THE FUTURE

The state presented itself as the agent of the future, making religious institutions and their worldview its principal competitors. In Central Europe as well as in black Africa the sharp conflict between church and state necessarily became part of the struggle, not only for the socialization of the people, but also for the control of the future. Even if Mobutu, for example, had personally remained a Catholic, he would have had to launch in Zaire one of the strongest anti-church campaigns in black Africa.

The past twenty years have demonstrated that in the short run, nothing is politically more dangerous for the state than the pretension of being able to control the future. The desire to make the future, to plan it, influenced the legitimacy not only of the leaders but of the whole political system. In citizens' eyes, the state did not escape from being responsible for the present while becoming also accountable for the future. In both black Africa and Central Europe, state legitimacy collapsed around 1989 over the issue of the future.

Today, it is clear that the first signs of exhaustion of post-Independence black African and post-Soviet states came from discursive investments made on the part of the national intelligentsia in ethical or religious fields. From the 1970s on, numerous intermediate social organizations were formed on the basis of reclaiming moral responsibility from the state, promoting moral rebirth. These were perceived in the West as the revenge of civil society. Some of the new leaders and organizations remained secular; most, however, became increasingly religious, finding in the churches an institutional base for the power struggle not so much with the state as on its behalf. The revalorization of the discourse on both collective and individual ethics—its centrality in the political reincarnation of many old regimes and personalities—is generally blurred today by the diversity of its religious and/or secular forms. Those who, in Eastern Europe or black Africa, watch attentively the situation of the former state intelligentsia, of the *nomenclatura,*

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can easily guess where the new assaults on the state will come from.

The future as a political field is created by people who did not greatly benefit from the privatization of state assets, in Zaire, Algeria, Poland, Russia, or East Germany. Some members of the former nomenclatura, conscious of the exhaustion of the former state, probably agreed to or even facilitated the privatization of state assets. By Western standards, they may be called Cartesians. Others are busy making political capital out of the crises resulting from the economic and social transformations, investing in community values, national historic missions, and the like. While today the new states limit themselves to seeking to control the past and the present, the future has not ceased to be a hot political issue. The 1989 "*refolutions*" (reform revolutions)[29] turned out to be political struggles principally about control of the past (the truth about it); the next round of political struggles for the state may well be about control of the future.

The post-revolution states do their best to manage the present through correcting the past; their political competition links the past with the future, making the state appear almost irrelevant to what are advanced as the issues of the next century. Looked at from the West, both appear to be only temporary answers to the post-authoritarian situation, made in order to avoid the more arduous task of dealing with the present as it is. Claimants for the control of the state are busy carving out something new from the dead body of the authoritarian state rather than working out new forms of political action.

FORGETTING AS A PATH TO A RADIANT FUTURE

No one offers a better explanation of the Soviet-type state relations with society than Milan Kundera. In 1967, at the Congress of Writers, Kundera warned against the state producing a cultural desert, stripped of memory and history. In one of his novels, he tells of a picture taken in the mid-1940s that kept changing as the official version of the past changed. At one point, Clementis's body is cut out and replaced with Gottwald's, but Clementis's cap remains perched on Gottwald's head. Clementis is completely removed, not only in his body but in his image as well. Such touch-

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ups were common practices in other Soviet system countries as well, but also in the post-Independence black African states.

In *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting,* Kundera quotes the historian Milan Hubel, saying that nations are first stripped of their memory, then their books and history are destroyed, and finally a new history is written to reeducate them. The struggle for mastery of the past has not been unique to Czechoslovakian politics. In Poland, the suppression of the state monopoly on history writing was part of the Gdansk agreements between the state and Solidarity. Jan Szczepanski, a highly respected Polish sociologist, wrote recently that in the Polish bureaucratic system before 1989, as the immediate consequence of its own discourse, a kind of *Potemkin village constituted the ideal model of reality.*[30] Tadeusz Lepkowski, one of the best Polish historians, has written about the pre-1989 Polish state's perception of itself: "Only the popular Poland, the true mother and not—as before—the stepmother, has suppressed all contradictions and has become a people who is at the same time the nation."[31] For another Polish intellectual, such a state cannot but infantilize its society: "...obedience, discipline and collectivism characterize contemporary Polish thought...the docile submission to the opinions of the majority and the authority—thus the acceptance of intellectual paternalism."[32]

The post-Soviet Central European states and the post-Independence black African states have essentially settled their legitimacy in the ideologically-shaped relationship between history and social memory. Uncertain, fleeting, and, above all nonscientific memories, rearranged by party-state intellectuals, have become important elements of the new past. In both colonial and postcolonial Africa social memories were standardized, normalized, codified, and disciplined, by ethnography first and by history later, to become the founding tradition of the contemporary African state. Ghana, the first twentieth-century independent African state, anachronistically borrowed the name of a kingdom both distant in time and space. As most precolonial black African states were either incorporated as part of a colonial unit that became independent, or were split between two or three such units, precolonial African history has been used to legitimize the African state.

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REMEMBERING AS IMPROVEMENT OF THE PRESENT

Following the revolutions of 1989, the pretension to control history has not disappeared, but its nature is changed. Many new states devote energy and significant internal and external resources to setting right what they consider was wrong in respect to the national past. They erase from public space and from people's memories the immediate past. In Poland, state-sponsored and promoted historical celebrations, massive changes of places and street names, especially in the cities, and the replacement of monuments have kept the administration busy for the last years. The latest of these efforts was the reburial in 1995 of the last Polish king, Stanislaw August, who died almost two hundred years ago. The previous reburial, celebrated by the second Polish Republic in 1938, reinforced the message of the futility of time, but the most recent reburial was meant to stress continuity. As Lévi-Strauss and Bourdieu remind us, the main purpose of all rituals is to reaffirm continuity. In an article published in the Winter 1992 Croatian edition of *Lettre internationale,* Dubravka Ugresic reflected on the legitimacy building of the new Croatian state; she compared it with Tito's Yugoslav state. What was considered socialist *kitsch* under Tito's state belongs today to the culture "of the heart in spice bread."[33] The Yugoslav nationalities celebrated each year the rite of the *kolo* (circle), in which the representatives of each republic danced in a circle and sang together, followed by a relay race from village to village, city to city, across the country. Their slogan, "We belong to Tito," is echoed in present-day Croatia by "We belong to Franja."[34]

The Polish sociologist Szczepanski recently warned: "It can be said that this era [popular Poland] did not exist, that it only represented in the history of the nation a 'black hole,' but these words cannot erase the big problems which originate in this period. . . .It is of course true that the years 1948–1989 were an ugly parenthesis in the history of Central and Eastern Europe; their legacy is mostly ashes, their impact mostly negative. But they did not come from nowhere, and even ashes leave their mark."[35] Jan Rubes recently wrote about the similar manipulation of history by the post-1989 Czech state.[36]

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For many intellectuals, to be stateless seems even worse than to live under a bad state; the orphan nation, one without a state, is thought to be hazardous, an artificial situation that must be corrected. How long is it possible to live in a pathological situation? Numerous writers have specialized in creating museums of the memory in the sense that literature "safeguards the national identity,"[37] and in the process they have transformed themselves into future state servants.

CONCLUSION

Post-Independence black African and post-Soviet European states' historicist epistemologies rely on the state being the agent of history, leading societies to a radiant future, bringing about the end of history. The state intelligentsia adapt the past and the present to what they imagine to be its future needs. The states that emerged from the recent *refolutions* deal with the present as the product of an abnormal past. Thus, correcting that past is perceived to be the best way to change the present.

Translated by
Kathryn Barrett-Gaines and Nadine LeMeur

ENDNOTES

[1]Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), and Pierre Bourdieu, *Raisons pratiques* (Paris: Seuil, 1994).

[2]Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[3]Ibid., 22–23.

[4]Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe, 1492–1992," *Theory and Society* 23 (1994): 131–46.

[5]If nationhood as an institutionalized cultural and political forum makes it possible to think about nationalism without the nation, modern nationalism cannot be thought of without the state, which institutionalizes nationhood. See Rogers Brubaker, "Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event," *Contention* 4 (1) (Fall 1994): 18.

[6]Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 5.

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[7]Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (London: 1936), 8.

[8]See Dominique Colas, *Le glaive et le fléau. Généalogie du fanatisme et de la société civile* (Paris: Grasset, 1993) and Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994).

[9]Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 33, in his 1991 Carr Memorial Lecture links nationalism to the switch from agrarian to industrial society.

[10]Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). See Bogumil Jewsiewicki and V.-Y. Mudimbe, "For Said. Why Even the Critic of Imperialism Labors under Western Skies," *Transition* 63 (1994): 34–50.

[11]Parti Québécois, *La souverainet; des responses vos questions* (Montreal: Service des communications du Parti Québécois, 1995).

[12]Jacques Mathieu and Jacques Lacoursière, *Les mémoires québécoises* (Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1991); Fernand Dumont, *Genèse de la société québécoise* (Montreal: Boréal, 1993).

[13]Lord Durham, quoted in Marcel-Pierre Hamel, *Le rapport Durham* (Quebec: Editions du Quebec, 1948), 86–89.

[14]It was the intelligentsia who broke down the premodern imperial separation of rulers and ruled, which is best expressed in the famous Ottoman Circle of Equity. See Lucette Valensi, *Venise et la Sublime Porte* (Paris: Hachette, 1987). The intelligentsia worked hard to replace ethnic distinctiveness as well as territorial discontinuity by a common territorial culture under a nationalizing state, legitimized by both national history and tradition. See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Michael Harzfeld, *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1982); Ernest Gellner, "The Betrayal of the Universal" and "Kemalism" in Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism,* 47–58 and 81–91; and Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "L'tatisation des sociétés et les structures d'identit collective: Afrique noire et Europe de l'Est," in Fredric Dufaux and Philippe Gervais-Lambony, eds., *Afrique noire—Europe de l'Est. Regards croiss* (Paris: Karthala, 1994), 67–78.

[15]Catherine Lutard, "Structure nationale: complexité et danger. Genèse du citoyen yougoslave," *Transitions* 35 (1) (1994): 11–54.

[16]Pierre Birnbaum, *La logique de l'État* (Paris: Fayard, 1982); for the past century analysts of industrialism, such as Friedrich List, have viewed the nation as a very recent phenomenon.

[17]Despite its clumsiness, this adjective suits us better than the formulation nation-state, since the relationship between the political unity and the cultural/historical unity is more a project than a reality.

[18]V.-Y. Mudimbe, "Culture," in Andr Huybrechts et al., *Du Congo au Zare 1960–1980* (Brussels: CRISP, 1982), 389; see also Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "The Formation of the Political Culture of Ethnicity in the Belgian Congo, 1920–1959," in Leroy Vail, ed., *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (London: James Currey, 1989), 324–49.

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[19]See James G. Carrier, ed., *Occidentalism: Images of the West* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

[20]Colas, *Le glaive,* passim, demonstrated how tenuous are relations between civil society of Western philosophy and that of today's political analysis and newspaper reports.

[21]Andrzej Stasiuk, *Mury Hebronu* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Glodnych duchow, 1992). We use invention in the sense inspired by Jean-Paul Sartre, for whom when an object is hidden from our eyes, it is necessary to invent all parts of it in order to discover it.

[22]Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" Conference faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882, *Oevres compltes* (Paris: C. Levy, 1947), t. 1, 891.

[23]Roch Little, "Le mythe de l'antihéros socialiste contre le mythe du héros antisocialiste: le débat sur Pilsudski dans l'historiographie polonaise de l'après-guerre (1945–1989)," Ph.D. dissertation, Quebec, Université Laval, 1994.

[24]Jozef Pilsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe* (Warsaw: Instytut Jozefa Pilsudskiego, 1937), t. 5, 198–206, 286–96.

[25]Aleksander Smolar, "Jews as a Polish Problem," *Dædalus* 116 (2) (Spring 1987): 70.

[26]See V.-Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1989) and V.-Y. Mudimbe, *The Idea of Africa* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1994).

[27]Bogumil Jewsiewicki and V.-Y. Mudimbe, "African's Memories and Contemporary History of Africa," in *History Making in Africa: History and Theory, Beiheft* 32 (1993): 1–11.

[28]Tony Judt, "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe," *Dædalus* 121 (4) (Fall 1992): 100. But as Charles Tilly recently wrote: "Stalin's organization of the Soviet State as a mosaic of ethnically labeled subdivisions laid the basis for Georgia's, Uzbekistan's, or Tadzhikistan's post-Soviet claims on international recognition." Mutatis mutandis it is as well the case of former Yugoslavia as of colonial empires and of almost all postcolonial states in Africa. Charles Tilly, "A Bridge Halfway: Responding to Brubaker," *Contention* 4 (1) (1994): 17.

[29]Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993), 202.

[30]Jan Szczepanski, *Uroki dworu (Rzecz o uniewalaniu)* (Krakow: Arka, 1993).

[31]Tadeusz Lepkowski, *Uparte trwanie polskosci* (London: Aneks, 1989), 48.

[32]Wlodzimierz Bolecki, *Prawdy niemile. Eseje* (Warsaw: Przedswit, 1993).

[33]Danilo Kis, *La leon d'anatomie* (Paris: Fayard, 1993); French translation of *Cas anatomije* published in Zagreb in 1983.

[34]Slavenka Drakulic, *The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 52: "...in new state of Croatia, no one is allowed to be a Croat."

[35]Szczepanski, *Uroki dworu,* 21, 23.

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[36]Jan Rubes, "Le sens de l'histoire dans la politique tchécoslovaque," *Transitions* 34 (2) (1994): 67–76.

[37]Kinga Dunin, "Literatura polska czy literatura w Polsce," *Exlibris: The Polish and East European Review of Books* 48 (1994): 1–2.

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History is not moved in a predetermined direction by a sort of Hegelian *Weltgeist* or a Marxian single cause. We ourselves are history. In passing from the abstract (history) to the concrete (ourselves) we acquire a full awareness of our responsibility—a responsibility limited by what is possible or practicable, but nonetheless a real and effective one—for the course of the world. And since my modest contribution to this inter- and multi-disciplinary symposium will be rather of an ethical nature (without, however, any overtones of moralism—I will clarify my position shortly), this *prise de conscience* of our responsibility seems a good starting point. To bring about the necessary conditions for a world order, for a just order in the world, supposes a conditioning and even an operation—in a sense akin to "surgical operation"—not only upon the future but also, in accordance with what we have said, upon the past. Reality, including, to some extent, social reality, is operable, and the natural, human, and social sciences are nothing else but the subtly constructed network of those "operations." When mathematicians speak of "mathematical operations" they do so with good reason, and we must take their expression at its literal value.

José Luis L. Aranguren

From "Openness to the World:
An Approach to World Peace"
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Göran Rosenberg

Sweden and its Immigrants: Policies versus Opinions

INTRODUCTION

WHICH COMES FIRST, POLICIES OR OPINIONS? In an ideal and crude model of democracy—one that emphasizes popular rule—opinions come first, policy follows. In a more sophisticated model, opinions and policies influence each other. In a more degenerate or exhausted form of democracy, opinions and policies disconnect. What the policy-formulating elite deems to be either necessary or good will have less and less to do with the desires of the populace.

In such a democracy tensions will increase and policies will eventually fail. This is what seems to have happened in Sweden in the case of its refugees. I say "refugees" because this has long been the only category of immigrants for which Sweden has had any policies. Traditional immigration, in which men and women enter a foreign country in search of jobs or other social or economic goods, has for all practical purposes ceased to exist in Sweden. The clash between policies and opinions—in this instance between political myth and social realities—has become a matter of great importance.

THE MYTH OF HOMOGENEITY

Sweden is generally perceived as a homogeneous society with clearly defined cultural and social values, boasting a distinctive set of national codes. This perception is largely shared by Swedes today. However, the national self-image of Sweden is a very recent

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artifact, created by an ascending national bourgeoisie in its quest for power and popular support.[1]

Sweden, in fact, is a country largely formed by migrations—before World War II by net emigration; in the postwar period by net immigration (in both instances of not inconsiderable numbers). The immigration to Sweden in 1970 was 77,000, almost 1 percent of its total population, which is comparable with immigration to the United States in the early 1900s. The ethnic and cultural differences may have been even larger in Sweden during the 1970s than in the United States in the early years of the twentieth century. Today, 10 percent of all Swedes are born abroad, a third of them in countries outside Europe.[2] (see *Table 1*)

TABLE 1. Immigrants in Sweden, 1992

	Foreign citizens	Swedish citizens	Total
Not born in Sweden (first generation)	403,695	430,837	834,532
Born in Sweden (second generation)	95,377	495,937*	591,314
Total	499,072	926,774	1,425,846 (17%)

*With at least one parent born abroad.

Source: SOD Befolkningsstatistik, 1992.

THE "ENLIGHTENED" ELITE

The postwar political "ideologies" of immigration have generally followed economic cycles: liberal in times of fast growth, restrictive in times of slow growth or decline. Until the 1960s, immigration policies in Sweden were liberal; formalities took only a day or two. At first immigration issues were decided by the local unions and employers, but soon the locus of decision-making was centralized along with labor market relations. The key issue was the balance between supply and demand in the labor market. When immigration put pressure on wages and labor conditions, the unions became more restrictive; when a shortage of labor threatened industrial development, the unions took on a more liberal attitude.

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The final turning point began in 1964 when the number of immigrants grew rapidly (netting 28,000 per year, twice as many as in the previous decade, and far more than had been anticipated by the government), and they were no longer primarily from the other Nordic countries but were from Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia). Unions became vociferous; reports focused on the social and economic problems resulting from immigration, on exploitation by cynical employers, and on the creation of a new underclass.

This led in 1966 to the first restrictions on immigration, and to a set of rules that have been in place ever since, with the demand for a pregiven *arbetstillstånd* (labor permit) at the core. In 1968, the Swedish immigration bureaucracy was in place, with restriction as its normal modus operandi. Labor immigration narrowed to a trickle. The only way for non-Nordic citizens to work in Sweden was to be officially recruited or, as it often was said, imported by the Swedish labor market authority, AMS.[3] The basic prerequisites for obtaining labor permits were a job and housing, but also the approval of the unions, which decided whether the labor market situation called for labor import, all domestic labor sources having been exhausted.

FROM IMMIGRANTS TO REFUGEES

Since 1972 labor immigration to Sweden has, for all practical purposes, ceased. From 1984 to 1992 an average of two hundred persons per year (less than 1 percent of the total number of non-Nordic immigrants) were given *uppehållstillstånd* (residence permits) for labor. The focus shifted completely from immigrants to refugees. To some extent the word refugee became synonymous with immigration.

An important consequence was the shift in emphasis from the needs of Sweden to the needs of the refugees. Refugees did not immigrate for the sake of helping Sweden; Sweden existed to help the refugees. More or less overnight the Swedish political elite redefined the role of Sweden vis-à-vis its immigrants, from an economic necessity to a moral duty. And when economic prosperity declined, refugees were redefined as an *economic* burden as well. The perceived *economic* limits to further labor immigration

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were never translated into a correspondingly limited *moral* obligation to receive refugees. Proposals and directives from the current social democratic government, with open or tacit support from its major opponents, are, in effect, attempts to legally limit the country's moral obligations by reducing the numbers and categories of refugees, introducing time-limited asylum, and emphasizing "preventive" help to refugees in "safe zones" in or near the areas of crisis.[4]

It is very important to bear in mind that Swedish immigration policies after the war were the business of a small economic and political elite. The locus of decision-making was moved from citizens, voluntary organizations, local unions, and local employers to centralized institutions, with an accordingly more centralized legislation. The fact that Sweden suddenly shifted from a labor importing country to a benevolent recipient of asylum seekers was not the result of public opinion, but of economic and political calculations, and thus was subject to change when economic and political calculations changed.

FUELING TENSIONS

A period of nervous and unpredictable immigration policies followed, tearing policies and opinions further apart and fueling tensions. Before the famous, or infamous, Luciadecision of December 13, 1989 (aimed at narrowing the definition of asylants) the dominant ideologies were formulated by the elite, and few dared to question them. After the Luciadecision, made by a social democratic government, and which effectively demonstrated the hollowness of political rhetoric, the floodgates of frustration and criticism opened. It became quite legitimate to question the reception of refugees, or at least the number of refugees Sweden should take in. For the first time, Sweden had a popular debate and the political space in which to form popular opinion. The unexpected success in the 1991 elections of the populist party *ny demokrati* owed probably much to the party's open questioning of Sweden's immigration policies.

The impact of drastic policy changes can be measured in the increased levels of cynicism and *politikerförakt* (contempt for politicians) in the political debate. In no other political sphere have words and actions seemed so far apart. The most suicidal position

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in the Swedish government today is considered to be that of the minister of immigration. Attempts to disperse responsibility for the implementation of refugee policies among various governmental boards and committees have been of little avail.

THE ELITE IDEOLOGY OF MULTICULTURALISM

The political vision underlying the elite ideology of immigration has successively changed from total assimilation to freedom of choice. One can say that the ideology of assimilation was a non-ideology, that it was the result of regarding immigration not as a political issue, but as a labor or economic issue. Terms such as "ethnic" or "minority" were scarcely used. "Freedom of choice" introduced multiculturalism, or multicultural ideals, into a country where having an accent still remains a stigma. It also tried to accommodate ethnic segregation in Sweden.

It is significant that a major factor influencing immigration and minority policies was the Swedish central trade union, *Landsorganisationen* (LO), which based its action on three main, albeit conflicting, principles: *1)* equality in conditions (implying extra resources for integration, Swedish lessons, etc.); *2)* freedom of choice (implying extra resources for supporting separate cultural identities); and *3)* cooperation (implying an ongoing dichotomy between immigrants and non-immigrants). Their practical effect was to create a heavy institutional apparatus around the issue of immigration, and to make it an integral part of social policy. Immigration, or, as it came to be called, refugee reception, became a task for *Socialsverige* (the public welfare apparatus), leaving little room for the local and private initiatives that signified refugee reception in Sweden before, during, and immediately after World War II.

Social rights and benefits were assigned only to those foreign citizens who managed to get through a lengthy screening procedure. The contradictions in policy were papered over with money. Immigrants were given both free Swedish language lessons and the right to *hemspråksundervisning* (instruction in a chosen minority language). In 1989 this right was utilized by 65,000 persons in 118 languages.

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An increasingly centralized, restrictive, and controlling attitude toward immigration was masked by a benevolent and tolerant official ideology. This ideology manifested itself in pompous and surrealistic government documents about the growing Swedish paradise of tolerance and multiculturalism.[5] The final report of *Diskrimineringsutredningen*[6] has the title *I rätt riktning* (*In the Right Direction*) and describes a continuing improvement in relations between the majority population and ethnic minorities. However, surveys by Charles Westin at Stockholm University give little basis for such a conclusion. Figures show a rather constant reluctance to receive "too many" foreigners among 45–50 percent of the population, with data going back to 1969.[7]

THE PRACTICES OF ELITE IDEOLOGY

The practical manifestations of Swedish immigration policies were, I would argue, the result of an extremely centralized, top-down policy-making procedure. For a long time the issue was not part of the public debate; to even discuss minor details was taboo.

The fact remains that the elite ideology shunned public opinion and shunned the task of reconciling political and moral commitments with economic realities. Instead of being confronted, the issue and the political choices were swept under the carpet.

The stories that came out in the press fueled the public's suspicion. These were stories about how a few people had made a lot of money on housing for refugees, about extremely bureaucratic procedures at *Invandrarverket,* or about excessive social spending. The stories also revealed an increased insensitivity regarding individual refugees, i.e., separating children from close relatives, throwing people out after two or three years of investigation, forcing thousands of refugees into hiding. The political randomness in the process was easy to detect and to exploit journalistically.

Local communities were offered compensation for taking in a certain number of refugees. Responsibility and local administration rested with the central immigration authority. Refugees came as clients of the state, not as guests of the local community, which saw an opportunity to fill empty public housing, not to foster new local citizens. The fact that residence often was temporary contributed to this attitude. Refugees were not allowed to support them-

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selves during the waiting period (this has recently changed such that refugees are now almost obligated to work to "pay" for social benefits).

There have been cases where initiatives to mobilize local church and non-profit organizations to handle refugee reception were fought by *Invandrarverket* with such arguments as "we need to employ our personnel first" or "we need to use our own facilities." A year ago, in Finspång, six organizations, among them three church communities, managed to get a contract with *Invandrarverket,* thereby mobilizing the local community in new ways and reducing costs and social tensions. But *Invandrarverket* saw its position threatened and decided to terminate the contract. New legislation has since made this kind of external bidding mandatory. What we see is the forcing of an alliance between the state and the immigrants, the formation of a category of specially protected people.

It became increasingly obvious that the political moral of the elite ideology was regularly adjusted to the refugee situation of the day. When the threat of Kosovo Albanians immigrating to Sweden became real, the situation in Kosovo was determined to be tolerable and the Kosovo Albanians were more or less collectively denied refugee status. The numerous refugees from Bosnia, on the other hand, were given special treatment; the thirty to forty thousand Bosnians already in Sweden were handed an instant permit of residence, while those outside were burdened with a visa requirement, which effectively denied them refugee status. To what extent has this system created or exacerbated the unavoidable tensions in the Swedish society? The situation in Gimo provides an illustrative example.

GIMO

A year ago, five hundred refugees, or asylants, from a number of mostly non-European countries were placed in the industrial village of Gimo (population 3,000) in northern Uppland. The village, tiny by any standard, had serious problems: dependence on a large industrial employer, a refugee camp, and a central state agency office that was staffed only in the daytime. At night the only link between the camp and the authorities was a direct telephone line to a security firm located 50 kilometers away. The

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assumption seemed to be that it was quite normal to place five hundred foreign persons, foreign even to each other, in a village of three thousand people. To the local government it meant filling empty apartments and finding jobs for unemployed preschool teachers. No other arrangements with the population were deemed necessary.

Suddenly, Gimo became a headline in the evening news, branded as a hotbed for racism. What the news programs did not tell was the background story, nor did they distinguish between normal social tensions and fears and blatant racism. Those in Gimo who expressed a desire to help the refugees were portrayed as ignorant fools. In the March issue of *Moderna Tider,* Maciej Zaremba pointed at the corrosive role that was played by *Invandrarverket,* that more and more was perceived as an intrusion from above, disregarding or neglecting the needs of the community.[8]

One argument for having strong central policies is the basic lack of local support for immigration. Tolerance has to be imposed from above. People who argue that local referendums in general are a tool of democracy will argue for an exception when it comes to issues of immigration. When Sjöbo, in southern Sweden, refused to accept refugees it caused a political storm. But the real issue was never discussed, namely the gap between official ideology and popular sentiment. Sjöbo was portrayed as an extremist village. Legitimate popular fears of social and economic disruptions were transformed into flagrant racism.

The surveys by Anders Lange and Charles Westin show a significant increase in social and economic resentment and fear, but not in racist attitudes: "In summary, our data do not lend support to the hypothesis that xenophobia is on the rise in popular opinion. They give even less support to the suggestion that we face a strong surge in racist ideas in the Swedish society. There is, however, quite clearly an increased dissatisfaction with immigration policies and, ultimately, with immigration."[9]

COULD IT HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY?

I do not know whether it could have been done differently. I do believe, however, that the centralization, bureaucratization, and professionalization of immigration policies in Sweden have re-

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duced opportunities for social integration, and that the lack of frankness in promoting various policies and the insistence on an elite ideology have been damaging in the long run. How could anyone expect large numbers of refugees to be absorbed without anyone noticing, or without any social and economic consequences?

To say that this twisting of normal migration between countries into a refugee issue has caused confusion is not to say that confusion could have been avoided. The impact of immigration on the Swedish society is a real and serious one. It transforms a culturally (but not ethnically) homogenous society into something different. It creates a new ethnic underclass, ethnic ghettos, and new patterns of social and asocial behavior.

BUILDING OPINIONS, NOT OVERRIDING THEM

Strengthening local social structures and creating room for local initiatives and responsibilities must form an important part of any immigration policy that wishes to build opinions, not to override them. This in turn demands a self-confident society, knowing more or less where it stands and where it is heading. No immigration policy in the world could be a substitute for that ingredient, not in Sweden, nor anywhere else.

ENDNOTES

[1]Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 1993). Eriksen analyzes Norway, but the discussion is relevant to Sweden as well.

[2]Christer Lundh and Rolf Ohlsson, *Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktinginvandring* (Sweden: SNS Förlag, 1994), 8–9.

[3]Ibid., 32. Recruiting offices were established in Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1966 and 1967.

[4]Government directives to the parliamentary committee for the review of immigration and refugee policies, *Kommittédirektiv* (1994): 129, 130.

[5]Mauricio Rojas, *I ensamhetens labyrint* (Stockholm: Brombergs, 1993).

[6]Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU), *Invandrar-och minoritetspolitiken* (Stockholm: Liber, 1984), 58.

[7]Rojas, *I ensamhetens labyrint,* 49–51.

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[8]Maciej Zaremba, "Rivningen av Gimo," *Moderna Tider* (40) (February 1994).

[9]Anders Lange and Charles Westin, *Den mångtydiga toleransen, förhållningssätt till invandring och invandrare,* Centrum för invandringsforskning, University of Stockholm, 1993.

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John de la Mothe and Paul R. Dufour

Techno-Globalism and the Challenges to Science and Technology Policy

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the character of both the world economy and the world order has changed. Science and technology have become deeply implicated in the move towards an increasingly "globalized," open, and knowledge-based economy. In so doing, they have continued an ascendancy that began over four decades ago.[1]

There is little dispute over the import of science and technology in shaping the competitiveness of firms and the wealth of nations. There is widespread agreement that both will be critical to our understanding of emerging security and transboundary environmental issues. However, these economic and geopolitical changes are creating a context that is fast-paced, deeply interactive, and interdependent, and thus are making many traditional policy responses—and assumptions—inadequate.[2] Science and technology policy is under increasing pressure to organize, manage, and direct an ever expanding and complex enterprise.[3]

This essay outlines some of these more important shifts and suggests some considerations for the future of science and technology policy.

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EMERGING CHALLENGES

Science and technology policy is a practical activity concerned with developing, managing, and supporting the capabilities of countries to advance and apply knowledge. The dynamics of how best to do this are vexing. By the mid-1960s, this policy arena was considered to be a legitimate concern for governments,[4] and during the postwar period, the relationship between science and the state became ever closer. Publicly-funded research budgets expanded rapidly in the widespread belief that the same approach to scientific research that had delivered nuclear weapons, antibiotics, and jet aircraft would advance other national interests. In international relations, a healthy science system was seen as a hallmark of national prestige and cultural achievement. Encouraged by such statements as Vannevar Bush's *Science: The Endless Frontier*[5] and Harold Wilson's speech on the "White Heat of Technological Revolution,"[6] an extensive research infrastructure was built for the advancement of knowledge and the protection of the public interest. This ranged from the development of well-funded and well-equipped university systems, government laboratories, and other technical institutes to the creation of such agencies as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the British Atomic Energy Authority.

This expansion was common in a great number of countries. In Canada, Australia, and Great Britain, for example, the number of universities, polytechnics, and colleges grew rapidly; in Switzerland, international facilities for physics and energy research, like the Centre Européen de Récherche Nucléaire (CERN), were thought to be model agencies, soon to be replicated elsewhere; in France, its *grands projets* strategy for dealing with energy, nuclear power, and transportation was developed. Public expenditures on science and technology grew enormously; they now exceed $150 billion annually. The Group of Seven (G7) nations now employ more than three million professionally-trained scientists and engineers. The scientific communities publish more than twenty thousand scientific papers daily, and the number of authors per paper is growing. These multi-authored papers reflect the rise of research teams—not individuals—as the norm; new kinds of collaboration

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between institutes, disciplines, and nations are increasingly common. The concomitant rise of very expensive, collaborative, mega-science proposals to governments (outside the normal framework of research council applications) increased, particularly since the late 1980s. These, ranging from centralized facilities like the Sudbury Neutrino Observatory to distributed research platforms like the geophysics program of Lithoprobe and shared facilities such as the Canada-France telescope in Hawaii, suggest how various these institutions can be. New science and technology-based industries—from electronics, telecommunications, and aeronautics to biopharmaceuticals—provide a vast number of jobs and are regarded by many to be the backbone of economic growth. The system that delivered these benefits focused on institution building, individual researchers, disciplinary research, and research grants. But, as Nathan Rosenberg has intimated, the linear model of innovation that science and technology policy has long assumed—which saw the links between research and growth as a relay race where participants pass the baton from one to the other—is "dead, but it won't lie down."[7]

Today's challenges to science and technology policy are formidable and stem from a number of shifts both in the nature of the research enterprise and in the nature of its socioeconomic context. These can be sketched briefly: *1)* The nature of science is changing: Science is growing at an increased pace; the "line" between science and technology has become blurred; and scientific and technological research is becoming transdisciplinary, increasingly transnational, and team-based. *2)* The nature of economic activity is changing: Science and technology are becoming increasingly relevant in such areas as trade, investment, foreign relations, and regional development, as well as in a host of social and environmental areas. *3)* The management of science and technology is changing: The costs of doing scientific and technological research are growing; governments are trying to reorganize their research funding, evaluation, and foresight activities in order to position themselves competitively and to anticipate impacts; and governments are being forced to downsize public expenditures on higher education and science and technology while maintaining the enterprise's public prestige. The consequences of these shifts for

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the practice of science and technology policy are serious and must be considered.

THE SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY-ECONOMY NEXUS

Many policy analysts and politicians today equate science and technology with innovation. However, innovation is a complex activity in which science and technology are only partial inputs. As Joseph Schumpeter noted long ago, innovation—upon which economic growth depends—cannot only be found in research and development (R&D). It can also, and more importantly, be found in the development of new products and new industrial processes (both of which may involve formal research) and in the search for new raw materials or new markets. And it can include social reorganization in the ways in which firms arrange their research, development, design, production, management, and marketing functions. These are principally the domain of private firms, but public policy can influence innovation through the provision of a stable macroeconomic environment through tax regimes, monetary policy, trade policy, regulatory frameworks and standards, and intellectual property rights. Understanding how each of these affects a nation's scientific, technological, and educational capabilities is in any government's best interest.

The boundaries between science and technology policy and the more traditional economic, industrial, trade, and foreign policies are shifting. Indeed, throughout the 1980s, the term "industrial policy" was something of a taboo in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. The idea of government intervention in the economy seemed, at the time, to be anathema to healthy, sustainable economic growth. But, as Sylvia Ostry and Richard Nelson have recently noted,

> many influential people continue to argue that government should not be supporting the development of technology, but that this should be left up to business alone. However...high technology industries have, from their beginnings, been complex structures in which public institutions such as universities and private for-profit ones such as business firms have interacted....[8]

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This is a fundamental point. High technology industries in North America, Europe, and Asia have developed *because of* government involvement. The style and extent of involvement have varied, but government-business-university interaction has always played a critical role.

In a sense, then, governments have been instrumental in shifting the industrial profiles of countries away from low knowledge or low value-added occupations, and in so doing have helped improve standards of living. Moreover, government sponsorship of research, training, and education has been a major boon to the development of new jobs and industries.[9]

In the so-called "new growth theory" or "strategic trade theory," these factors are central. Innovation and the science-technology-economy nexus are broken down into their constituent parts: the "black box" of technical change is seen as a series of dynamic processes that rely on both institutions (firms, universities, government departments) and knowledge. Analysts have been able to explain the innovative behavior of firms and regions by pointing to the combination of organizational histories and routines, the available know-how, research, and skill sets, and the cultural and financial qualities offered by the local environments.[10]

It is now widely accepted that any national science and technology policy must follow from the premise that firms—not governments—create wealth through science and technology. It is also acknowledged that public investments in science and technology have an indirect effect on economic development. These basic parameters apply across all countries, but the manner in which they are translated into policies and programs is mitigated by the organizational structures that exist within each country.[11]

NATIONAL SYSTEMS, DIFFERENCES, AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Science and technology infrastructures and policies differ across countries and regions.[12] These differences, which Henry Ergas has defined as being either "mission oriented" or "diffusion oriented,"[13] form the basis of competition and comparative advantage. Until recently, for example, countries like the United States, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and France spent a considerable amount of their R&D dollars on military, space, and energy missions whereas

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countries like the Netherlands, Japan, and Canada focused their efforts on technology diffusion and knowledge transfer.

The different approaches taken by countries can also be discussed in terms of "supply and demand."[14] In this formulation, "supply" is concerned with the provision of new ideas, new skills, and trained personnel. The "demand side" is more focused on getting new ideas, research results, and technologies into practice. Which approach a country will take is based on its national capabilities and resources. Italy, for example, is a member of the G7 but it does not have the resources necessary to match Germany, Japan, or the United States in science and technology. It therefore follows an "adopt and adapt" strategy, which promotes flows of foreign technologies into the country while ensuring research exchanges with (in particular) Europe and the United States. It also ensures that its membership in geopolitical "clubs" allows access to new knowledge and technologies.

A third way of classifying approaches is to group nations according to their science and technology expenditures. Thus, if one were to take R&D expenditures as being synonymous with technological advance, there would clearly be six leaders: the United States, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and Israel. The first three countries have industry-financed R&D output ratios of around 1.8 percent and gross expenditures on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) of more than 2.5 percent. The leading group is followed by Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Canada. Such taxonomies work well as a first approximation, but they can be misleading when questions of efficiency and quality arise.

A fourth, and more promising, framework, the "national system of innovation" (NSI), has recently emerged from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the work of B. A. Lundvall.[15] It deals not with aggregate expenditures but with the interactions between organizations (user-producer linkages), networking, and the role of various institutions (government agencies, universities, and financial institutions). In this framework governments are seen as "guiding" or "framework institutions" while universities are seen as training grounds and custodians of scientific knowledge. The policy and strategy goal of an NSI is to produce scientific and technological knowledge within na-

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tional borders for consumption and the construction of competitive advantage. In this scheme, the majority of innovating units are corporations, but governments provide R&D funds, promote the training of scientific and technical personnel through research grants and scholarships, foster the development of "smart infrastructure" (i.e., the information superhighway), negotiate the international "rules of the game" (vis-à-vis national security, transboundary environmental conventions, trade, intellectual property rights, and antitrust laws), and articulate national goals. The quality and quantity of these inputs decisively determines the characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses of an NSI.[16]

The debates surrounding science and technology policy—like those concerning economic growth—have typically focused on a select "club" of NSIs: advanced nations that have been shaped largely by the experiences of the Cold War. However, with the end of a bipolar world, the relative decline of American hegemony,[17] and the rapid rise in the number of nation-states, there are several factors besides economic performance that make size an important limiting factor in the scientific and technological strength of countries.

Small countries tend to have limited domestic markets. This means that firms in small countries must export to foreign markets in order to gain economies of scale. They may also be heavily influenced in terms of trade or procurement policy by being in close proximity to a major power: the United States in the case of Canada; Germany in the case of Austria; or the former Soviet Union in the case of Sweden. Increasingly, they also need to justify heavy expenditures on R&D, for "as technology increases the sophistication of products and processes, so the scientific, technological and industrial resources and skills development become more costly and complex."[18]

Small countries tend to have less money, proportionally, to spend on R&D. They also have fewer research personnel per capita, and there is a considerable tendency for researchers from small countries to emigrate. Moreover, small countries have problems in concentrating R&D efforts. They need to fund across the full spectrum of scientific, engineering, and technological research for educational purposes and in order to be as open as possible to new developments, but in so doing they often fail to define their

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own technological niche areas, buying into, or falling behind, the research agendas of larger countries. As a result, technologically advanced small countries generally adopt a specialization strategy. They tend to seek market niches, while the industries they support are those in which they already have strong multitechnology corporations. (In the case of Canada, for example, these would include Bell Northern Research, Northern Telecom, and Alcan.) Thus, while there may be a consensus across a wide number of countries on the importance of investing in science and technology, and while the major problems of organizing a "knowledge infrastructure" may be quite similar across the more advanced nations, policies may in fact be quite different.

As small, open economies begin to organize themselves or collectively join various science and technology "clubs," their power to set market and research agendas rises. This is particularly notable in the case of the nonadvanced small economies as they join a "race" to find strategic cooperation partners, attract foreign investment, and emulate the patterns of other countries to develop core technologies: The new science and technology agenda of the Organization of American States (OAS) involves cooperation between Latin America, Canada, and the United States; Israel and its neighbors are engaged in joint technology transfer programs to strengthen the research infrastructure of the region;[19] and post-apartheid South Africa has moved toward establishing researcher exchange programs with Canada and the Netherlands.

New world economic divisions are also emerging. As the European Commission warned in November 1994, these are different from the traditional East/West and North/South splits with which we have lived for four decades. Now nations are divided between those that are "catching up" and those that are gradually being excluded.

The general impression that there is a process of "catching up" is broadly confirmed by science and technology indicators. If one examines the GERD/GDP ratios of countries in the period from 1981 to 1993, one finds a convergence of R&D intensity among the European Union (EU), the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries, and Japan. And, taking as a measure the scientific output in peer-reviewed journals over the same period, there is a

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stabilization taking place across fields. There has been a dramatic increase in the world share of publications produced by Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China, although their impact is still low. Each of these countries has essentially gone from zero representation in world scientific publishing to between 1 and 4 percent of the world total, beginning to rival the output of countries like Australia and Canada. What these indicators show is that in key areas of research—namely computing, engineering, mathematics, biochemistry, and material science (i.e., areas upon which critical technologies and competitive advantages are built)—these nontraditional players are deliberately and successfully constructing a credible research base.[20]

The excluded group is comprised of some one hundred nations, mostly in Africa and South America, and represents less than 1 percent of the world scientific publications, R&D expenditures, and patents. It also contains about 30 percent of the world's population. With this minimal level of involvement in the creation of scientific and technological knowledge, the prospects for economic growth are low.

A third group of countries exists within the penumbra of the excluded countries. These are small nations that have had the beginnings of a sophisticated research infrastructure but unfortunately are in the process of "moving backwards," much to the consternation of their researchers. For example, in Ethiopia six years ago, researchers at Addis Ababa University had access to twelve hundred journals, but the elimination of the foreign currency budget in 1989 forced the library to cancel 90 percent of its subscriptions. Library shelves now stand bare, and research instruments are aging rapidly.

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND TECHNO-GLOBALISM

International trade has been one of the main engines of economic growth in the postwar period. With the liberalization of trade, world trade flows increased by more than 500 percent between 1950 and 1975. This compares to an increase in world output of only 200 percent. Outpacing output growth as well were expenditures on R&D, which in 1993 reached $380 billion annually. However, more recently something of a reversal has occurred.

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Research and development spending has flattened and investment flows have taken over from trade as a prime mover for economic growth. International investment flows now regularly top $900 billion daily. In the process, technology and production flows have seen a remarkable growth. This new internationalization has been called "techno-globalism."[21]

Graham Vickery and Claudio Casadio of the OECD have noted that the internationalization of R&D, knowledge production, and technology is part of a much wider trend towards industrial and economic integration.[22] Because technological advantages are major components of the international strategies of firms and nations, it should not be surprising that "there are likely to be differences between the international distribution of R&D capabilities, and the pattern of commercialization, application, and use of the results of technological advance."

High technology industries accounted for 16 percent of OECD total manufacturing exports in 1970; in 1992 this figure rose to 24 percent. Within this group, there has been a considerable redistribution of export market shares, especially between the United States and Japan. Exports of medium technology industries remained constant in the 1970–1990 period, accounting for 43 percent of total manufacturing. Within this group, the United States and Japan experienced the largest changes in shares of motor vehicle exports, with the US share falling from over 18 percent in 1970 to under 11 percent in 1990 while Japan's share nearly tripled to 22 percent. Low technology exports constitute a shrinking portion of the total OECD manufacturing exports, falling to 30 percent in 1992. The US share of the total has remained stable at about 11 percent, while Japan's has fallen to 6 percent, and the European countries moderately increased their shares.[23] The shift in knowledge production can also be seen in the activities of nontraditional players. Though starting from a very low base, growth rates in high technology exports from the Philippines, Venezuela, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia have all risen in value by more than 130 percent since 1986. China, over the same period, has achieved a growth rate of 1,700 percent.

The internationalization of production over the last three decades has led to a global diffusion of technologies and "best practice" production techniques. But as firms have placed produc-

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tion facilities abroad, so too have they moved engineering, maintenance, and R&D facilities. Important differences can exist between home user and foreign user requirements: foreign regulations, standards, and procurement specifications can vary, as well as local customs and tastes. These factors have led many multinational firms to become involved in offshore R&D and technical design. Canada, the United States, France, and Japan have the highest distribution of foreign industrial laboratories; the number of Japanese R&D facilities in Europe has risen from 77 in 1990 to 250 in 1994.

International technology transfer among the more advanced economies is on the increase, and, since the 1970s, trade in high technology goods and services has increased dramatically, diffusing technologies throughout developing and newly-industrializing countries. The flow of researchers between countries has also increased markedly. Traditionally, this has been the most important mechanism of international technology transfer: skills move with people.

Today, knowledge crosses borders in the form of patents, published articles, blueprints, and manuals. In addition, advances in telecommunications have made it uneconomic to move people when information can be transported electronically. Nonetheless, an important part of knowledge and knowledge transfer is tacit (in the form of memory, experience, etc.) and therefore cannot be easily accessed or learned except through direct contact.

Science and technology also crosses borders through international technical alliances, strategic alliances, and joint ventures between multinational firms. The 1991 R&D collaboration between Motorola (US) and Northern Telecom to develop interfaces and compatibilities between Motorola's cellular telephones and Northern Telecom's central switching systems is one example. The 1992 research agreement between IBM, Siemens, and Toshiba to create a new generation of memory chips is another. In information technologies, biotechnologies, and new materials, US-Japan agreements and US-Europe agreements represent approximately 40 percent of all alliances.

Disputes between nations over unfair subsidization and protectionism are destined to increase around technology and research-related questions.[24] As a result, countries will shift their concep-

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tions of national security away from military concerns and towards economic interests. As technology and trade become increasingly tied, and as the number of nations increases, pressures will continue to mount on the abilities of the diplomatic corps of nations—particularly science attachés and trade commissioners—to anticipate and evaluate such issues.

WHAT DOES TECHNO-GLOBALISM MEAN FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY?

In recent years debates about science and technology within the OECD countries that had been building since the 1960s were brought to a head.[25] In 1992, all candidates for the American presidency called attention to the profound changes that were taking place in the spheres of the economy, security, and the environment, and made particular reference to the interdependencies that were emerging between nations. In February 1993, the Clinton administration issued a technology policy that focused on industrial technology development and world markets. In May of that year, the British government published *Realizing Our Potential,* a white paper that called for national priority setting in science and technology and the establishment of a Foresight Steering Committee. In June 1993 the Dutch government released its policy statement on the issue, entitled *Competing with Technology.* In 1994, the Canadian government announced a major science and technology review that would look at duplication, coordination, and changing institutional mandates within its science-based departments and national laboratories, and at the views and priorities of the Canadian public and its industrial leadership. In 1995, the Australian government followed suit, releasing a series of reports from the Office of the Chief Scientist on national goals and priority setting in science and technology as well as on the future national requirements for science and technology. The issue of science and technology has clearly gained government attention. Policy statements, governmental reorganizations of their science systems and their science advisory apparatus, and extensive public scrutiny of expenditures all point to the fact that something of a consensus has been reached on the importance of science and technology. This recognition no longer centers around culture and

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prestige, but now almost uniformly focuses on wealth creation, social development, and environmental protection.

The principal concern throughout the OECD is with budgets. As one veteran of Washington politics put it, "the budget is policy."[26] This is a "hard realist's" perspective, but after two decades of almost unbridled growth budgets are being constrained. In Canada, an estimated $650 million is being cut from the science and technology budget in 1995/1996. In Europe, science and technology budgets are being heavily constrained as governments seek to reduce public deficits and public spending. The cancellation of the Super Conducting Supercollider (SSC) in the United States and the repeated redesigns of the International Space Station "Alpha" are both visible examples of these pressures.

Harvey Brooks has pointed out that no one speaks of priority setting and evaluation when funds are plentiful. But today's period of fiscal restraint is forcing governments to justify expenditures, evaluate critically between competing proposals and research areas, and identify technology areas that are critical or strategic to the nation's interests and industrial strengths. This process has led many nations to leverage funds from nonpublic sources through university-industry programs, the design of research consortia, networks and "centers of excellence," matching industry contributions to university research, the promotion of international cooperation between researchers, and so on. It has also led to the criteria of utility and industrial application taking a stronger position over scientific merit, and it has forced governments to factor in the intentions of foreign governments to participate in projects before deciding whether to fund mega-science proposals. All of this has shifted the nature of research activity.[27]

Over the past decade, there has been a convergence by governments on the distribution of funds across broad socioeconomic objectives. These include a decrease in the share of public funds allocated to energy and defense research, a strengthening of the objectives of social welfare (including health, education, and the environment), and a commitment to strengthening the science base. But in the process, the nature of science and technology policy has been altered as well.

Decision-making processes have become focused on short-term, "value for money" concerns. Some governments have reduced

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science and technology expenditures across the board so that the onus is now on science-based departments, national laboratories, and universities to "do more with less." Still other debates are concerned with whether the social sciences should be funded with public monies or whether technology foresight and technology assessment capabilities are worthwhile activities.

There are also indications that governments are increasingly willing to look at the social effects of research and development. This will not be confined to issues of biodiversity or climate change but, because of the expanding sites of knowledge production, will involve consultation with citizen groups and international organizations. To some degree, this has been more a feature of the American system than of others. The US National Science and Technology Council, for example, has noted in its 1995 international science and technology strategic planning document that such issues as population stabilization, food security and nutrition, and challenges of (re-)emerging infectious diseases will require considerable international effort in the coming years.

Science and technology policy will be improved by augmenting the advisory structures of governments.[28] This is partly because a plurality of institutions tends to strengthen democratic decision-making. But it is also because as science and technology become increasingly implicated in a vast array of issues broad-based advice will increasingly be required.

CONCLUSIONS

The challenges and pressures facing science and technology policy today cover a complex range of factors that both international research communities and national governments will have to face in the decades ahead. They are at the heart of international trade relations, foreign policy, economic strategy, and social interests. Despite the best efforts by such institutions as the EU, the OECD, and the NSF, the data that is available to measure science performance, technology developments, and innovation are thin. Yet their collection and analysis needs to be supported.

There may be a danger as well that too much science policy can be counterproductive.[29] The growing policy convergence among countries and the desire to "do more with less" may actually

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impede the performance of the research system. But the need for technology assessment, research evaluation, and science and technology foresight activities will only increase as knowledge-based activities continue to become central to public policy concerns, and as policymakers require a more articulate appreciation of the complex linkages, dynamics, and impacts that are brought on by research systems. These activities also need to be supported.

Broad consensus is emerging across governments on the importance of science and technology; national and public debates regarding science and technology are common and frequent. Governments are seeking ways to set priorities and adapt to change without damaging the research enterprise. And the challenges of techno-globalism will increasingly bring the need for cooperation, collaboration, and a recognition of interdependence.

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ENDNOTES

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What forms can the materially-good life take in a world of automated industry, mechanized agriculture, great mobility of individuals, and widely dispersed supplies of energy? There is need for great creative thinking in the domain which is becoming known as "the science of human settlements," or "ekistics," which is concerned with such questions as the organization of cities, complexes of towns and villages, roads, railways, and other communication networks, different types of land utilization, and so on. Again, mankind will have to think out afresh the kinds of economic systems which will work effectively in a world from which the burden of heavy, time-consuming routine work has been removed. The underdeveloped nations approach these problems from the starting-point of conditions which differ from those of the affluent countries; but all societies face the same challenge to their ability to create a new type of society. In respect to the past and the present, the various societies of mankind differ widely, and in those differences there is scarcely any basis for a stable world order. It is in respect to the future that all men are equal; and it is only by concentrating their attention on the material future that mankind can discover a community of interest which could serve as an adequate basis for a world order.

C. H. Waddington

From "The Desire for Material Progress as a World Ordering System"
Dædalus 95 (2) (Spring 1966)

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